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
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EMILIUS AND SOPHIA.

VOL. II.

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VOL. II.

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EMILIUS AND SOPHIA;

OR,

A NEW SYSTEM

OF

EDUCATION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF

Mr. J.^an J.^acques ROUSSEAU,

CITIZEN OF GENEVA.

BY THE TRANSLATOR OF *ELOISA.*

VOL. II.

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EMILIUS;

OR,

A NEW SYSTEM

OF

EDUCATION.

BOOK III.

ALTHOUGH a child, till he arrive at the age of puberty, be in a conſtant ſtate of imbecility and weakneſs, there is a certain period in this ſtage of life, at which the progreſs of his paſſions being greater than that of his neceſſities, the growing animal, though abſolutely weak, becomes relatively ſtrong. His wants not having all diſplayed themſelves, his actual powers are more than capable to provide for thoſe of which he is ſenſible. Conſidered as a man, he is undoubtedly weak; but as a child he is more than ſufficiently ſtrong.

Hence we ſee proceeds the weakneſs of man, that is from the diſproportion ariſing between

his faculties and his deſires. It is our paſſions that render us feeble; becauſe to gratify them, requires greater powers than nature has furniſhed us with. Diminiſh, then, the number, check the extravagance, of your deſires, and you increaſe your powers of gratification. He who can compaſs more than he requires, hath ability to ſpare; and is certainly a powerful being.

At this period commences the third ſtage of infancy, of which I am now about to treat; it being that ſtate of childhood which approaches nearly to puberty without being quite arrived at that term.

At the age of twelve or thirteen, the powers and faculties of a child make a ſpeedier progreſs than his deſires, and diſplay themſelves in greater proportion than his wants. The moſt impetuous, the moſt coercive of all phyſical neceſſities he hath not yet experienced. The very organs that provide for its gratification are as yet imperfect, and ſeem to wait the exertion of the will to capacitate them for action. Unaffected by the inclemency of the weather or the change of ſeaſons, his natural heat ſupplies the artificial warmth of apparel, and his keenneſs of appetite the provocatives of ſauce. At his age whatever is but nouriſhing is good; if he be drowſy, he ſtretches himſelf on the ground and falls aſleep. Whatever he hath occaſion for is within his reach; he craves not after imaginary dainties; he feels

no diſguſt from prepoſſeſſion. His deſires confined within the ſphere of his abilities, he is not only capable of providing for himſelf, but poſſeſſes ſuperfluous faculties for which he has no uſe. This, however, is the only time during life, in which he will be in ſuch a ſituation.

It will poſſibly be objected that, though I have not ſuppoſed the wants of my child fewer than they really are, yet that I attribute to him too great a power of ſatisfying them. It ſhould always be remembered, however, that I am ſpeaking particularly of my own pupil, and not of thoſe enervated puppets, who make it a journey to waddle out of one room into another; who gaſp for breath in ſtrait-laced ſtays, or labour under a load of whalebone or buckram. It may be ſaid that manly abilities are diſplayed only in a ſtate of manhood; that the animal ſpirits, duely prepared and diſtributed in their proper channels through the whole body, are only capable to give that conſiſtence, activity, tone, and elaſticity to the muſcles which conſtitute real ſtrength. Such, indeed, is the philoſophy of the cloſet; but I appeal to experience. I ſee ſturdy boys daily employed in the fields about the moſt laborious parts of huſbandry; ſo that they might be taken for grown men, if their voices did not betray them. Even in our cities we ſee the young artiſans frequently as robuſt as their maſters, and equally expert for the time they have ſerved. If there be any difference in their capacity and abilities,

and I confeſs there is ſome, it is much leſs, I ſay again, than that between the impetuous deſires of a man and the confined inclinations of a child. For, it is to be obſerved, we are not here ſpeaking of mere corporeal abilities: but more particularly of thoſe mental faculties and talents, by which the former are directed and ſupplied. This interval, in which the individual is able to effect more than he requires, though it be not the period of his greateſt abſolute ſtrength, is, as I before obſerved, that of his greateſt relative ability. This interval contains the moſt precious moments of his life; moments never to return, few, and tranſitory; hence the more precious, as to employ them well becomes of the greater importance.

To what uſe, then, is it proper a child ſhould put that redundancy of abilities, of which he is at preſent poſſeſſed, and hereafter will ſtand in need of? He ſhould employ it on thoſe things which may be of utility in time to come. He ſhould throw, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, the ſuperfluity of his preſent being into his future exiſtence. The robuſt child ſhould provide for the ſubſiſtence of the feeble man; not in laying up his treaſure in coffers whence thieves may ſteal, nor by entruſting it in the hands of others; but by keeping it in his own. To appropriate his acquiſitions to himſelf he will ſecure them in the ſtrength and dexterity of his own arms, and in the capacity of his own head. This, therefore, is the time for employment, for inſtruction

ſtruction, for ſtudy. Obſerve alſo, that I have not arbitrarily fixed on this period for that purpoſe: nature itſelf plainly points it out to us.

So circumſcribed is human intelligence, that we are not only denied the power of attaining univerſal knowledge, but it is impoſſible even to know perfectly the little that is attained by others. As the reverſe of every falſe propoſition is true, the ſource of truth muſt be as inexhauſtible as that of error. A proper choice, therefore, ſhould be made of the ſubjects, as well as of the time for inſtruction. Of the arts and ſciences within our acquiſition, ſome are fallacious, others uſeleſs, and others again ſerve only to flatter the vanity of their reſpective profeſſors. The ſmall number of ſuch as really contribute to our well-being, are thoſe only that merit the attention of a wiſe man, and of courſe of the child that we are ſollicitous to make ſo. The point in view, therefore, is not what may be true, but what is uſeful.

From this ſcanty proportion of uſeful knowledge, we muſt yet further ſubſtract thoſe truths which require an underſtanding already formed; ſuch as preſuppoſe the knowledge of thoſe different relations and circumſtances, with which a child cannot be acquainted, and which, though true in themſelves, diſpoſe an unexperienced mind to form a wrong judgement on other occaſions.

Thus are we reduced, in our ſyſtem of education, to a very ſmall circle, compared with

the ſyſtem of things. This, however, appears an immenſe ſphere to the contracted faculties of a child: ſo dark are the clouds that obſcure the dawn of the human underſtanding! Where is the man who hath temerity enough to attempt their diſſipation? What an abyſs hath fruitleſs knowledge dug round the hapleſs youth! Tremble, preſumptuous man! thou who art about to conduct him through its dangerous paths, and to draw from before his eyes the ſacred curtain of nature. Be firſt well aſſured of his capacity and your own, leſt the intellects of one or the other, and perhaps both, be perverted in the attempt. Beware of the ſpecious allurements of falſehood, and the intoxicating fumes of pride. Remember, conſtantly remember, that mere ignorance hath never been hurtful; that error alone is deſtructive, and that we do not err in things we are profeſſedly ignorant of, but in thoſe which we conceive we know.

The progreſs which your pupil makes in geometry, will ſerve, both as a proof and a guide, in the diſplay of his capacity. As ſoon, however, as he is capable of diſtinguiſhing what is uſeful, it requires great addreſs and circumſpection to introduce ſpeculative ſubjects. Are you deſirous, for inſtance, that he ſhould know how to find a mean proportional between two given lines? begin by inducing him practically to find a ſquare, equal to a given rectangle. If the queſtion be, to find two mean proportionals, it will be requiſite to make the problem of doubling

bling the cube peculiarly intereſting. Hence you ſee, in what manner we might approach by degrees thoſe truths, on which are founded the moral diſtinctions of good and evil. Hitherto we have been governed by no law but that of neceſſity; at preſent we begin to conſider what is uſeful, and ſhall not be long before we come to the conſideration of what is good and proper.

The various faculties of men are excited by the ſame inſtinct. To the activity of the body, making conſtant efforts to diſplay its abilities, ſucceeds that of the mind, as conſtantly ſeeking after information. Children, when very young, ſeem endowed only with a capacity and inclination for motion; they afterwards become inquiſitive and curious, and this curioſity, well directed, becomes at the age they have now attained, their chief ſpring of action. Let us be always careful to diſtinguiſh thoſe propenſities which are implanted by nature, from thoſe which are ingrafted by the dictates of prejudice and opinion. A thirſt after knowledge may proceed merely from the vanity of deſiring to be thought learned; it may alſo ariſe from that curioſity which naturally excites us to enquire after every thing in which we may be either directly or indirectly intereſted. Our innate deſire of happineſs, and the impoſſibility of our fully gratifying that deſire, are the cauſe of our conſtant reſearches after new expedients, to contribute to that end.

This is the firſt principle or motive of curioſity; a principle which is natural to the heart of man, but which diſplays itſelf only in obedience to our paſſions and in proportion to our acquirements of knowledge. Let us ſuppoſe a philoſopher caſt aſhore on a deſert iſland, together with his books and inſtruments, and that he was under an abſolute certainty of ſpending in that ſolitude the remainder of his days. He would never trouble himſelf further about the ſyſtem of the univerſe, the laws of attraction, or the fluctionary calculus. It is probable he would never after look into a book, during his whole life: but he certainly would not fail to explore the iſland, however extenſive, even to its remoteſt corners Let us, therefore, in our early ſtudies, reject thoſe ſciences for which man has not a natural turn, and confine ourſelves to thoſe which inſtinct directs us to purſue.

This earth is the iſland on which mankind are caſt, and the moſt ſtriking object of their obſervation is the ſun. As ſoon as our ideas begin to extend beyond ourſelves, our attention will therefore naturally be engroſſed between two ſuch intereſting ſubjects. Hence the philoſophy of almoſt every ſavage nation is confined ſolely to the imaginary diviſions of the earth, and the divinity of the ſun. "What an excurſion! cries the reader. We were but juſt now employed about objects that immediately ſurround us, and we are now traverſing the globe, and ſoaring to the diſtant extremities of the univerſe." This excurſion,

ſion, however, is the ſimple effect of the progreſs of our faculties and the bent of our underſtanding. During our infant ſtate of weakneſs and incapacity, all our thoughts, influenced by ſelf-preſervation, are confined within ourſelves. On the contrary, in a more advanced age, as our abilities increaſe, the deſire of improving our exiſtence carries us out of ourſelves, and our ideas extend to their utmoſt limits. As the intellectual world, however, is as yet unknown to us, our thoughts cannot extend farther than we can ſee; but our comprehenſion dilates itſelf with the bounds of ſpace.

Let us convert our ſenſations into ideas; but let us not fly at once from ſenſible to intellectual objects. It is by a due and rational attention to the former we can only attain the latter. In the firſt operations of the underſtanding, let our ſenſes then always be our guide, the world our only book, and facts our ſole precepts. Children, when taught to read, learn that only; they never think; they gain no information; all their learning conſiſts in words.

Direct the attention of your pupil to the phenomena of nature, and you will ſoon awaken his curioſity; but to keep that curioſity alive, you muſt be in no haſte to ſatisfy it. Put queſtions to him adapted to his capacity, and leave him to reſolve them. Let him take nothing on truſt from his preceptor, but on his own comprehenſion and conviction: he ſhould not learn, but invent, the ſciences. If ever you ſubſti-

tute authority in the place of argument, he will reaſon no longer; he will be ever afterwards bandied like a ſhuttle-cock between the opinions of others.

You intend, we'll ſuppoſe, to teach your child geography, and for that purpoſe provide for him maps, ſpheres, and globes. What an apparatus! Wherefore all theſe mere repreſentations of things? Why do you not rather begin by ſhowing him the object itſelf, that he may, at leaſt, know what it is you are talking about? Walk out with him, ſome fine evening, to a convenient ſpot, from whence an extenſive horizon may give you a full view of the ſetting ſun; and then take particular notice of ſuch objects as mark the place of its going down. Return the next morning, with a profeſſed deſign only of taking the freſh air, to the ſame place, before the ſun riſes. There you will ſee the fiery rays it ſcatters among the clouds, as harbingers of its approach. The illumination increaſes, the eaſt ſeems all in flames, and you expect the glorious orb long before it diſcovers itſelf above the horizon; you think you ſee it every moment; it at length appears. Its rays dart like lightning over the face of nature, and darkneſs vaniſhes at the ſight. Man glories in his habitation, and ſees it embelliſhed with new beauty. The lawn is refreſhed by the coolneſs of the night, and the light of the morn diſplays its increaſing verdure: the dew-beſpangled flowers that enamel its ſurface glitter in the ſun-beams, and, like rubies

rubies and emeralds, dart their colours on the eye. The chearful birds unite in choirs, and hail in concert the parent of life: not one is ſilent—at this enchanting moment none are mute, though in feeble notes, more ſlow and ſoft than thoſe they chaunt all day, as if from peaceful ſlumbers ſcarce awoke, they join in languid harmony. The aſſemblage of ſo many pleaſing objects imprints a glowing ſenſation that ſeems to penetrate the ſoul. Who can withſtand the rapture of this ſhort interval of enchantment? It is impoſſible ſo grand, ſo beautiful, ſo delightful a ſcene can be ever beheld with indifference. Full of that enthuſiaſtick rapture with which a preceptor is inſpired on ſuch an occaſion, he endeavours perhaps to communicate it to his pupil; he expects to excite the ſame emotions in the child, by attracting its attention to thoſe ſenſations which he experiences within himſelf. Ridiculous expectation! It is the heart only that contemplates the beauties of nature: to be ſeen they ſhould always be felt: a child indeed may perceive the ſeveral objects, but their connexion is to him inviſible; he is inſenſible to the harmony of the ſpheres. He requires an experience he hath not yet attained, and ſentiments to which he is as yet a ſtranger, to be ſuſceptible of that complex impreſſion which is the general reſult of all theſe ſenſations. If he has not travelled over deſerts; if his feet have never been parched by burning ſands; if he never hath felt the ſcorching ſun-beams reflected from the ſurround-

ing rocks, how can he taſte the freſh air of a fine morning? How ſhould he be enraptured with the fragrance of the flowers, the refreſhing verdure of the graſs, the dew drops ſparkling in the ſun, or the ſoft carpet of the downy moſs? How ſhould the warbling of birds inſpire him with glowing raptures, who is a ſtranger to the ſoft accents of love and delight? How can he behold with tranſport the dawn of ſo lovely a day, whoſe imagination cannot paint to itſelf the joys it is capable of beſtowing? In a word, what tender ſenſations can be excited, by the charms of nature, in him who is ignorant by whoſe hand ſhe is ſo beautifully adorned? Talk not to children in a language they do not comprehend; make uſe of no pompous deſcriptions, no flowers of ſpeech, no tropes and figures, no poetry; taſte and ſentiment are at preſent quite out of the queſtion: ſimplicity, gravity, and and preciſion are all that are yet required: the time will come but too ſoon, when we muſt aſſume a different ſtyle.

A pupil educated agreeably to theſe maxims, and accuſtomed to receive no aſſiſtance till he has diſcovered his own abilities, will examine every new object with a long and ſilent attention. He will be thoughtful without aſking queſtions. Content yourſelf, therefore, with preſenting proper objects opportunely to his notice, and when you ſee they have ſufficiently excited his curioſity, drop ſome leading laconick queſtions,

queſtions, which may put him in the way of diſcovering the truth.

On the preſent occaſion; having for ſome time contemplated the riſing ſun, and made your pupil obſerve the hills and other neighbouring objects on that ſide, permitting him the while to talk about them without interruption, ſtand ſilent a few moments, and affect a profound meditation. You may then addreſs him thus: "I am thinking that when the ſun ſet laſt night, it went down yonder behind us; whereas, this morning, you ſee, he is riſen on the oppoſite ſide of the plain, here, before us. What can be the meaning of this." Say nothing more; and, if he aſks you any thing about it, divert his attention, for the preſent, by talking of ſomething elſe. Leave him to reflect on it himſelf, and be aſſured he will think of your obſervation.

To accuſtom a child to give attention to objects, and to make ſenſible truths appear ſtriking to his imagination, it is neceſſary to keep him ſome time in ſuſpenſe before they are are explained or diſcovered to him. If he ſhould not ſufficiently comprehend the nature of the preſent queſtion by the means propoſed, it may be rendered ſtill more obvious, by diverſifying the terms of it. If he cannot comprehend in what manner the ſun proceeds from its ſetting to its riſing, he knows at leaſt how it proceeds from its riſing to its ſetting; he hath ocular information of this. Explain the firſt queſtion, then, by the ſecond, and if your pupil be not extremely

extremely dull indeed, the analogy is too obvious to eſcape him.

Such is our firſt lecture in coſmography.

As we proceed ſlowly from one ſenſible idea to another, making ourſelves familiarly acquainted with each as we go on, and as our pupil's attention is never required upon compulſion, the diſtance will be very conſiderable, from the object of his firſt leſſon to the knowledge of the ſun's courſe, and the figure of the earth: but as the apparent motion of all the heavenly bodies depends on the ſame principle, and as the firſt obſervation naturally leads to all the reſt, it requires leſs capacity, though more time, to proceed from the diurnal rotation of the earth to the calculation of an eclipſe, than to acquire clear ideas of the phenomenon of day and night.

As the ſun turns round the earth he deſcribes a circle, and every circle hath a center; this we already know. This center, alſo, muſt needs be inviſible, becauſe it is in the middle of our globe; but we can ſuppoſe two points on the ſurface ſo correſponding with it, that a rod paſſing through all three and extended both ways to the heavens, would be at once the axis of the earth and of the ſun's apparent diurnal motion. A whirl-bone or globular totum, turning upon one of its points, may ſerve to repreſent the heavens turning upon their axis, the two points of this play-thing being the two poles; one of which may be pointed out to our pupil, near the

the tail of the little bear. This would furniſh us with an amuſement for the night; by which means we ſhould become gradually acquainted with the ſtars, and thence in time grow anxious to diſtinguiſh the planets and conſtellations.

Emilius and I have ſeen the ſun riſe at midſummer: we ſhall next take a view of his riſing, ſome fine morning in the depth of winter. We are neither of us idle you know, and both deſpiſe the cold. I have taken care to make the ſecond obſervation on the very ſame ſpot, where we made the former; ſo that in conſequence of a little preparatory diſcourſe to introduce the remark, one or other of us will infallibly cry out when the ſun firſt appears above the horizon, "Ha! this is pleaſant enough! the ſun does not riſe in the place it uſed to do. Here, you ſee, are our old marks to the left, and now he riſes yonder, to the right. So it ſeems there is one caſt for the ſummer, and another for the winter." Theſe examples will be ſufficient to ſhow the unexperienced preceptor the way to bring his pupil acquainted with the ſphere, by making uſe of the earth itſelf inſtead of a globe, and the apparent revolution of the ſun inſtead of any imperfect repreſentation of it. It ought, indeed, to be laid down as a general rule, never to ſubſtitute the ſhadow unleſs were it is impoſſible to exhibit the ſubſtance; for the repreſentation engroſſing the attention of the child generally makes him forget the object repreſented.

The

The armillary ſphere appears to me a very ill contrived and diſproportioned machine. Its confuſed circles, and the ſtrange figures delineated thereon, give it an air of necromancy, which is enough to frighten children. The earth is, beſides, too ſmall; the circles too wide and numerous; while ſome, particularly the two colures, are entirely uſeleſs. Each circle exceeds in breadth the diameter of the earth, and their thickneſs gives them ſuch an air of ſubſtance and reality, that when you tell your pupil they repreſent only imaginary circles, you confound him; he neither knows what he ſees, nor comprehends what you ſay to him.

We never know how to ſuppoſe ourſelves in the place of children; we never enter into their manner of thinking. On the contrary we attribute to them our ideas; and, purſuing our own method of argumentation, fill their heads, even while we are diſcuſſing inconteſtible truths, with extravagance and error. It is diſputed, whether the ſciences are beſt taught by the ſynthetic or analytic method. It is not always neceſſary to abide by either. We may ſometimes compound and reſolve in the ſame diſquiſition, and inſtruct a child by the former mode of argument while he thinks himſelf employing the latter. Add to this, that, by making uſe of both methods indifferently, they ſerve reciprocally to confirm each other. Setting out at the ſame time from two different points, without ſeeming to take the ſame route, he will

be

be ſurpriſed to find himſelf directed two ways to one and the ſame object; and that ſurpriſe cannot fail of giving him great ſatisfaction. In teaching him geography, for example, I would begin at its two extremes; and, with the ſtudy of the apparent aſtronomical revolutions, unite that of the diviſions and meaſurement of the earth. While he is ſtudying the ſphere, and thus tranſporting himſelf in imagination to the heavens, I would call back his attention to the diviſions of the earth, and point out to him their relation to his own place of abode.

The two firſt objects of his geographical ſtudies, ſhould be the town where he reſides, and his father's ſeat in the country. After having well obſerved the ſituation of theſe, he ſhould take the like notice of the neighbouring villages and country ſeats on the road, together with the adjacent rivers; obſerving the ſituation and aſpect of each object, in regard to the riſing and ſetting of the ſun. This is the point of re-union. He ſhould make a map from this ſurvey; beginning ſimply with the two firſt objects before-mentioned, and inſerting the others by degrees, as he comes to know, or eſtimates, their poſition and diſtance. You ſee, already, the advantages he will have in this reſpect, by having accuſtomed him to meaſure objects and diſtances by his eye.

Notwithſtanding this advantage, however, it will be neceſſary to direct a child in theſe operations a little; but this ſhould be very little and

and imperceptibly. If he falls into a miſtake, let him. Be in no haſte to ſet him right; but wait with patience till he be himſelf in a ſtate to diſcover and correct his error; or at moſt take occaſion only, at a favourable opportunity, by ſome diſtant hint, to make him ſenſible of it. If he ſhould never miſtake, he would make but little improvement. It is not neceſſary that he ſhould know at preſent the topography of the country, but the means whereby ſuch knowledge is obtained; it is of no importance to him to have a number of maps in his head, provided he knows what they ſerve to repreſent, and has clear ideas of the art, by which they are conſtructed. Here you ſee the difference between Emilius and the pupils of others. Their knowledge lies in maps and charts, that of my pupil in the ſcience of geography. His progreſs in the art of map-making will hence furniſh new ornaments for his apartment. You will remember it is my conſtant maxim, not to teach a child a multiplicity of things, but to prevent his acquiring any but clear and preciſe ideas. His knowing but little is of no conſequence, provided he imbibes no falſe principles. I ſtore his head with truth, only to prevent the enterance of error. Reaſon and judgement advance but ſlowly, while prejudice attacks with early impetuoſity; we muſt carefully guard therefore againſt the latter. If you regard ſcience, indeed for its own ſake, and aim at knowledge in general, you enter upon an unfathomable ocean, without a ſhore,

ſhore, to founder among the rocks. When I ſee a man, enamoured by the charms of univerſal knowledge, and flying from the purſuit of one ſcience to another, I think I ſee a child gathering ſhells on the ſea-ſhore. He firſt loads himſelf indiſcriminately with as many as he can carry; when, tempted by others of a gayer appearance, he throws the former away, taking and rejecting, till, fatigued and bewildered in his choice, he hath thrown all away, and returns home without a ſingle ſhell.

During the firſt term of childhood, we endeavoured only to loſe time, to avoid the ill employment of it. The caſe is now altered; and we have not time ſufficient for every thing that might be uſeful. The paſſions advance upon us apace, and the moment they give notice of their arrival, your pupil will give no ear to any other monitor. The term of diſpaſſionate intelligence is ſhort and tranſitory; and is, beſides, employed on ſo many ſubjects of preſent utility, that it is a folly to think it ſufficiently long for a child to acquire much learning or wiſdom. It is not our buſineſs at preſent to make him an adept in the ſciences, but to give him a taſte for them, and point out the method of improving it. This is moſt certainly the fundamental principle of a rational education.

The preſent is alſo the proper time to accuſtom your pupil by degrees to fix his attention, for ſome time, on one and the ſame object. This attention, however, muſt always be accompanied

companied by pleaſure or inclination, and never be the effect of compulſion. We muſt be careful, alſo, not to keep it too long upon the ſtretch, leſt wearineſs and diſguſt ſhould enſue. Keep, therefore, a watchful eye over your pupil, and by no means permit him to fatigue himſelf by too intenſe application. He had better learn nothing, than learn upon compulſion.

When he aſks a queſtion, be your anſwer always calculated rather to keep alive than ſatisfy his curioſity; eſpecially when you obſerve he has a mind to trifle rather than be inſtructed. You ought to pay leſs regard to the terms of interrogation, than to his motives for enquiry. This conduct becomes of the greateſt importance when a child begins to reaſon.

The ſciences are connected together by a ſeries of propoſitions, all dependent on ſome general and common principles, which are gradually diſplayed. The philoſophers make uſe of theſe; with us they are as yet out of the queſtion. There is another chain of reaſoning, of a different conſtruction, by which every particular object is connected to ſome other, and points out that which ſucceeds it. This order of ſucceſſion, which, from our natural curioſity, keeps alive our attention, is generally made uſe of by grown perſons, and is peculiarly adapted to children.

Before we begin to delineate our map, we muſt trace a meridian. The two points of interſection

tion found by ſhadows of equal length in the morning and evening, will give an excellent meridian for an aſtronomer of thirteen. To find theſe, however, will require time and oblige us to work conſtantly on the ſame ſpot. This method might be too troubleſome and diſguſting: having foreſeen this inconvenience, therefore, we have provided againſt it.

But I am now fallen again into my uſual cuſtom of being tediouſly circumſtantial. I hear your murmurs, grumbling reader, and diſregard them. I am determined I will not ſacrifice the moſt uſeful part of my book to your impatience. Act as you pleaſe with regard to my prolixity, I am, for my part, perfectly eaſy about your complaints.

My pupil has long ſince obſerved that amber, glaſs, wax, and ſeveral other bodies, on being rubbed, attract bits of ſtraw, feathers and the like; and that other bodies in general have not that quality. Among them, however, we have accidentally diſcovered one, which is poſſeſſed of a yet more ſingular property: it attracts ſteel-filings and bits of iron, not only at a diſtance, but without friction. This diſcovery engages our attention for ſome time, without anſwering any other purpoſe than amuſement. At length, we perceive it communicates its attractive property to iron and ſteel. About this time, I take my pupil to ſee the diverſions of a neighbouring fair; where, among other wonderful performances, a juggler produces a duck of wax, ſwimming

ſwimming about in a baſon, after a piece of bread, which he holds in his hand. We are greatly ſurprized at this ſtrange phenomenon, but as we are unacquainted with the fables of witchcraft, we charge not the artiſt with being either a wizard or conjurer. As we are daily accuſtomed to various ſtriking effects, of whoſe cauſes we are confeſſedly ignorant, we are not very anxious to account for every thing we ſee; but reſt contented till ſome fortunate event affords us information.

At our return home, however, our converſation very naturally turns on this extraordinary duck, and accordingly a thought ſuggeſts itſelf of imitating it. We take a large needle, and touching it on the load-ſtone, cover it with wax, which we mould as well as we can into the ſhape of a duck, the needle paſſing through its body from the beak to the tail. We then ſet it afloat in a baſon of water, and preſenting a key to its beak, we find, to our great joy, the duck follows it, in the ſame manner as that of the juggler followed the bread. As to the line of direction in which the body of the duck remains when at reſt, we may obſerve that ſome other time: at preſent, we are too much taken up with the firſt object of attention to think of any thing elſe. In the evening we repair to the juggler's booth, with a piece of bread, properly prepared, in our pocket; when the boaſting artiſt having performed his trick, my young philoſopher, who had with difficulty ſo long contained himſelf,

himſelf, tells him, there is nothing in it, and that he himſelf can do as much. He is taken at his word; and inſtantly pulls the bread with the concealed iron out of his pocket. His heart flutters as he approaches the table, and his hand trembles as he preſents the bread. The duck, however, follows it, on which he leaps for joy, and triumphs in the applauſe of the ſpectators. The juggler, though a little confounded, embraces him, felicitates him on his ſucceſs, and begs he will honour him with his preſence the next day, when he promiſes to collect a more numerous aſſembly to witneſs and applaud his abilities. Our young naturaliſt, in the mean while, ſo proud of his ſcience, is juſt on the point of diſcovering the ſecret; when I hurry him away from the ſcene.

Full of the applauſe he is to receive to-morrow, he counts the moments, in the mean time, with ridiculous impatience. He invites every one he knows, and would be glad the whole world ſhould be witneſſes of his triumph. At length the appointed hour is come; we haſten to the place of rendezvous, and find the room already crowded with ſpectators. His young heart is elated with joy at the ſight. Other tricks in their courſe preceding our's, the juggler ſurpaſſes his uſual dexterity, and performs wonders. My pupil, however, pays no attention to what is doing; but keeps fumbling all the while in his pocket; with his piece of bread in his hand, fetching his breath ſhort, and ſweating with impatience

patience and anxiety. At length it is his turn to exhibit: the artiſt pompouſly introduces the apparatus and prepares the ſpectators for the trick. Emilius, though ſomewhat abaſhed, approaches the table, and offering his bread to the duck—what a new turn in human affairs! tame as it was yeſterday, it is become a mere wild-duck to day: inſtead of preſenting its beak, it turns tail and ſwims away, flying from the bread, and the hand preſenting it, as faſt as it before had followed them. After many fruitleſs tryals, for which he is conſtantly hiſſed by the company, my pupil complains that he is impoſed on, and that this is not the duck he practiſed on yeſterday: defying the juggler himſelf to draw this about in the ſame manner.

The artiſt, without making a reply, takes up a piece of bread, and preſenting it to the duck draws it immediately after his hand. Emilius takes up the ſame piece of bread; but, inſtead of ſuceeding better than with the former, has the mortification to ſee the duck turn regardleſs from him and make circles round the baſon: On this he retires in confuſion, unable to ſtand the hiſſes of the company any longer.

The juggler now takes the piece of bread my pupil had brought, and makes uſe of it with as much ſucceſs as he did his own: He takes the iron from within it; and, expoſing it to the company, raiſes another laugh at our expenſe: He even draws the duck about, as before, with the bread thus ſeparated from the iron. He performs

forms the ſame trick, alſo, with another piece, cut from the loaf by a third perſon; he does the ſame thing with his glove, and with the bare end of his finger. He next advances into the middle of the room, and declaring aloud, with that emphatick tone ſo peculiar to theſe gentry, that his duck would obey his call as well as his motions; he ſpeaks to it, and it immediately obeys the word of command. If he bids it move to the right, to the right it goes; if to return, it returns; if to turn about, about it turns; its motion conſtantly obedient to his order. The repeated ſhouts of applauſe, that follow theſe ſpecimens of his art, are ſo many inſults upon us; we, therefore, privately ſlip out, and making the beſt of our way home, ſhut ourſelves up in our apartment, inſtead of going about, as we had projected, to tell every body our ſucceſs.

The next morning ſomebody knocks at the door: who ſhould this be but our friend the juggler? He enters, and modeſtly complains of our conduct: he cannot think what he has done to us, that we ſhould endeavour to diſcredit his tricks, and deprive him of his bread; or that there is any thing ſo very wonderful in the art of drawing about a duck of wax, that we ſhould be ambitious of that honour, at the expſene of a poor man's ſubſiſtance. "Faith, gentlemen (continues he) if I could get a living by any other talent, I ſhould never be proud of this. You ſhould reflect that a man, who has ſpent great part of his life in the exerciſe of this pitiful in-

duſtry muſt of courſe know more of the matter than you, who only throw away a few minutes on it. If I did not exhibit the maſter-piece of my dexterity at firſt, it was becauſe one ſhould not be in haſte to make an unneceſſary diſplay of one's knowledge: I have always taken care to preſerve my beſt tricks for particular occaſions; and have, beſides what you have ſeen, many others to check young and indiſcreet obſervers. I am come, nevertheleſs, gentlemen, very readily to acquaint you of the ſecret that ſo much embarraſſed you; at the ſame time hoping you will make no ill uſe of it, to my prejudice; and that you will another time be more reſerved."

He produces his machine; when, to our very great ſurpriſe, we ſee it conſiſts only of a powerful loadſtone, which a child, hid under the table for that purpoſe, moved about without being perceived.

As he is putting his loadſtone up again, we thank him, and, excuſing ourſelves for what is paſſed, offer to make him a preſent, which he refuſes. "No! gentlemen (ſays he) you don't deſerve ſo well of me, that I ſhould accept your favours; you ſhall be obliged to me againſt your will; this is all the revenge I ſhall take. You may hence learn that there are men of ſpirit in all conditions of life: I am paid for the exerciſe of my hands, and not of my tongue." In going out he addreſſes to me, particularly, the following reprimand: "I can eaſily excuſe the child (ſays he aloud) as he offended only through ignorance.

rance. But you, ſir, who ought to have known his errour, why did you permit him? As you both live together, you, as the elder, owe him your advice and direction: your experience ſhould be the authority for his conduct. In reproaching himſelf, as he grows up, for the faults of his youth, he will doubtleſs reproach you for thoſe of which you did not adviſe him."

Having ſaid this, he departs, leaving us both in a good deal of confuſion. I blame myſelf for my own eaſy and pliant temper; promiſing my pupil to ſacrifice it another time to his intereſt, and to warn him of his faults before he commits them. For the time is now approaching when our relation to each other muſt change, and the ſeverity of the maſter give place to the complacence of the companion. This change ought to be effected by degrees; and, like every other, be timely and early provided for.

We return the next day to the fair, to ſee the trick repeated, of which we are let into the ſecret. We accoſt our Socratick juggler with a profound reſpect; hardly daring to look him in the face. He, on the other hand, loads us with civilities, and in ſeating mortifies us with the moſt humiliating marks of diſtinction. He performs his uſual ſlights, and amuſes himſelf a long time with the trick of the duck, caſting every now and then a ſevere and confident look at us. In the mean time, we, though privy to the whole, keep the moſt profound ſilence.

Should my pupil dare but to open his mouth on ſuch an occaſion, I ſhould have no hopes of him.

The circumſtantial account of this example is of more conſequence than it may at firſt appear. How many leſſons are contained in this one! How many mortifying conſequences are ſure to follow the firſt emotion of vanity! Watch with care, young preceptor, this firſt emotion in your pupil; and be aſſured that, if you can thus make it productive of humiliation and diſgrace, you will be long before you ſee any appearance of a ſecond. What preparations are here! you will ſay: I confeſs it; and all to make us a compaſs to ſerve us inſtead of a meridian.

Having learnt that a load-ſtone acts through the ſubſtance of other bodies, we have nothing to do but to conſtruct a machine like that we have ſeen. To this end, we procure a large flat baſon; placing it on a table and filling it with water; we make our duck alſo a little neater than the former; and thus our apparatus is ready. From our conſtant attention to what paſſes in the baſon, we at length remark that the body of the duck, when at reſt, preſerves always nearly the ſame direction. We repeat the experiment, and, on examination, find this direction to be from ſouth to north. This is ſufficient; our compaſs is now as good as made.

The earth hath various climates, and thoſe climates different temperatures; the ſeaſons varying more conſiderably in proportion as we

approach either pole. All bodies contract with cold and dilate with heat; this effect is ſtill more conſpicuous in fluids than ſolids, and is commenſurable by ſpirituous liquors; by means of which the Thermometer was conſtructed. The wind blows againſt our faces; hence we find air is a body, a palpable fluid, although we cannot by any means ſee it. Preſs a drinking-glaſs, turned upſide down, into water, the fluid will not occupy the whole ſpace within it, unleſs by leaning it ſide-ways you let the air eſcape. Hence we find air is capable of reſiſtance: preſs the glaſs with a ſtill greater force downwards, and the water will gain upon the air without ever being able entirely to fill the glaſs; hence we find air is capable of a certain degree of compreſſion. A ball filled with compreſſed air will rebound better than another filled with any other ſubſtance: air then is an elaſtick body. Lying down at one's full length in a bathing tub, if we endeavour to raiſe our arms in an horizontal poſition out of the water, we ſhall find them loaded with a prodigious weight; air, therefore, is evidently heavy, and may be weighed againſt other fluids; hence the contrivance of the barometer, the ſyphon, the wind-gun, and the air-pump. All the laws of ſtaticks and hydroſtaticks diſcover themſelves by experiments equally obvious and common. I would not, therefore, have him enter the cabinet of an experimental philoſopher to learn any of theſe. His apparatus and pomp of machinery diſguſt me; their

ſcientifiick air is deſtructive to ſcience itſelf; thoſe various engines either frightening a child, or taking up that attention to their figure which he ought to beſtow on their effects. I would have all our machines be of our own conſtruction, and would not begin to conſtruct the inſtrument before I had made the experiment; but, after having made this imperfectly, and as it were by chance, we would by degrees invent the inſtrument to confirm it. I had rather our machines ſhould be leſs accurate and complete, and that we ſhould have more juſt ideas of what they ought to be, and of their operations. For my firſt leſſon in ſtaticks, inſtead of providing myſelf with a balance and ſcales, I lay a ſtick acroſs the back of a chair; I meaſure the length of both ends, when it hangs in equilibrio, I next hang different weights on each; placing them nearer or farther off the point of ſuſpenſion, as occaſion requires: by theſe means I find that the equilibrium depends on a reciprocal proportion between the weights and the length of the levers; and thus I inſtruct my young mechanick to rectify a balance before he has ever ſeen one.

We acquire, without doubt, notions more clear and certain of things we thus learn of ourſelves, than of thoſe we are taught by others. Another advantage alſo reſulting from this method is, that we do not accuſtom ourſelves to a ſervile ſubmiſſion to the authority of others; but, by exerciſing our reaſon, grow every day more

more ingenious in the diſcovery of the relations of things, in connecting our ideas, and in the contrivance of machines; whereas, by adopting thoſe which are put into our hands, our invention grows dull and indifferent; as the man who never dreſſes himſelf, but is ſerved in every thing by his ſervants, and drawn about every where by his horſes, loſes by degrees the activity and uſe of his limbs. Boileau boaſted that he had taught Racine to rhime with much difficulty. Among the many admirable methods taken to abridge the ſtudy of the ſciences, we are in great want of one to make us learn them with difficulty.

The moſt obvious advantage of theſe ſlow and laborious reſearches, is to preſerve, in the cultivation of ſpeculative ſtudies, the activity of the body; to preſerve the ſuppleneſs of the limbs, and to be always buſied in ſome manual operation or employment, of uſe to mankind. The diverſity of inſtruments, invented to direct us in our experiments, and make up for the deficiency of our organs of ſenſe, makes us neglect the exerciſe of the latter. A Theodolite diſpenſes with our eſtimating the extent of angles; the eye, which is capable of meaſuring diſtances with great exactneſs, gives up the taſk to the chain; the ſteel-yard excuſes me from judging of the weight of any thing by poiſing it in my hand. Thus the more ingenious and accurate our inſtruments, the more unſuſceptible and inexpert become our organs: by aſſembling a heap

of machinery about us, we find afterwards none in ourſelves.

But when we ſet about the conſtruction of theſe machines ourſelves, and employ therein that ſagacity and addreſs which are required to do without them, we loſe nothing: on the contrary we gain every thing; and, by adding the knowledge of art to nature, become more ingenious without being leſs dextrous. If inſtead of keeping a boy poring over books, I employ him in a work-ſhop, his hands will be buſied to the improvement of his underſtanding; he will become a philoſopher while he thinks himſelf only an artiſan. In ſhort this practice hath other uſes which I ſhall ſpeak of hereafter, and ſhow in what manner theſe philoſophical amuſements lead to the exerciſe of the proper functions of a man.

I have already obſerved that the mere ſpeculative part of ſcience is by no means adapted to children, even when they approach adoleſcency; it is proper, nevertheleſs, though you do not enter with them too profoundly into the depth of phyſical theory, to connect their experiments by ſome chain of deduction, that they may arrange them in ſome order in their minds, for the ſake of remembering them: for it is very difficult to retain ſeparate and independent facts and concluſions long in the memory, without ſome leading clue for occaſional recollection.

In your reſearches into the laws of nature, begin always with the moſt common and obvious

vious phenomena; accuſtoming your pupil to look upon them always as mere facts. I take up, for inſtance, a ſtone; and, pretending to place it in the air, open my hand, and it immediately falls to the ground. I look upon Emilius, who ſtands all the while attentive to what I am doing, and aſk him, why the ſtone falls? Where is there a child who would not have an anſwer ready to that queſtion? There is none, not even Emilius, if I had not taken great pains to prepare him not to know how to anſwer it. Every one will ſay the ſtone falls becauſe it is heavy. And what is heavy? the thing that falls. So the ſtone falls becauſe it falls. Here my little philoſopher is ſtopped in good earneſt; and thus ends my firſt lecture of phyſical theory; whether he profits by it, alſo, in this ſcience or not, it is a general leſſon of good ſenſe.

As a child advances in underſtanding, other important conſiderations oblige us to be more nice in the objects of his employment. As ſoon as he acquires ſo much knowledge of himſelf, as to conceive in what his happineſs conſiſts; or becomes ſenſible of ſuch extenſive relations, as to be able to judge what is fitting or unfitting to his ſtate and condition; he is then in a ſituation to perceive the difference between labour and amuſement, and to regard the latter only as a relaxation from the former. Objects of real utility may then make part of his ſtudy, and engage him to give a more conſtant application to it than he might do to mere amuſements.

The law of neceſſity, ever recurring to the mind, teaches us betimes to do that which is diſagreeable, in order to prevent conſequences ſtill more diſpleaſing. Such is the uſe of forecaſt; in the regulation of which conſiſts all the wiſdom, and depends all the miſery of mankind.

Every individual would be happy: but, in order to arrive at happineſs, it is firſt neceſſary to know what it is. The happineſs of man in a ſtate of nature, is as ſimple as his manner of living: it conſiſts in his being free from pain; and is conſtituted by health, liberty and the neceſſaries of life. The happineſs of man in a ſtate of ſociety, is another thing; but this is at preſent out of the queſtion. I cannot too often obſerve, that objects purely phyſical are thoſe only which can intereſt children, particularly thoſe whoſe vanity is not yet excited, and who are not already vitiated by the prejudices of opinion.

When they come to foreſee their wants, their underſtanding is conſiderably advanced, and they begin to be ſenſible of the value of time. It is of conſequence, now, to uſe them to employ themſelves on ſubjects of utility; this utility, however, ſhould be applicable to their age, and adapted to their knowledge. Every thing that depends on moral inſtitutions and the practices of ſociety, ſhould not be ſo early preſented to their view; becauſe they are not in a capacity to underſtand it. It is a folly to require them to apply themſelves to things, merely becauſe they are told

told in general terms that ſuch things are good for them, while they are ignorant in what that good conſiſts; we may in vain aſſure them they will find their intereſt therein as they grow up; while they are unintereſted by their preſent uſe, they are incapable of comprehending the future.

Let a child do nothing merely becauſe he is bid; nothing is good for him which he cannot perceive to be ſo. In hurrying him on before his knowledge, you think yourſelves making uſe of forecaſt, and you only betray the want of it. In providing him with many implements he may never uſe, you deprive him of the moſt univerſal and uſeful of all others, that of good ſenſe. You uſe him to permit himſelf to be always conducted, and to be only a machine in the hands of others. In requiring him to be docile and tractable when he is little, you prepare him to be a credulous dupe when he is grown up. You are for ever telling him,—"All I deſire of you, child, is for your own advantage; though you are as yet incapable of knowing it to be ſo. What is it to me whether you do what I require or not? It is for your own good only you ſhould do it." With ſuch fine ſpeeches as theſe, intended to make him wiſe, you only pave the way for the ſucceſs of thoſe who may hereafter take him to ſome projector, alchemiſt, falſe prophet, or any kind of cheat, with a view to entrap him by ſome ſnare, or in order to make him adopt their own folly.

It is requiſite men ſhould be acquainted with many things, of which children cannot in the

leaſt comprehend the utility: but is it neceſſary, or even poſſible, that a child ſhould learn every thing it is requiſite a man ſhould know? Endeavour to teach a child every thing that is uſeful to him at his age; and you will find him full employment. Why will you inſiſt on his application to the ſtudies proper for an age to which he may never arrive, in prejudice of thoſe which are proper for him at preſent? But, you will aſk me, perhaps, whether he will have time to learn what he ought to know, when it is required of him to make uſe of his knowledge? This I cannot tell; but I am very certain it is impoſſible to learn it ſooner; for our real and only true inſtructors are experience and ſentiment. Never can man be made truely ſenſible of what is uſeful to him but from the circumſtances in which he is ſituated. A child knows he is deſigned to grow up to manhood; all the ideas he can form of that ſtate will be to him ſo many opportunities of inſtruction: but as for thoſe which are above his capacity to comprehend, it is better he ſhould remain in abſolute ignorance of them. This whole treatiſe is calculated to illuſtrate this principle of education.

As ſoon as we are ſo far advanced as to give our pupil an idea of the word uſeful, we have attained a conſiderable influence over his future conduct; this term being very ſtriking, provided the ſenſe annexed to it be adapted to his years, and he ſee clearly its relation to his preſent welfare. Ordinary children are not affected by this term, becauſe no care has been taken to affix to it an idea

conform

conformable to their underſtandings, and becauſe, others taking upon them to provide for them what is uſeful, they have no need to think of it themſelves, and therefore remain ignorant of the meaning of utility.

What is the uſe of that? This, for the future, ſhall be the determinate queſtion between my pupil and me, on all occaſions. On my part I ſhall infallibly make uſe of it in anſwer to all his interrogatories, which may ſerve as a check to that multiplicity of ſilly, troubleſome queſtions, with which children are inceſſantly teizing thoſe about them, more for the ſake of indulging themſelves in a kind of imperiouſneſs, than out of a deſire of information. The child who is taught, as the moſt important leſſon, to know nothing but what is uſeful to him, will interrogate with the views of a Socrates: he will not put a queſtion, without having an anſwer ready to that which he knows will be put to him before his own is reſolved.

What a powerful inſtrument have I here put into your hands, for the conduct of your pupil! Knowing a reaſon for nothing, he is reduced to ſilence whenever you pleaſe; while, on the other hand you can make uſe of every advantage your knowledge and experience give you, to demonſtrate the utility of what you propoſe. For you, muſt not miſtake the end of this queſtion; it is only to inſtruct him to queſtion you in his turn; and you muſt expect, in whatever you propoſe to him afterwards, to have him reply by aſking you

you, of what uſe is this or that, in the terms of your propoſal.

This will lay a ſnare, perhaps, which a governour will not eaſily avoid falling into. If on a child's aſking this queſtion, you only endeavour to divert the affair, by giving him an anſwer he cannot well comprehend, he will think that you reaſon on your own ideas and not on his, and will believe what you call uſeful to be ſo to yourſelf only, and not to him: he will no longer place any confidence in you, and then all is over. But where is the preceptor who will ſtop ſhort and own his want of knowledge or miſtakes to his pupil? it is the general rule with tutors not to confeſs their real ignorance, whereas I make it mine to affect to be more ignorant than I am, when I cannot adapt the required information to his underſtanding. Hence, always apparently candid in my behaviour, he does not ſuſpect my motives, and I gain more credit with him by affecting ignorance, than other preceptors would do by concealing their's.

In the firſt place, you are to conſider how ſeldom it is proper for you to propoſe what he is to learn; it is his place to deſire to know, to ſeek for, to diſcover it: it is your's artfully to excite this deſire, to place the object within his reach, and to furniſh him with the means of attaining it. It follows hence, that your interrogations ſhould be few, but ſelect; and that, as he will have much more to do with you, than you with him, you will be leſs expoſed than he,

and more often in the circumſtances of ſaying to him, of what uſe is it to you to know what you aſk?

Add to this, that as it is of little conſequence whether he learns many things, or not, provided he has a clear conception of what he does learn, and its uſe; whenever you have not a proper explanation of the thing required at hand, you may ſafely forbear to give him any at all. You may ſay to him without ſcruple—"I have no good reaſon to give you; I am ſomehow miſtaken;" and leave it there. If your inſtruction was really improper, it is not amiſs to give it up entirely; and, if not ſo, you will ſoon find occaſion to make him ſenſible of its utility.

I do not at all admire explanatory diſcourſes: young people give little attention to them, and never retain them in memory. The things themſelves are the beſt explanations. I can never enough repeat it, that we make words of too much conſequence; with our prating modes of education we make nothing but praters.

Let us ſuppoſe that, while I am ſtudying with my pupil the courſe of the ſun and the method of its returning to the eaſt, he ſhould ſtop me ſhort by aſking me to what purpoſe is all this? What a florid diſcourſe might I not make him, in anſwer to ſuch a queſtion? What a number of fine things might I not take occaſion to expatiate on, by the way; particularly if there were any witneſſes to our converſation. * I might

* I have often remarked, that the learned inſtructions uſually given to pupils, have been calculated rather for

might talk to him of the utility of travelling, the advantages of commerce, the produce peculiar to every climate; of the manners of different nations, of the uſe of the Kalendar, of the computations of the returning ſeaſons for agriculture, of the art of navigation, and the manner of conducting a ſhip at ſea. Politics, natural hiſtory, aſtronomy, and even morality itſelf, with the laws of nations, might all be introduced in the courſe of my harangue, with a view to give my pupil great ideas of the ſciences, and to excite in him a deſire to ſtudy them. When I had done, however, I ſhould only have been expoſing my own pedantry, without my pupil's having comprehended one ſingle thing I had been talking about. He would have ſtill a great mind to aſk me, as before, to what end the ſun returned to the eaſt, but he would be fearful of offending. He would therefore find his account in pretending to underſtand what he was thus compelled to hear. This is the practice carried on in polite education. Our Emilius, however, brought up in greater ruſticity, and ſo difficult of comprehenſion, will liſten to nothing of all this. At the very firſt word he might not underſtand, he would turn away, and play about the room, leaving me to finiſh my oration by myſelf. We muſt ſeek, therefore, ſome more obvious ſolution: this

the grown perſons, in whoſe preſence they were delivered, than for the puerile capacity of children. I am very certain, alſo, of the juſtice of this remark, as it is founded on my own repeated obſervation.

this ſcientific method of explication being uſeleſs to him.

We were obſerving the poſition of the foreſt to the north of Montmorency, when he interrupted me with his impertinent queſtion, of "To what end is all this?" On which, I anſwer—You are in the right, we muſt think of this matter at leiſure, and if we find this enquiry is uſeleſs, we will drop it, for we have no need of uſeleſs amuſements." We then betake ourſelves to ſome other employment, and talk no more of geography during the reſt of the day.

I propoſe to him next morning a walk before breakfaſt: he likes nothing better; children are in general ever ready for running about; and mine is fit for exerciſe. We enter the foreſt, traverſe the country, and rambling about till we are almoſt tired, we loſe ourſelves, and know not which way to return home. Our time is ſpent; the heat of the day increaſes; we begin to grow hungry, and wander about from one place to another, among copſes, woods, and quarries, without meeting with any object we are acquainted with. At length overheated, famiſhed, and fatigued, we find ourſelves only more and more bewildered. We ſit down, therefore, to reſt ourſelves and deliberate on what is to be done. Suppoſing Emilius to have been educated like another child, he does not deliberate about the matter, but ſits down and begins to cry; ignorant that we are juſt by the gate of Montmorenci, which is concealed from us only by the trees of

a narrow coppice: theſe trees, however, appear an impenetrable foreſt to him; ſuch a little gentleman as he, loſt in the buſhes.

After ſome few minutes paſſed in ſilence, I ſay to him, with an air of diſquietude—"What ſhall we do, my dear Emilius, to get out of this foreſt?"

EMILIUS, *all in a ſweat, with the tears running down his cheeks.*

I know not: I am ſo weary, ſo hungry, ſo dry, I know not what to do.

Rouſſeau.—Do you think I am in a better ſituation than you; or that I ſhould not cry too if I could breakfaſt upon tears? Our buſineſs is not to weep, but to look about us. Look at your watch; what is it o'Clock?

Emilius.—It is noon and I have not yet breakfaſted.

Rouſſeau.—It is very true; it is noon, and I am faſting too.

Emilius.—You muſt then ſurely be very hungry?

Rouſſeau.—Yes! but the worſt on't is my dinner will not come here to find me. Let me ſee—it is noon; that is preciſely the time at which we obſerved yeſterday the ſituation of this foreſt from Montmorenci: if we could but obſerve in like manner the poſition of Montmorenci from this foreſt——

Emilius.—True; but yeſterday we ſaw the foreſt, and we cannot from hence ſee the town.

Rouſſeau.—

Rouſſeau.—That's our very misfortune—— If we could, by any means, but find its ſituation without ſeeing it——

Emilius.—O, my good friend! but how?

Rouſſeau.—Did not we obſerve that the foreſt lay——

Emilius.—To the north of Montmorenci.

Rouſſeau.—Montmorenci therefore ſhould be—

Emilius.—To the ſouth of the foreſt.

Rouſſeau.—We have a method to find out the north at noon.

Emilius.—We have ſo, by the direction of our ſhadow.

Rouſſeau.—But as for the ſouth.

Emilius.—How ſhall we find that?

Rouſſeau.—The ſouth is always oppoſite to the north.

Emilius.—That's true; we have only to take the direction contrary to our ſhadows: Here, this muſt be the ſouth. Montmorenci muſt certainly lie on this ſide: let us go this way.

Rouſſeau.—You may poſſibly be in the right; here, let us take this path through the wood.

EMILIUS, *clapping his hands and ſhouting for joy.*

Ah! I ſee Montmorenci directly before us. Come alonge, let us go to breakfaſt, to dinner, let us make haſte: Aſtronomy, I ſee, is good for ſomething.

Obſerve that if he does not actually make uſe of the latter expreſſion, he will think ſo; it does not ſignify which, provided I do not teach it him. You may be aſſured, alſo, he never will

will forget this day's leſſon as long as he lives; whereas had I only ſuppoſed this adventure in my chamber, all that I could have ſaid on it would have been forgotten the next day. For this reaſon we ought to inculcate all we poſſibly can by actions, and to ſay only what we cannot do.

The reader will not expect I can have ſo little opinion of his ſagacity, as to give him an example in every kind of ſtudy; but, whichſoever may occaſionally relate to the point in queſtion, I cannot too much exhort the preceptor to adapt his explication to the capacity of his pupil; for I repeat it once more, the evil lies not in what he is ignorant of, but in what he imagines he underſtands.

I remember, that, one day, endeavouring to give a child a taſte for chemiſtry, after I had ſhown him ſeveral metalline precipitations, I explained to him the method of making ink. I told him its blackneſs was occaſioned only by the very fine particles of iron ſeparated from the vitriol, and precipitated by an alcaline fluid. In the middle of my learned explication, the ſhrewd little queriſt ſtopped me ſhort with my queſtion, which I had taught him; and which indeed not a little embarraſſed me. After thinking a little, however, I took the following method to reſolve it. I ordered a bottle of wine to be brought out of the cellar, and another of common ordinary wine to be fetched from the tavern. I then took a little phial full of a ſolution

of

of fixed alcali; and pouring out two glaſſes of wine, one out of each bottle, I thus prepared for the experiment*.

It is cuſtomary, ſaid I, for the venders of certain commodities to adulterate them in order to make them look better than they really are. Theſe adulterations deceive both the eye and taſte; but are in themſelves hurtful, and make the adulterated commodity, notwithſtanding its appearance, worſe than before.

Liquors in particular, and wines more than any other, are ſubject to this adulteration; becauſe the deception is not eaſily detected and is very profitable to the vender. The adulteration of tart or ſour wines is made with litharge, which is a preparation of lead. Lead united to an acid produces a ſugar or ſweet ſalt, which corrects the taſte of ſour wine, but is poiſonous to thoſe who drink it. It is requiſite, therefore, before we drink any wine ſuſpected of adulteration, to know certainly whether there be litharge in it or not. Now, it is by this method of reaſoning I am led to the means of diſcovering it.

I know that wine contains not only an inflammable ſpirit, as you have ſeen in the brandy diſtilled from it; but alſo an acid, as you may be convinced, by the tartar ſubſiding from it, and the vinegar into which it is converted.

The

* A little preparation is neceſſary to every experiment exhibited to children, as it ſerves to render them attentive to what is doing.

The acid is attracted by metallic ſubſtances, and adheres to them in their ſolution, forming a compound ſalt; ſuch, for example as is the ruſt of iron, which is nothing more than the particles of the metal diſſolved by the acid ſpirit contained in the air or in water: ſuch alſo is verdigris, which is only copper diſſolved by vinegar.

At the ſame time this acid has a ſtronger attraction, however, to alcaline than to metalline ſubſtances; in ſo much that by the intervention of the former between the compound ſalts abovementioned, the acid is ſeparated from the metal to which it was before united, and adheres to the alcali. Hence the metalline ſubſtance, detached from the acid, which kept it in a ſtate of ſolution, is precipitated, and makes the fluid black.

If, then, either of the wines before us be adulterated with litharge, its acid keeps it in a ſtate of ſolution. So that if I pour this alcaline fluid into them, it will compel the acid to let go its hold of the metal and adhere to itſelf; when the lead, being no longer kept floating, will again appear, trouble the wine, and at length be precipitated to the bottom of the glaſs.

On the contrary, if there be no lead nor mixture of other metal in the wine,* the alcali will

* The wines, which are ſold by retail by the wine-merchants at Paris, although they ſhould not be purpoſely adulterated with litharge, are ſeldom without ſome lead in them: becauſe their meaſures and other imple-

will unite itſelf quietly to the acid*, the whole will remain diſſolved, and you will ſee no precipitation.

On this, I poured the alcaline ſolution ſucceſſively into both glaſſes; the liquor in one of them remaining afterwards clear and tranſparent; that in the other became thick and troubled, and in leſs than an hour we could ſee clearly the lead precipitated to the bottom.

There, ſaid I, you ſee one of theſe wines is pure and genuine, and the other adulterated and poiſonous. This diſcovery we make, by means of that kind of knowledge, of which you require to know the utility. When we know how to make ink, we know how to detect adulterated wine.

I was myſelf very well ſatisfied with the explication and example I had given; I obſerved, however, that it did not ſtrike the child. It required ſome time for me to diſcover it to be very idle, and that I had been all the while talking to no purpoſe. For, ſetting aſide the impoſſibility that a boy of twelve years of age ſhould follow the courſe of my argument, the utility of the experi-

ments are uſually made of lead; and the wine, in paſſing through them always diſſolves ſome part. It is ſtrange ſo manifeſtly abuſive and dangerous a practice ſhould be ſuffered in a city ſo reſpectable for its police. It is true people of faſhion and ſubſtance, never drinking theſe retailed wines, they are not ſo liable to be poiſoned.

* The vegetable acid is very mild. If it were a mineral one, their union would not be effected without fermentation.

experiment would never enter his head; becauſe, taſting both wines and finding both good, he had annexed no meaning to the term of *adulteration*, which I thought I had ſo clearly explained; the words *pernicious* and *poiſonous* conveying no idea to his apprehenſion.

Thoſe relations between cauſe and effect of which we cannot perceive the connexion, that good and evil of which we have no idea, and the neceſſities we have never felt, have no influence on our underſtandings. We have as vague notions, at fifteen years of age, of the happineſs attendant on wiſdom, as at thirty of the celeſtial glories of the New Jeruſalem. If we have no clear conceptions of the one or the other, we ſhall take but little trouble to obtain them; and, though our ideas were ever ſo preciſe on theſe ſubjects, we ſhould take juſt as little, unleſs we felt ſome attachment to, or deſire after them. It is eaſy to convince a child of the utility of whatever we have a mind to teach him; but it ſignifies little to convince him of this, unleſs you can perſuade him alſo to purſue it. Reaſon in vain may induce us coldly to approve or blame; the paſſions only are the ſprings of action; and how can our paſſions be excited by objects or circumſtances in which we do not perceive ourſelves at all intereſted?

Never point out any thing to a child which is beyond his views. While he is a ſtranger to the relations and duties of humanity, as you cannot raiſe his comprehenſion to the ſtate of manhood,

manhood, you ſhould bring down the ſtate of manhood to a level with his capacity. In projecting what may be uſeful to him hereafter, ſpeak to him directly only of what is apparently uſeful to him at preſent. Beware, alſo, in general, of making compariſons between your pupil and other children; let him have no rival, no competitor, not even in his corporeal exerciſes, as ſoon as he begins to reaſon. I had much rather he ſhould not learn at all whatever muſt be taught him by means of vanity or jealouſy. I would content myſelf, in this reſpect, with remarking his annual progreſs, and comparing his ſituation and exploits in the preſent year with thoſe of the paſt. I would ſay to him, you are grown ſo much ſince ſuch a time; here is the ditch you leaped, the weight you lifted, the diſtance you threw a ſtone, ſo far you ran without fetching breath; let us ſee what you can do more at preſent. Thus would I excite him to emulation, without making him jealous or envious of a rival; he would be deſirous indeed to excel himſelf, and ſo he ought to be; I ſee no inconvenience in this kind of emulation.

I hate books; they only teach people to talk about what they don't underſtand. It is ſaid that Hermes engraved the elements of the ſciences on columns, to ſecure his diſcoveries from being loſt in the time of a general deluge. Had he imprinted them on the minds of men, they had been better preſerved by tradition. The organs of the memory, duely prepared, are the monu-

ments on which human ſcience would be moſt indelibly engraven.

Is there no expedient to be thought of, to collect the various inſtructions, ſcattered up and down in ſo many voluminous tomes? to unite them under one general head, which may be eaſy to comprehend, intereſting to purſue, and which may ſerve as a *ſtimulus*, even to children of this age? If one could but conceive a ſituation, in which all the natural wants of man would be diſplayed, in a manner adapted to the underſtanding of a child, and wherein the means of ſatisfying thoſe wants are gradually diſcovered with the ſame eaſe and ſimplicity, it would be in a juſt and lively deſcription of ſuch a ſtate, that we ſhould firſt exerciſe his imagination.

I ſee the imagination of the philoſopher already take fire. Impetuous genius! give yourſelf no trouble; ſuch a ſituation is already diſcovered; it is already deſcribed, and I may ſay, without any impeachment to your talents, much better than you could deſcribe it yourſelf; at leaſt with more exactneſs and ſimplicity. Since we muſt have books, there is one already which, in my opinion, affords a complete treatiſe on natural education. This book ſhall be the firſt Emilius ſhall read: In this, indeed, will, for a long time, conſiſt his whole library, and it will always hold a diſtinguiſhed place among others. It will afford us the text, to which all our converſations on the objects of natural ſcience will ſerve only as a comment. It will

ſerve as our guide during our progreſs to a ſtate of reaſon; and will even afterwards give us conſtant pleaſure unleſs our taſte be totally vitiated. You aſk impatiently, what is the title of this wonderful book? Is it Ariſtotle, Pliny, or Buffon? No. It is Robinſon Cruſoe.

Robinſon Cruſoe, caſt aſhore on a deſolate iſland, deſtitute of human aſſiſtance, and of mechanical implements, providing, nevertheleſs, for his ſubſiſtence, for ſelf-preſervation, and even procuring for himſelf a kind of competency. In theſe circumſtances, I ſay, there cannot be an object more intereſting to perſons of every age; and there are a thouſand ways to render it agreeable to children. Thus, you ſee, I have realized that deſert iſland, which I at firſt made uſe of only by way of compariſon. Such a ſituation, I confeſs, is very different from that of man in a ſtate of ſociety. Very probably it will never be that of Emilius; but it is from ſuch a ſtate he ought to learn to eſtimate others. The moſt certain method for him to raiſe himſelf above vulgar prejudices and to form his judgement on the actual relations of things, is to take on himſelf the character of ſuch a ſolitary adventurer, and to judge of every thing about him, as a man in ſuch circumſtances would, by its real utility. This romance beginning with his ſhipwreck on the iſland, and ending with the arrival of the veſſel that brought him away, would, if cleared of its rubbiſh, afford Emilius,

during the period we are now treating of, at once both inſtruction and amuſement. I would have him indeed perſonate the hero of the tale, and be entirely taken up with his caſtle, his goats and his plantations; he ſhould make himſelf minutely acquainted, not from books but circumſtances, with every thing requiſite for a man in ſuch a ſituation. He ſhould affect even his dreſs, wear a coat of ſkins, a great hat, a large hanger; in ſhort, he ſhould be entirely equipped in his groteſque manner, even with his umbrello, though he would have no occaſion for it. I would have him when at a loſs about the meaſures neceſſary to be taken for his proviſion or ſecurity, upon this or the other occaſion, examine the conduct of his hero; he ſhould ſee if he omitted nothing, or if any thing better could be ſubſtituted in the room of what was actually done; and, on the diſcovery of any miſtake in Robinſon, ſhould amend it in a ſimilar caſe himſelf: for I doubt not but he will form a project of going to make a like ſettlement. Not unlike to this were thoſe ancient caſtles in Spain, in that happy age when the height of human felicity conſiſted in the injoyment of liberty and the neceſſaries of life.

What opportunities of inſtruction would ſuch an amuſement afford an able preceptor, who ſhould project it only with a view to that end! The pupil, eager to furniſh a magazine for his iſland, would be more ready to learn than his tutor to teach him. He would be ſollicitous to know

know every thing that is uſeful, and nothing elſe: You would in ſuch a caſe have no more occaſion to direct; but only to reſtrain him. Let us haſten, therefore, to eſtabliſh him in this imaginary iſle, ſince to this he confines his preſent happineſs; for the time will now ſoon come, in which, if he is deſirous of life, it is not to live alone, and in which even a man *Friday*, the want of whom does not now affect him, would not be long ſatisfactory.

The practice of ſimple manual arts, to the exerciſe of which the abilities of the individual are equal, leads to the invention of the arts of induſtry, the exerciſe of which requires the concurrence of many. The former may be practiſed by hermits, and ſavages; but the latter can be exerciſed only in a ſtate of ſociety, and render that ſtate neceſſary. While man is ſubject only to the calls of phyſical neceſſity, he is capable of ſatisfying them himſelf: but, by the introduction of ſuperfluous wants, the joint concern and diſtribution of labour become indiſpenſible: for though a man by his own labour, when alone, procures only ſubſiſtance for an individual, yet an hundred men, working in concert, will eaſily procure, in the ſame time, ſubſiſtence for double the number. As ſoon, therefore, as one part of mankind take upon themſelves to live idle, it becomes neceſſary that the concurrent labour of numbers ſhould ſupply the place of thoſe who live without work.

Your greateſt care ſhould be to keep from your pupil the notions of thoſe ſocial relations, which he is not in a capacity to comprehend; but when the connection of his ideas oblige you to ſpeak of the mutual dependence of mankind, inſtead of preſenting him at firſt the moral ſide of the queſtion, divert his attention as much as poſſible to induſtry and the mechanick arts, which render men uſeful to one another. In going about with him to the work-ſhops of various artiſans, never let him ſee any thing performed without lending a hand to the work, nor come out of the ſhop without perfectly underſtanding the reaſon of what he obſerves there. To this end, you ſhould work yourſelf, and in every thing ſet him an example. To make him a maſter, be you in every thing the apprentice; and reflect that he will learn more by one hour of manual labour, than he will retain from a whole day's verbal inſtructions.

The different arts are entitled to various proportions of public eſteem, and that in an inverſe ratio to their real uſe. This eſteem is directly as their inutility, and ſo it politically ought to be. The moſt uſeful arts are thoſe which are the worſt paid for, or leaſt rewarded; becauſe the number of workmen is proportioned to the wants of the whole ſociety, and the labour the poor muſt purchaſe muſt neceſſarily be at a low price. On the contrary, thoſe important artiſans, who, by way of diſtinction, are termed artiſts, and

are

are employed only in the ſervice of the rich and idle, ſet an arbi rary price on their workmanſhip; and as the excellence of their baubles is mere matter of opinion, their high price conſtitutes great part of their merit, and they are eſteemed in proportion to what they coſt. The value thus ſet upon them is not on account of any uſe they are of to the rich, but becauſe they are too coſtly to be purchaſed by the poor. *Nolo habere bona niſi quibus populus inviderit.**

What will become of your pupils, if you permit them to adopt this ridiculous prejudice; if you encourage it yourſelf, or ſee them, for example, enter, with more reſpect the ſhop of a jeweller than that of a lockſmith? What a judgment will they form of the real merit of the arts and the intrinſick value of things, when they ſee whim and caprice univerſally oppoſed to real utility, and find the more a thing coſts the leſs it is worth? If ever ſuch ideas as theſe take root in their minds, you may as well give up at once the remaining part of their education; they will, in ſpite of all you can do, be educated like the reſt of the world, and you will have taken, for fourteen years paſt, all your trouble for nothing.

Emilius will ſee things in a very different light, while he is employed in furniſhing his iſland. Robinſon Cruſoe would have ſet a greater value on the ſtock in trade of a petty ironmonger, than on that of the moſt magnificent

* Petron.

and beſt furniſhed toy-ſhop in Europe. The firſt had appeared to him a reſpectable perſonage, while the owner of the latter had been deſpiſed as frivolous and contemptible.

I doubt not but ſome ſagacious member of ſociety will make the following objection. "My ſon (he will ſay) is formed to live in the world; not to reſide among a ſet of philoſophers, but to herd with fools; it is proper, therefore, he ſhould be acquainted with thoſe follies that influence their conduct. The knowledge of things, as they are, may be uſeful; but that of men and opinions is much more ſo; for, in ſociety, the knowledge of mankind is the beſt means to make the moſt of them, and he is the wiſeſt man who acquires the moſt, and makes the beſt uſe of it. To what purpoſe, then, is it to give children the ideas of an imaginary order of things, directly contrary to that which cuſtom has eſtabliſhed, and by which they muſt regulate their behaviour? Read them, firſt, lectures to make themſelves wiſe, and then you may take what method you will to inſtruct them in what reſpect others are fools."

Such are the ſpecious maxims, on which is founded the falſe prudence of parents, who endeavour to make their children ſlaves to thoſe prejudices in which they themſelves are educated. How many things are neceſſary to be known, previous to the ſtudy of mankind! This is the laſt and moſt arduous taſk of the philoſo-

ſopher, and you would have it be the firſt child. Before you inſtruct him in the vledge of your own ſentiments, you ſhould ı, by teaching him to form ſome eſtimate ıeir truth and propriety: Our opinions are rted to children as reaſons; is this the way ach them the folly of them? In order to ı wiſdom, it is neceſſary to be able to diſcern is not ſo. How ſhall your child know how ıdy mankind, if he is incapable to judge of ſentiments, or to detect their errors? It is ſfortune for him to know their opinions, ? he is ignorant whether they be true or falſe. :h him firſt, therefore, what things are in ſelves; and you may afterwards inſtruct at leiſure, what are the general ſentiments ankind. Thus will he be enabled to judge ır opinions by the criterion of truth, and above the miſtaken notions of the vulgar. dopt prejudices is not to know them as ſuch, ıre the multitude governed by thoſe who ike themſelves. If you begin by making pupil acquainted with the opinions of the d, before you have taught him how to ? of them, you may aſſure yourſelf, ſay : you will, they will become his, and you never after be able to eradicate them. I lude this ſubject, therefore, by laying down maxim, that to render a youth ſenſible and ious, we ought to form his opinion of things not to dictate our's.

You will obſerve that hitherto I have ſaid nothing to my pupil about mankind, he would have had too much good ſenſe to underſtand me, if I had; his connexions with, and relations to, his fellow-creatures, are not as yet ſtriking and conſpicuous enough to enable him to judge of others by himſelf. He has no ideas of human nature but what centre in his own perſon, and even his ſelf-knowledge is but very confined. If his ideas, however, are contracted, at leaſt they are juſt. He knows not the relative ſituation of others, but he is ſenſible of his own, and keeps his place. Inſtead of reſtraining him by ſocial ties, the force of which he could not comprehend, we have bound him by the obvious chains of neceſſity. He is as yet little better than a mere phyſical being; let us continue to treat him as ſuch.

He forms his judgement, and eſtimates the value of the works both of nature and art, by their relation to his own convenience, ſecurity, and preſervation. Hence, he looks upon iron, as a more precious metal than gold, and glaſs to be more valuable than diamonds. For the ſame reaſon he hath more reſpect for a ſhoe-maker, or a maſon, than for all the celebrated jewellers in Europe. A paſtry-cook is, in his opinion, a perſon of ſingular importance, and the whole academy of ſciences of leſs conſequence than the reſpectable perſonage of the meaneſt confectioner. Goldſmiths, engravers, and gilders, are, with him, idle inſignificant people, who amuſe

amuſe themſelves in employments frivolous and uſeleſs; nay, he does not hold even a watch-maker in very high eſtimation. Happy in the enjoyment of this native liberty, he profits by time without knowing its value. That tranquillity, which, undiſturbed by the violence of paſſion, makes its ſucceſſion equal, ſerves him inſtead of a machine to meaſure the quantity elapſed *. In ſuppoſing his pocket to be furniſhed with a watch, as in ſuppoſing him to cry, I only made uſe on that occaſion of an Emilius vulgarly educated, for the ſake of illuſtration: for, in fact, a child, ſo different from all others, can hardly be made uſe of as an example in any caſe.

There is another order of diſtinction, not leſs natural, and ſtill more judicious, according to which the arts may be ranked agreeably to their order in that neceſſary chain which connects them together; placing the moſt independent in the firſt claſs, and thoſe which depend on the greateſt number of others, in the laſt. This method of arrangement, which may furniſh important conſiderations on the order of ſociety in general, is ſimilar to the former in that it is equally ſubject to be perverted by the prepoſſeſſions and caprices of mankind. Hence it is,

* We loſe our conſtitutional meaſure of time, when the paſſions would ſubject its duration to their will. The philoſopher's time-piece is evenneſs of temper and tranquillity of mind; he is always in his own time, and knows it exactly.

that all manufactured ſubſtances, are firſt laboriouſly operated on by workmen below conſideration, and almoſt without pay; that the more hands they paſs through, the more expenſive becomes the labour, and the more creditable the profeſſion of each ſucceſſive artiſan. I will not here enquire whether it be true, that induſtry is more exerted in the elegant arts than in thoſe which give the firſt form to the maſſive ſubſtance, and fit it for common uſes; but I affirm that in all caſes, thoſe arts which are the moſt general and indiſpenſible are inconteſtibly thoſe which deſerve to be held in the greateſt eſteem; and that ſuch as require the leaſt aſſiſtance from others deſerve ſtill leſs to be degraded loweſt of all, when they are at the ſame time the moſt free and independent. Theſe rules form the true criterion whereby to judge of the merit, and eſtimate the value, of arts and induſtry. All other are arbitrary and capricious. The firſt and moſt reſpectable of all arts and profeſſions is that of agriculture: next to the huſbandman I rank the ſmith; to the ſmith ſucceeds the carpenter, and ſo on. A child, who ſhould not have acquired a misjudging partiality from vulgar prejudices, would rank them alſo preciſely in the ſame order. How many important reflections on this ſubject, may not Emilius deduce from Robinſon Cruſoe! What will he think in ſeeing the arts carried to perfection, by being divided and ſubdivided into ſuch a number of branches, and by the inven-

tion of ſuch an infinite variety of implements to work with? Will he not call their ingenuity ridiculous, and think they are afraid their arms and fingers are not fit for uſe, that they have contrived ſo many expedients to work without them? To exerciſe one trade, they muſt be furniſhed with tools by a thouſand others: The artiſans of a whole town muſt be employed to ſet any one of them to work. As to my companion and myſelf, our ingenuity lies in our dexterity; we make uſe of the tools we carry about us. Let the proudeſt workman belonging to the nicknackitories of Paris come to our deſert iſland, his talents uſeleſs here, he will be glad in his turn to ſerve an apprenticeſhip to us.

Confine not your obſervation here, reader, to the corporeal exerciſe, and manual dexterity of my pupil; but conſider the proper methods we take to gratify his childiſh curioſity; remark the effects of his good ſenſe, his genius for invention, his foreſight and other intellectual abilities. In whatever he ſees, or is employed in, he wants to know the reaſon of every thing; tracing back one inſtrument from another, till he arrive at the firſt and moſt ſimple. He takes nothing upon ſuppoſition or on truſt; but refuſes even to learn any thing that requires a previous knowledge of which he is not poſſeſſed. If he ſees, for inſtance, a file, or a ſpring, he immediately recurs to the method of working up the materials from the ore. If he ſees the ſides of a cheſt fitted together, he muſt know the methods of

of felling the timber and ſawing it into planks. If he be, himſelf, at work, he never fails to reflect on every new tool he makes uſe of, and to conſider how he might have conſtructed ſuch an implement, or have made ſhift without it.

There is an errour, however, difficult to avoid, in employing your pupil in theſe mechanical operations; and that is, you will always ſuppoſe him to have a taſte for thoſe you are fond of yourſelf: but you muſt beware, that, while you are ſeeking your own amuſement, you do not fatigue and diſguſt your pupil, who perhaps will not let you perceive it. Your little artiſan ſhould find in himſelf every thing needful to execute his deſigns, but he ſhould find in you every thing needful to direct him in thoſe deſigns. You ſhould obſerve him, and watch his motions continually, without his knowing it; you ſhould anticipate his thoughts, and prevent thoſe which are improper; in ſhort, you ſhould keep him ſo employed, that he ſhould not only be ſenſible of the uſe of his own talents, but that he ſhould take delight in his employment, from a like ſenſe of its utility.

The intercourſe of the arts conſiſts in the reciprocal exchange of induſtry, that of commerce in the exchange of commodities, and that of money in the exchange of bills and caſh: All theſe are intimately connected with each other, and we have already acquired ideas of the principles on which they are founded, from our diſpute with Robert, the gardener. At preſent

ſent we have nothing more to do than to generalize thoſe ideas, and to extend them to a variety of examples, in order to give Emilius a juſt notion of the nature of commercial connexions; which may be exemplified by the natural hiſtory of the produce peculiar to different climates, by enumerating the arts and ſciences which relate to navigation, and repreſenting the various obſtacles that are ſurmounted in tranſporting commodities from one country to another. No ſociety can exiſt without making uſe of the expedients of exchange, nor can any exchange be carried on without ſome common ſtandard: this alſo muſt be formed on ſome principle of equality. Hence every ſociety has, for its firſt law, ſome conventional equality, both of perſons and of property.

The conventional equality between perſons is very different from the natural, and therefore requires the protection of government and laws. The political knowledge of a child ſhould be very clear and confined: he ought to have no other idea of government in general than what relates to the notion concerning the right of property which he hath already imbibed.

The conventional equality, between articles of property, gave riſe to the invention of money; which ſerves as the means of comparing the value of the different ſpecies of ſuch articles; and in this ſenſe money may be denominated the real bond of ſociety. Every thing, however, may be converted into money. Formerly cattle

cattle were made uſe of as ſuch, ſo at preſent, in ſome countries, are ſhells, teeth, &c. The money of Sparta, was iron, that of Sweden has been made of leather, as our's is now of gold and ſilver.

Metals, as the moſt eaſily tranſported, are generally made choice of to form this mean term in our uſual courſe of exchange. To facilitate this end, by ſparing the trouble of recurring to weights or meaſures, they are converted into regular coin. For the ſtamp imprinted thereon is no more than an atteſtation, that the piece ſo marked is of ſuch a certain weight; the ſovereign only having a right to coin money, ſo long as he is poſſeſſed of a right to require his atteſtation to paſs unqueſtioned through a whole people, or ſo long as he reſerves to himſelf ſuch excluſive privilege.

The uſe of this invention, thus explained, will be readily perceived by a child of the dulleſt apprehenſion. It is, indeed, difficult to make a direct compariſon between commodities of different kinds; as for example, between cloth and grain: but when a ſtandard common to both, ſuch as money, is eſtabliſhed, it is eaſy for the manufacturer and huſbandman to apply the value of their reſpective articles thereto, and to judge what quantity of each is equivalent to the other. For if ſo many yards of broad-cloth be worth a certain ſum of money, and ſo many buſhels of wheat be worth the like ſum, the draper, in taking the wheat for his cloth, makes a fair and equi-

equitable exchange. Thus it is, that through the medium of money, the produce and manufactures of different kinds and countries may be eſtimated and compared with each other.

Go no farther than this, nor enter into any diſquiſition concerning the moral effects of this inſtitution. It is of conſequence, in every caſe, to bring your pupil acquainted with the nature and end of every cuſtom before you point out its abuſe. If you attempt to explain to children in what manner ſigns are ſubſtituted for things, that money hath been productive of the numerous chimeras of prejudice and caprice, and that countries abounding in ſilver and gold muſt be proportionably deſtitute of real wealth; in doing this, I ſay, you treat them, not only as if they were profeſſed philoſophers, but alſo as men of experience; and attempt to give them conceptions of what even few philoſophers have clearly underſtood.

To what a variety of intereſting ſubjects may we not, by theſe means, direct the curioſity of our pupil, without ever quitting thoſe real and ſenſible relations, which are contained within the ſphere of his knowledge, or exciting in his mind one idea beyond the reach of his capacity. A judicious preceptor will not dwell, with heavy prolixity, on frivolous ſubjects, but be conſtantly preparing his pupil for the knowledge of thoſe important relations, which will one day be neceſſary for him, in order to his forming a right judgement of the good or evil cuſtoms of ſociety.

ſociety. He will endeavour to adapt his converſation and amuſements to the turn of mind he has given him. A queſtion that would ſcarce excite the attention of another child, will perplex Emilius for ſix months together.

I take an opportunity, we will ſuppoſe, to carry him to dinner at the houſe of ſome opulent family; where, when we arrive, we find great preparations making for an elegant entertainment, much company, a number of ſervants, a variety of diſhes, and a ſuperb ſideboard of plate. There is ſomething intoxicating, to thoſe who are unaccuſtomed to it, in this appearance of ſplendour and feſtivity. I foreſee the effect it will have on my pupil; and, therefore, in the midſt of the hurry and clamour that prevail round the table, I whiſper in his ear, and aſk him, how many hands he thinks were employed in furniſhing the entertainment before us. What a crowd of ideas will thoſe few words bring thronging into his mind! In an inſtant his delirium vaniſhes. He muſes, reflects, begins to calculate, and puzzles himſelf with thinking. While grave philoſophers, inſpired by the wine, or perhaps by the charms of the ladies, degrade themſelves by talking idly, and, in the gaiety of their hearts, behave like children, Emilius ſits philoſophiſing by himſelf at one corner of the table: he applies to me with an interrogation, which I refuſe to anſwer, deferring it to another opportunity. At this he grows uneaſy, he cannot eat a morſel, nor drink

drink a drop more, but burns with impatience to get away from table, in order to converſe with me more freely. What an object this for his curioſity to work upon! What a text, pregnant with inſtruction! With a ſound judgement, unbiaſſed by prepoſſeſſion, and untainted with prejudice, what ideas muſt he form of luxury, when he comes to find that all the countries in the world have been laid under contribution, that twenty millions of hands have been for a long time employed, that thouſands of men, perhaps, have loſt their lives, and all this to preſent him, in ſuch publick pomp at noon, what he may privately diſburthen himſelf of before night?

Be very attentive to thoſe concluſions which the heart of a child will deduce in ſecret from all his obſervations. If you have taken leſs pains with your's than I have preſcribed, he may be tempted, in ſuch a caſe as the above, to give his reflexions quite a different turn, and look upon himſelf as a perſon of very great importance in the world, in ſeeing ſo much pains taken to provide for his dinner. If you foreſee this ſentiment, you may eaſily prevent it, or at leaſt preſently efface the impreſſion it makes on him. Being as yet ignorant of the means of appropriating any thing to himſelf except by actual poſſeſſion and enjoyment, he cannot judge of their convenience or inconvenience to him, but by the pleaſure they afford him. Now the ſimple compariſon between ſuch a ſplendid and formal repaſt,

paſt, and a plain and homely dinner, provided by his own labour, and ſeaſoned by appetite, liberty, and eaſe, is ſufficient to make him ſenſible that all that magnificent appearance of feſtivity, had been of no real uſe, and that, his hunger being as fully ſatisfied at the table of the peaſant as at that of a lord, he enjoys nothing at the one more than at the other, which he can truely call his own.

Let us imagine what a polite governour would ſay to a child on ſuch an occaſion. "Recollect the circumſtances, he would ſay, of each repaſt, and determine within yourſelf which afforded you the greateſt pleaſure. At which have you demonſtrated the greateſt expreſſions of joy? At which have you ſhown the keeneſt appetite, drank the moſt chearfully, and laughed the moſt heartily? Which laſted the longeſt without making you weary, or kept you longeſt from being again hungry? Yet, ſee the difference: this brown bread, which you reliſh ſo well, comes from the corn ſown and reaped by the peaſant; his thick wine, ſo refreſhing and wholeſome, is produced from his own vine; his table-cloth is made of his own flax, ſpun in the winter by his wife and children: no other hands than thoſe of his family have been employed in providing for his table; the neareſt mill, and the next market town, are to him the extremities of the univerſe. What then have you really enjoyed of all that profuſion, with which the moſt diſtant parts of the earth, and the complicated

cated induſtry of man, ſo ſplendidly furniſhed the table at which you lately dined? If that ſplendour did not add to the ſatisfaction of your repaſt, what did you gain by all that ſuperfluity? What did you find there made for you? Had you even been the maſter of the houſe, might he add, the magnificence would be ſtill leſs, with any propriety, to be called your's: for your ſollicitude to diſplay the wealth and plenty you enjoyed, to others, would abſolutely deprive you of ſuch enjoyment: you only would have all the trouble, and your gueſts the pleaſure."

This diſcourſe may be very fine, but it would be of no uſe to Emilius; being above his comprehenſion, and, moreover, to dictate his reflexions is not our cuſtom. Speak to him, therefore, in a more ſimple manner. Having made both the above experiments, ſay to him ſome fine morning—"Where ſhall we dine to day? round that mountain of plate that covered three fourths of the table, and the deſert of artificial flowers and looking-glaſs? among thoſe women with their great hoop-petticoats, who treated you like a puppet, and wanted to make you talk what you did not underſtand? or ſhall we rather go to the village two leagues off, where the good people received us ſo joyfully, and gave us ſuch excellent cream?" Emilius will not heſitate a moment to determine; for he is neither given to babbling, nor puffed up by vanity; beſides this, he hates reſtraint, and has no reliſh for high-ſeaſoned ragouts: but he is always ready to run about

about the fields, and loves fine fruit, freſh ve tables, good cream, and good people*. Th is no doubt, but the reflexion you want to culcate, will ſuggeſt itſelf, during our excurſio and that our pupil will obſerve, that the peo who furniſh out ſuch grand entertainmen throw away their labour, or that they are qu ignorant of our enjoyments.

The examples, which I introduce by way illuſtration, though proper for one ſubject, m be improper for a thouſand others. If the re der enters into the ſpirit of them, however, will ſee they may be varied as occaſion requir their application depending on the genius a diſpoſition of the pupil; a knowledge of whi is acquired by the opportunities given the to diſplay themſelves. It cannot be expect that in the ſpace of three or four years, ſhould give a child, even of the moſt hap turn and diſpoſition, ſuch an idea of the ar

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* The taſte which I ſuppoſe my pupil to have for country, is the natural effect of his education. Havi beſides nothing of that foppiſh and affected air, whi is ſo taking with the women, he is leſs careſſed than otl children; and of courſe leſs pleaſed with, and ſpoiled b being in their company, the charms of which he is at p ſent incapable to perceive. I have taken care in partic lar, not to learn him to kiſs the hand; to repeat their ce monious nonſenſe, or ſhow them in preference to the otl ſex, even the reſpect which is their due. I lay it down an inviolable rule to require nothing of him, of whi he is not in a capacity to comprehend the reaſon: now good reaſon can be given, why a child ſhould treat o ſex with more reſpect than another.

and ſciences, as is ſufficient to enable him to ſtudy them without further aſſiſtance. In thus bringing him acquainted, however, with the various objects requiſite for him to know, we put him in a ſituation to diſplay his genius and taſte by degrees, to make the firſt advances to their proper objects, and to indicate the route which muſt be taken to ſecond the deſigns of nature.

Another advantage ariſing from our thus giving him a juſt, but limited, ſeries of ideas, is that of ſhowing him their proper relations and connexion, of placing every thing in a due order in his eſtimation, and of preventing the riſe of thoſe prepoſſeſſions which moſt men entertain, in favour of the talents they cultivate, and to the prejudice of ſuch as they have neglected. He, who perceives the order of the whole, ſees the due place of every part; and, though a man who knows only a part, if intimately acquainted with it, may be ſtiled a man of knowledge, the other only, is the man of judgement; and it is to be remembered that the great object in view, in our method of education, is judgement, and not ſcience.

However this be, my method is independent of the examples I make uſe of to illuſtrate it. It is founded on the progreſs of the human faculties at different periods, and on the choice of thoſe proper objects on which ſuch faculties ſhould be employed. I conceive it will be very eaſy to find another method which will promiſe better;

better; but if, it be leſs adapted to our ſpecies, age and ſex, I doubt much if it will be attended with the ſame ſucceſs.

In the commencement of this ſecond period of childhood, we took the advantage of our abilities exceeding our wants, to extend our views beyond our own perſons: we ſoared into the expanſe of the heavens, took meaſure of the earth, deduced the laws of nature; in a word, we have explored our whole iſland: let us now, therefore, return home to our more immediate habitation; happy to find at our entrance, that no enemy hath taken poſſeſſion, or threatens to wreſt it from us by force!

What remains for us to do after obſerving every thing that ſurrounds us? To make uſe of every thing we can appropriate, and to employ our curioſity to our advantage. Hitherto we have made a proviſion of tools and implements, of every kind, without knowing to what uſes we ſhall have occaſion to put them. Perhaps, uſeleſs to ourſelves, they might yet be of ſervice to others; and perhaps we in our turn, may have need of their's: Hence we ſhould all find our account in making an exchange. In order to do this, however, it is neceſſary to learn our reciprocal wants, every one ſhould know what the other poſſeſſes that might be of uſe to himſelf, and what he might be willing to accept in return. Let us ſuppoſe, for inſtance, ten men, each of whom ſtands in need of ten different things.

things. If they go about ſeparately to ſupply their wants, each muſt apply himſelf to ten different kinds of occupation; but, on account of their different turn and genius, ſome will ſucceed better at one occupation, and others at another: thus though collectively they might ſucceed equally in all; yet, each attempting it ſeparately, they are every one but ill ſerved. Let us form a little ſociety, therefore, of theſe ten individuals, and let each apply himſelf, ſolely, to that kind of occupation at which he is moſt expert; by this expedient each will profit as much by the talents of the reſt as if he had poſſeſſed them all. By continued application, alſo, to one kind of employment, they would all acquire additional dexterity, and thus would not only be completely provided for themſelves, but ſoon acquire a ſuperfluity for the uſe of others. This is the apparent principle on which are founded our various mechanical and other inſtitutions. It is not my buſineſs to examine here into the conſequences; I have already done it in another treatiſe.

On this principle, a man who ſhould be deſirous to conſider himſelf as a ſolitary and independent being, could not fail of being miſerable. It would be even impoſſible for him to ſubſiſt; for, finding the earth already occupied and divided into *meum* and *tuum*, and having no implements or property, by what means would he provide himſelf with the neceſſaries of life? In departing, ourſelves, from a ſtate of nature,

we oblige all our fellow creatures to do the like; no one can remain therein, in ſpite of the reſt; and it would be to act moſt prepoſterouſly againſt nature to be obſtinately tenacious of a ſituation, in which it is impoſſible we ſhould exiſt: for the firſt law of nature is that of ſelf-preſervation. Thus may we form, by degrees, in the mind of a child, ideas of ſocial relations, even before he really becomes an active member of ſociety. Emilius ſees already, that, to acquire implements for his own uſe, he muſt poſſeſs ſome for the uſe of others, which he may exchange for thoſe he ſtands in need of: thus I lead him eaſily to perceive the neceſſity of this commercial intercourſe, and prepare him, when occaſion offers, to turn it to his advantage.

"*Sir, I muſt live,*" was the ſaying of a wretched libeller to a miniſter of ſtate, who reproached him with the infamy of his profeſſion. "*I cannot ſee the neceſſity of it,*" replied the miniſter very coldly. This reply, excellent as it was from a ſecretary of ſtate, had been unjuſt and inhuman from any other perſon. Every man muſt live. This argument, which, every one thinks more or leſs cogent, in proportion to his humanity, appears to me unanſwerable, with reſpect to the perſon who urges it. Of all natural antipathies, our averſion to die is the ſtrongeſt; it follows, therefore, that neceſſity has no law, and that nature authoriſes a man, who hath no other poſſible means of living, to take any ſtep for his preſervation. The principles, on which a vir-

a virtuous man acquires a contempt for life, and learns to ſacrifice his exiſtence to his duty, are very different from this primitive ſimplicity. Happy people, among whom goodneſs requires no ſelf-denial, and men may be juſt without virtue! If there be ſo miſerable a ſtate in the world, as that wherein men cannot ſubſiſt without injuſtice, and whoſe citizens muſt of neceſſity be knaves, it is not their criminals who ought to be hanged, but thoſe who made them ſuch.

As ſoon as Emilius knows what life is, my firſt care ſhall be to teach him to preſerve it. Hitherto I have made no diſtinction of ſituation, rank, or fortune, nor ſhall I diſtinguiſh them otherwiſe in the ſequel; for man is the ſame in every rank and ſituation. The rich have not better appetites than the poor, nor quicker digeſtion: The maſter has no longer arms or ſtronger than the ſervant: a great man is no taller than the meaneſt artiſan; in a word, our natural wants being the ſame in every ſituation of life, the means of providing for them ought to be in all the ſame. Adapt the education of a man to his perſonal and not accidental abilities. Don't you ſee that by bringing him up only to fill one ſtation in life, you make him unfit for every other? and that mere accident may render all the pains you have taken uſeleſs, or deſtructive to him? Is there a more ridiculous being on earth than a lord, become a beggar, and retaining in his miſery the prejudices attached

to his birth? What is more vile and contemptible than a rich man become poor, ſenſible of the diſgrace of poverty, and reduced to the loweſt of the human ſpecies? The one hath no other reſource than to turn common cheat, and the other ſervilely to put on a livery, with this fine phraſe in their mouths; *we muſt live.*

You make a dependance on the actual order of ſociety, without thinking that order ſubject to unavoidable revolutions, and that it is impoſſible to foreſee or prevent that which may affect your children. The high may be reduced low, and the rich may become poor, and even the monarch dwindle into a ſubject. Are theſe changes of fortune ſo unfrequent, that you can flatter yourſelf that your pupil will be exempt from them? We certainly are approaching the criſis of human eſtabliſhments, the age of political revolutions*. Who can aſſure you what will be your lot? All that men have made, they may deſtroy. There are no characters indelible but thoſe imprinted by nature, and nature never made man royal, noble, or rich. What then will become of the pupil you have educated to live only with ſplendour, when debaſed

* I hold it impoſſible, that the great monarchies of Europe can ſubſiſt much longer; they all affect magnificence and ſplendour. Every ſtate that doth this, is upon its decline. I could give very particular and cogent reaſons for this aſſertion; but it may not be proper; and indeed they are but too obvious.

debaſed into indigence and meanneſs? What will become of a farmer of the revenues, whoſe ſoul delights in nothing but wealth, when he is reduced to want and beggary? How miſerable muſt be the ſituation of that pampered helpleſs being, who, deſtitute of every thing, is incapable of providing in the leaſt for himſelf, and places all his ſatisfaction in things dependent on others? Happy is he who knows how to quit a rank that is quitting him, and to remain ſtill a man in ſpite of fortune. Let others laviſh what encomiums they pleaſe on the frantick behaviour of the vanquiſhed monarch, who wanted to bury himſelf alive in the ruins of his throne; for my part, I hold him in contempt. It appears to me that his exiſtence depended on his crown, and that had he not been a king, he would have been nothing at all: But the monarch who can throw aſide the robes of royalty and be ſtill himſelf, is, in my opinion, infinitely ſuperior to a crown. From the rank of a king, which may be filled up by a coward, a knave, or a fool, he riſes to that of a man, which ſo few are able to fill with decency and dignity. Such a man may brave the viciſſitudes of fortune, and will triumph over them: He owes nothing to any one but himſelf, and though deſtitute of all adventitious ſubſtance, is not therefore annihilated; he is ſtill ſomething. Yes! I prefer infinitely the character of a king of Syracuſe turned ſchoolmaſter at Corinth, of a king of Macedon become a notary at Rome, to that of an unhap-

py Tarquin, ignorant how to ſubſiſt without a kingdom; of an heir to a race of kings, become the ſport of all who are brutal enough to exult in his miſery, wandering from court to court, in ſearch of relief, and meeting on every ſide with nothing but inſult, mockery, and affronts; and all for want of knowing how to exerciſe any employment different from that to which he has been educated, and which is no longer in his power.

Whether we conſider ourſelves as men or citizens, or whatever be our ſtation in life, we can contribute nothing more than our own perſonal abilities to ſociety; all our other acquirements belong to it, in ſpite of ourſelves; hence, when a man becomes rich he muſt either not enjoy his wealth himſelf, or the publick will enjoy it alſo. In the firſt caſe he only robs others of what he alſo deprives himſelf; and even in the laſt he gives them nothing. Thus the debt he owes ſociety remains undiſcharged ſo long as he pays it only with the uſe of his property. But, you will ſay, perhaps, my progenitor, in amaſſing his wealth, was of publick ſervice. He might be ſo, and therefore, may have diſcharged his own debt, but not your's. Nay, you lie under ſtill greater obligations than if you had been born poor, as you have had greater opportunities of profiting by education. It is not equitable that what one man hath done for the publick ſhould diſcharge another of what it has a right to expect from him: for every one, ſtanding

ing indebted, in himſelf to ſociety, cannot ſubſtitute any thing in the room of his perſonal ſervice. A father cannot tranſmit to his ſon the right of being uſeleſs to his fellow-creatures; and yet, according to your notions, he actually does this, by tranſmitting to him his wealth, the proof and reward of his labour. The man who earns not his ſubſiſtence, but eats the bread of idleneſs, is no better than a thief; and a penſioner, who is paid by the ſtate for doing nothing, differs little, according to my notion of things, from a robber who is ſupported by the plunder he makes on the highway. Man, in a ſtate of ſolitude, not being indebted to the aſſiſtance or good offices of others, hath a right to live as he pleaſes: but in a ſtate of ſociety, where he muſt be neceſſarily maintained at the expence of the community, he certainly owes the ſtate ſo much labour as will pay for his ſubſiſtence; and this without exception to rank or perſons. To labour, then, is the indiſpenſible duty of ſocial or political man. Rich or poor, ſtrong or weak, every idle citizen is a knave.

Now of all the occupations, which ſerve to furniſh ſubſiſtence to mankind, thoſe which approach neareſt to a ſtate of nature are the manual arts: of all conditions of life, the moſt independent of fortune or the caprices of mankind, is that of the artiſan. The artiſan depends only on his own labour; he is as free as the huſbandman is a ſlave; for the latter de-

pends on the produce of his fields, which lie at the diſcretion of others. The enemy, the ſovereign, a powerful neighbour, a law-ſuit, may run away with the crop which he hath laboriouſly toiled for: he may be diſtreſſed a thouſand ways by means of the local ſtability of his property; whereas, if an artiſan be oppreſſed in one place, his baggage is eaſily packed up, he folds his arms about him, and diſdainfully marches off to another. Agriculture is, nevertheleſs, the principal profeſſion of mankind; it is the moſt honeſt, the moſt uſeful, and of courſe the moſt creditable in the world. I have no need to bid Emilius apply himſelf to agriculture: it is already his ſtudy: every kind of ruſtick employment is familiar to him. His firſt application was to the labours of the huſbandman, and it is in thoſe he regularly exerciſes himſelf. I ſay to him, therefore, cultivate the land thou inheriteſt from thy fathers. But it may be ſaid, ſuppoſe this were to be loſt, or that a child had no paternal inheritance, what muſt he do then? Learn a trade.

"My child learn a trade! make my ſon a mechanick! Conſider, Sir, what you adviſe"—"I do, Madam, I conſider this matter better than you, who would reduce your child to the neceſſity of being a lord, a marquis, or a prince, or perhaps one day or other to be leſs than nothing. I am deſirous of inveſting him with a title that cannot be taken from him, that will in all times and places command reſpect; and, I

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can tell you, whatever you may think of it, he will have fewer equals in this rank than in that he may derive from you."

The letter deſtroys and the ſpirit maketh alive. I would not have him learn a trade, merely for the ſake of knowing how to exerciſe it, but that he may overcome the prejudices uſually conceived againſt it. You will never be reduced, you ſay, to work for your bread. So much the worſe for you; I ſay, ſo much the worſe. But, no matter; if you labour not through neceſſity, do it for reputation. Stoop to the ſituation of an artiſan that you may raiſe yourſelf above your own. To make fortune ſubſervient to your will, you muſt begin by rendering yourſelf independent. To triumph in the opinion of the world, you muſt begin by deſpiſing that opinion.

Remember, I do not adviſe you to acquire a talent, but a trade, a mechanical art, in the exerciſe of which the hands are more employed than the head; an art by which you will never get a fortune, but may be enabled to live without one. I have often obſerved, and that in families far enough removed from all appearance of wanting bread, a provident father very anxious to furniſh his children with various kinds of knowledge, that, at all events, they might be capacitated to earn a ſubſiſtence. In doing this, alſo, ſuch parents conceived they did a great deal in the way of making proviſion for their offspring, in caſe of the worſt accidents. In

this, however, they did nothing; becauſe the reſources with which they thus provided their children, depend on the ſame good fortune, of which they wanted to render them independent. So that a man poſſeſſed of the fineſt talents, unleſs he find himſelf in favourable circumſtances to diſplay them, is as liable to periſh for want, as he that hath none.

Ever ſince the intrigues of party have been in faſhion, it requires as much art and aſſiduity to live genteelly by a liberal profeſſion, as to regain the eſtate you may have loſt. If you have cultivated thoſe arts, whoſe ſucceſs depends on the reputation of the artiſt; if you have fitted yourſelf for ſuch employments as are in the gift of the great; of what uſe to you will be all your acquirements, when, diſguſted with the world, you diſdain to make uſe of thoſe means, without which it is impoſſible you ſhould ſucceed? Let us ſuppoſe you may have ſtudied politicks, and made yourſelf perfectly acquainted with the intereſts of princes: all this is very well; but what will you do with your knowledge, if you know not how to get acceſs to miniſters of ſtate, have no patroneſs in a woman of quality, no intereſt with the commiſſioners of the ſeveral departments of the finances; if you have not the art of making yourſelf agreeable to them, or the baſeneſs to do all the dirty buſineſs in which they might find you employment? But you are an architect or painter, we will ſay. It is very well; they are noble

arts: but you muſt make your abilities known to the publick. Do you think to carry your point merely by expoſing your deſigns at an exhibition? No, no, this will not do. You muſt be previouſly admitted into the academy; you muſt be honoured by the protection of the great: you muſt throw aſide your pencil and rule, take coach, and drive about from houſe to houſe, to make intereſt for reputation in your profeſſion. At the ſame time you are to obſerve, that the houſes you are to viſit have all Swiſs or other porters, who underſtand nothing but facts, and have the gift of hearing only in their hands. Are you deſirous of teaching any of the arts and ſciences you have learned; to become a teacher of geography, of the mathematicks, of languages, of muſick, or deſign? To do this you muſt find ſcholars, and of courſe advocates and puffers. It is of more conſequence to be acquainted with the arts of quackery and impoſition, than to excel in your profeſſion; and you may depend on it, if you know nothing but what you profeſs, you will ever be treated as a blockhead.

Thus you ſee how unſerviceable will be all thoſe fine accompliſhments on which you depend, and how much you ſtand in need of others to profit by theſe. What then muſt become of you in this humiliating ſtate of depreſſion? The rebuffs you meet with will debaſe without inſtructing you; ſubject more than ever to the caprice of publick prejudice, how will you raiſe

yourſelf above it, when it is become the arbiter of your fortune? How will you be able to deſpiſe that meanneſs and vice which are neceſſary to your ſubſiſtence? You would depend on the encouragement of wealth, and would ſoon become dependent on the perſons of the rich; you would have only added mortification to ſervility, and loaded yourſelf with miſery. Thus would you behold yourſelf poor without being free; the moſt wretched and contemptible ſtate into which it is poſſible to fall.

But if, inſtead of recurring to theſe ſublime profeſſions, which are rather calculated to nouriſh the mind than the body, you apply yourſelf, when occaſion requires, to the uſe of your hands, all theſe difficulties will diſappear; the arts of ſervility are needleſs; your reſources are at hand the moment you want to profit by them: probity and honour are no obſtacles to your ſubſiſtence; you have no need to fear or flatter the great, to creep or cringe to knaves, to be complaiſant to the world, or to be either a borrower or a thief, which is much the ſame thing when a man ſees no proſpect of paying what he borrows. The opinion of others will not affect you; you will be under no neceſſity of paying your court to any one, you will have no ideot to humour, or Swiſs to ſoothe, no courtezan to bribe, nor what is worſe, to flatter. Let knaves joſtle each other, and thruſt themſelves into preferment; it is nothing to you: this will not hinder you, in your obſcure ſituation,

ſituation, from being an honeſt man, or gaining a livelihood. You have only to go into the firſt ſhop of the trade you have learned, and deſire employment, and it will be readily given you. Before noon you will have earned your dinner; and, if you are ſober and induſtrious, before the week is out you will have earned enough to ſubſiſt on a fortnight; thus may you live free, healthy, ſincere, diligent, and honeſt: a man's time is not thrown away in learning to make this proviſion.

I am determined, therefore, that Emilius ſhall learn a trade. "A creditable one, to be ſure!" you will ſay. I ſhould like to know the meaning of that word. Is not every employment creditable that is uſeful? I would not have him learn to be an embroiderer, a gilder, or varniſher, like the fine gentleman of Mr. Locke. I would have him neither a fiddler, a player, nor a pamphleteer. Except theſe profeſſions, and a few of a ſimilar nature, he might take his choice of all others; I would confine him to nothing. I had much rather he ſhould be a cobbler than a poet; that he ſhould learn to pave the highway, than enamel or paint the flowers on China But, you will ſay, ſpies, bailiff's followers, and even hangmen are uſeful people in their way. That they are ſo is the fault of government, which might render them uſeleſs: but to give up this point: I was indeed miſtaken; it is not enough to fix on a trade uſeful to ſociety; it ſhould be ſuch a one as doth not

not require thoſe who exerciſe it to be poſſeſſed of thoſe deteſtable qualities of mind, which are incompatible with humanity. We will recur, therefore, to the term you made uſe of, and chooſe a creditable employment, always remembering, however, that nothing ſhould be called creditable that is not at the ſame time uſeful.

A celebrated modern authour, whoſe books are full of extenſive projects and confined views, made the vows of chaſtity, like other prieſts of his communion, and had, therefore, no wife of his own. Being a little more ſcrupulous, alſo, in having to do with the wives of others than many of his profeſſion, it is ſaid, he choſe to have pretty ſervant-maids, with whoſe aſſiſtance he endeavoured to repair, as well as poſſible, the wrong he had done his ſpecies by entering into ſuch raſh engagements. He looked upon it as a duty incumbent on a citizen, to provide children for the ſtate, and with the tribute he paid of this kind, he peopled the claſs of artiſans. As ſoon as his children were arrived at a proper age, he put them all to ſome profeſſion agreeable to their inclinations; excepting againſt thoſe only which were idle, frivolous, or ſubject to the faſhion; ſuch, for example, as is that of a peruke-maker, which is not at all neceſſary, and may ſome time or other become uſeleſs: unleſs nature, indeed, ſhould take it into her head not to furniſh our heads with hair.

By theſe views, ſhould we be conducted in hooſing a trade for Emilius; or, rather, we ught to leave that choice entirely to him; as, he maxims he hath already imbibed, giving him natural contempt for things that are uſeleſs, ıe will never think of throwing away his time n an unprofitable employment; and he judges of their being profitable by their real utility: ne would chooſe a trade that might have been of uſe to Robinſon Cruſoe in his deſert iſland.

By giving a child a ſucceſſive view of the various productions of nature and art, by exciting his curioſity, and tracing its tendency, we may be enabled to ſtudy his taſte, inclinations, and propenſities; to diſcover the firſt ſpark of his genius, if he have one of any particular turn. But it is a common errour, which you ought carefully to avoid, that of attributing to the warmth of genius the mere effect of opportunity, and to conſtrue into an inclination for a particular art, that ſpirit of imitation which is as common to the ape as to the human ſpecies, and leads him mechanically to do what he ſees done by others, without very well knowing to what purpoſe. The world is full of artiſans, and particularly of artiſts, who have no natural talents for the arts they profeſs, to which they have been trained from their infancy, either from motives of convenience, or from ſome apparent zeal which had operated as well in favour of any other art, had the ſame opportunities offered of ſeeing it exerciſed. One youth

youth hears the beat of a drum, and conceives himſelf born to be a general; another ſees the maſons at work, and immediately forms the deſign of being an architect. Every one is tempted to make choice of that profeſſion which offers itſelf, and appears to be held in eſteem.

I knew an inſtance in a foot-boy, who, from ſeeing his maſter deſign and paint pictures, took it in his head to be a limner and hiſtory painter. From the moment he formed this reſolution, he took up the crayon, which he laid down only to aſſume the pencil, and this he will never quit while he lives. Without rules, without inſtructions, he ſet himſelf down to deſign every thing that fell in his way. Three whole years did he ſit poring over his wretched daubings, getting nothing but his labour for his pains, and yet without being diſguſted at the little progreſs his mediocrity of talents permitted him to make. I remember to have ſeen him, for ſix months together in a very hot ſummer, ſitting, or rather nailed to his chair, in a little antechamber open to the ſouth, before a globe, of which he was attempting to draw the figure on canvaſs; beginning, rubbing out, and beginning again with the moſt invincible obſtinacy, till at laſt he hit off the rotundity of the ſphere to his ſatisfaction.

By the directions of an artiſt and the patronage of his maſter, he at length ſo far ſucceeded as to throw off his livery, and live by the pencil. Perſeverance ſupplied his want of talents

talents to a certain degree; having attained this, he could never go farther. The ſpirit of emulation and reſolution of this honeſt lad are commendable: he will be ever eſteemed for his aſſiduity, fidelity, and good behaviour; but he will never riſe in his profeſſion higher than to the merit of a ſign-painter. Who is there that has not been miſled by his inclinations, and miſtaken them for real abilities? There is a conſiderable difference between being pleaſed with any occupation, and being capable of it. It requires much nicer obſervation than is generally imagined, to aſcertain the taſte and genius of children; their caſual inclinations diſplay themſelves oftener than their innate diſpoſitions, and we judge from the firſt, for want of knowing how to ſtudy the laſt. I wiſh ſome judicious hand would give us a treatiſe on the art of ſtudying children—an art of the greateſt importance to be acquainted with, though fathers and preceptors know not as yet even its ſimple elements.

But, perhaps we here make the choice of our employment of too great conſequence. As it relates only to ſome handicraft buſineſs, Emilius need not heſitate, he hath already ſerved half his apprenticeſhip in the exerciſes to which he has been accuſtomed. He is ready to turn his hand to whatever you may require of him: he knows how to handle the ſpade and the hoe, to make uſe of the mallet, the plane, and the file; the tools of all kinds of workmen are familiar to him. All that he needs further, is,

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to acquire the ſame dexterity and facility, in the uſe of them, as a good artiſt in that peculiar branch to which he may apply. To this end, alſo, he hath a great advantage above moſt other children; in the agility of his body and the ſuppleneſs of his limbs, by means of which he can throw himſelf into any attitude, and continue any kind of exerciſe for a long time without tiring. Add to this, that his ſenſes are acute and experienced; and all the mechaniſm of the arts already known to him. To turn the work out of his hands like a maſter, he requires nothing but practice; and practice is to be gained only by time. All that we have to do, therefore, is to determine what kind of mechanick employment we ſhall beſtow ſo much time on, as to make ourſelves expert in the exerciſe of it.

Let every man apply himſelf to one that is becoming his ſex and age. A cloſe and ſedentary profeſſion, which enervates the body, will neither pleaſe nor be proper for youth. No one ever yet naturally aſpired to be a tailor; artificial motives are required to induce our ſex, for whom ſuch buſineſs was never deſigned, to embrace ſo effeminate an employment*. The ſword and the needle are not made for the ſame hands. Were I a ſovereign, I would permit none but women, or maimed and deformed perſons, to follow any ſuch kind of trade. On the ſup-

* There were no tailors among the ancients, the clothes of the men being made at home, by the women of the family.

ıppoſition that eunuchs are neceſſary, I think he Turks very great fools for making them on ıurpoſe. Why do not they content themſelves with ſuch as are impotent by nature; ſelecting them from that herd of diſpirited, cowardly mortals, whoſe mutilated hearts render them unfit for the more manly offices of life: ſociety hath a uſe for all others. Every feeble, timid and delicate male, is condemned by his conſtitution to a ſedentary life; he is formed to live among the females; or at leaſt after their manner. Let ſuch be early initiated into the myſteries of the tailor, the mantua-maker, and other profeſſions of the like nature; and if it be abſolutely neceſſary to have real eunuchs, let thoſe only be made ſuch, who diſhonour their ſex by their voluntary application to ſuch unbecoming employments. Their very choice ſufficiently indicates the errour of nature; in correcting it therefore, either one way or the other, you can do no harm.

I prohibit my pupil following any unhealthy buſineſs, but not thoſe which are laborious, or even dangerous. The latter exerciſe at once both his ſtrength and his courage; they are proper for the men only; the women making no pretenſions to them: how comes it then, the men are not aſhamed to encroach on thoſe properly exerciſed by the women?

Luctantur paucæ, comedunt colliphia paucæ
Vos lanam trahitis, calathiſque peracta refertis
*Vallera**.

In

* Juven. Sat. 2.

In Italy no women are to be ſeen ſerving in the ſhops, which gives the ſtreets a very dull and heavy appearance to thoſe who have been accuſtomed to the gay and lively figure they make in France and England. When I ſee your haberdaſhers and man-milliners, meaſuring out lace, ribbons, and gauze to the ladies, I cannot help thinking ſuch elegant commodities appear very ridiculous in thoſe clumſy fiſts, which would be with greater propriety employed in blowing a ſmith's bellows, or at the labours of the anvil. I ſhould think that in ſuch countries, the women ought by way of repriſals to turn ſword-cutlers and gun-ſmiths. Let each ſex manufacture and vend the arms peculiar to itſelf. To underſtand them well, it is requiſite we ſhould know how to employ them.

I would have a young man learn to exert a ſtrong arm; to handle the axe and the ſaw; to ſquare a piece of unhewn timber, to mount the roof of a houſe, to lay on the ridge, and to fit the joiſts and ſcantlings. Would it be more ridiculous in him, while thus employed, to call out to his ſiſter to come and aſſiſt him in his labour, than for her to bid him ſit down to her needle-work?

I perceive I have already ſaid too much for my polite and delicate cotemporaries; but I ſometimes permit myſelf to be hurried away by the force of my own arguments. Thus far however, is certain, that if any man whatever

be aſhamed of being ſeen to handle a plane, or wear a leather apron in publick, he is only a ſlave to prejudice, one that would be aſhamed of the moſt commendable actions, if they were ridiculed as unfaſhionable. We may give up nevertheleſs to the prepoſſeſſions of parents, whatever be not injurious to the underſtanding of the child. It is not neceſſary to exerciſe indiſcriminately ſuch profeſſions as are uſeful, merely to do honour to them all; it is ſufficient not to hold any one in leſs eſteem than it deſerves. When we are at liberty to make our choice, and have no other motives to determine us, why may we not conſult our own inclination and convenience, in chooſing among profeſſions of the ſame rank? The manufacture of hard-ware is uſeful, perhaps the moſt uſeful of all others; and yet, without ſome particular reaſon for it, I ſhould not make your ſon a brazier or a blackſmith; I ſhould not like to ſee him, at the forge, reſemble the figure of a Cyclops. Neither would I make him a maſon or bricklayer, and ſtill much leſs a ſhoe-maker. Somebody doubtleſs muſt be of thoſe trades; but he who can make choice of which he pleaſes, ought to have ſome regard to cleanlineſs and neatneſs: theſe do not depend on caprice, but affect our ſenſes. Add to this, I ſhould not like any of thoſe ſtupid profeſſions, in the exerciſe of which the workmen need neither induſtry nor ingenuity; but like mere machines, employ their hands conſtantly in the ſame manner. Such

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are cloth and ſtocking-weavers, ſtone ſawyers, and the like. To what purpoſe ſhould a man of any underſtanding be put to ſuch trades; wherein the workman and his engine are only one machine moving another?

All things duely conſidered, the trade I ſhould like beſt my pupil ſhould have a taſte for, is that of a joiner. This is neat, uſeful, and may be carried on within doors: it is ſufficiently laborious to keep the body in exerciſe, and requires both diligence and dexterity: at the ſame time, taſte and elegance are not excluded from being diſplayed on the form and contrivance of the work.

If it ſhould ſo happen, indeed, that your pupil has a natural turn for the ſpeculative ſciences, I ſhould not blame you for teaching him a mechanick art conformable to his inclinations; let him learn for example, to deſign and conſtruct mathematical inſtruments, quadrants, teleſcopes, and the like.

When Emilius learns a trade, I alſo will learn it with him; for I am convinced he will never learn, as ſhould be, what we do not learn together. We will, therefore, both ſerve an apprenticeſhip; not affecting to be treated as gentlemen, but as real apprentices, who are not trifling with a profeſſion: Nay, why ſhould we not be ſo in reality? Czar Peter worked as a common ſhip-carpenter in the yard, and ſerved as a drummer in his own troops: do you think that prince was not your equal, at leaſt, either

either in birth or merit? The reader will obſerve I do not aſk Emilius this queſtion, but put it to every one, of whatever rank he may happen to be.

Unfortunately we cannot ſpend all our time at the work-bench; as we not only apprentice ourſelves to the profeſſion of a joiner but to that of man; the latter of which is by much the moſt tedious and difficult to learn. What then ſhall we do? Shall we hire a maſter-joiner, for an hour in a day, as we do the dancing-maſter? No! That would not be making ourſelves his apprentices, but his ſcholars; and our ambition is not ſo much to learn the trade, as to raiſe ourſelves to the condition of a joiner. I am therefore of opinion that we ſhould go once or twice a week, at leaſt, and ſpend the whole day at his ſhop; that we ſhould riſe at his hour in the morning, that we ſhould be at our work before him, that we ſhould eat at his table, work according to his orders, and, after having had the honour of ſupping with the family, return, if we pleaſed, to ſleep on our own hard mattraſſes. Thus you ſee how we might learn ſeveral trades at once, and exerciſe ourſelves with manual labour, without neglecting our other accompliſhments.

Be ſimple in well-doing. Let us not encourage vanity by the means we are taking to deſtroy it. To take a pride in having overcome prejudice, is to ſubmit to it. It is ſaid, that from an ancient cuſtom peculiar to the Ottoman

Ottoman race, the Grand Signor is obliged to practice ſome mechanical employment, and every one knows the ſuperior merit of ſuch workmanſhip: A prince can turn nothing out of his hands but a maſter-piece. Theſe curious productions of his ingenuity he diſtributes about magnificently to the grandees of the court, and the work is paid for according to the quality of the workman. The real evil of this cuſtom is not in the pretended impoſition of it, againſt which ſome have ſo loudly exclaimed. This, on the contrary, is a benefit: for in thus obliging the baſhaws and other petty tyrants of his empire to divide with him the ſpoils of the people, the prince is excuſed from doing it directly himſelf. This is a neceſſary relief to depotiſm, without which that horrible mode of government could not poſſibly ſubſiſt.

The real inconvenience of ſuch a cuſtom lies in the idea it gives the poor wretch of his princely merit. Like Midas, he ſees every thing he touches changed into gold; but perceives not the long ears ſprouting out and expoſing the aſs. To preſerve Emilius from being expoſed in the like manner, we ſhall not give him any ſuch valuable talent; the price of his labour ſhall not depend on the workman but on the work. We ſhall never ſuffer him to judge of the merit of his workmanſhip, but by comparing it with that of the beſt artiſans. Of any thing that is well executed, we may ſay to him, "*this is well made*;" but it will be wrong

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to add, "*who made it?*" And if he ſhould ever himſelf add, with an air of triumph and ſatisfaction, "*it was I that made it,*" it will be requiſite to anſwer coldly, "*whether you, or any body elſe, it is no matter; the work is very well done.*"

Let every careful and well-meaning mother guard againſt the impoſitions, to which ſhe may be liable in reſpect to the improvement of her child. If her ſon pretends to much knowledge, let her diſtruſt every thing he affects to know: if he has the misfortune to be rich, and to be educated at Paris, he is undone. So long as he is in the midſt of able artiſts he will be poſſeſſed of all their talents; but, when he is at a diſtance from them, he will have none at all. At Paris, a man who is rich knows every thing: there is nobody ignorant there that is not poor. That capital is full of pretended connoiſſeurs, and ſuperficial judges, of both ſexes. I know but three honourable exceptions amongſt the men, though there may be more. But I know not of one among the women, and I much doubt that there is really any. In general, a name is acquired in the arts as in the law; we may become artiſts, and judge of artiſts, as readily as take up a degree in the civil law, and become a magiſtrate.

If, therefore, it ſhould ever become faſhionable to be maſter of ſome mechanick art, your children would ſoon be expert at it, without taking the trouble to learn: They would paſs maſters of arts like the counſellors of Zurich.

I will admit of no mere ceremonies of this kind with Emilius; he ſhall make no appearances, but always poſſeſs the reality. He ſhall not talk of what he knows, but continue to improve himſelf in ſilence. He ſhall be always employed about a maſter-piece, without ever ſetting up for a maſter, and be known for a workman only by his labour, and not by what he profeſſes.

If I have hitherto made myſelf underſtood, the reader will perceive that, while I have accuſtomed my pupil to corporeal exerciſe and manual labour, I have given him inſenſibly a taſte for reflexion and meditation; in order to counterbalance that indolence which would be the natural reſult of his indifference for the opinions of mankind, and the tranquillity of his paſſions. It is neceſſary that he work like a peaſant, and think like a philoſopher, leſt he become as idle as a ſavage. The great ſecret of education is, to make the exerciſes of the body and the mind ſerve as a relaxation to each other.

Let us beware, however, of anticipating thoſe inſtructions which require a riper judgement. Emilius will not be long a workman before he becomes ſenſible in himſelf of that inequality of conditions which he at firſt barely perceived. Hence, proceeding on the maxims I have laid down, he will be diſpoſed in turn, to examine me. In receiving every thing from me, and ſeeing himſelf ſo little removed from a ſtate of poverty,

poverty, he will be curious to know wherefore I appear to be ſo rich. Taking me unprovided on this head, he may put ſome very knotty queſtions. "*You are rich* (he might ſay) *you have told me ſo, and I ſee it. But a rich man owes his labours to ſociety in his quality as man; and of what publick utility are your's?*" What anſwer a polite tutor might make to ſuch a queſtion I know not. He might probably be ridiculous enough to talk to him of the nature and importance of his ſervices in taking care of his education. As for me, the joiner's workſhop affords me an apology: I might, therefore, put off the queſtion thus: "*A very pertinent query, Emilius; and I promiſe to anſwer it, on my part, when you can make a ſatisfactory reply to it on your own. In the mean time, I ſhall take care to give my ſuperfluity to you and the poor, and to make a table or a bench every week, that I may not be quite uſeleſs to the publick.*"

Thus are we returned again to ourſelves. Behold my pupil, juſt ready to throw off a ſtate of infancy, recur again to himſelf, and perceive more than ever that neceſſity he lies under to circumſtances and things. After having ſet out with the exerciſe of his body and its organs, we proceeded to that of his genius and underſtanding, and have at length united the uſe of his limbs with that of his faculties. We have ſucceeded in the formation of an active, thinking being; to complete the man we have nothing more to do than to render him affectionate and

ſuſceptible; that is to ſay to perfect his reaſon by ſentiment. But, before we enter upon this new diſpoſition of things, let us take a retroſpect of that we are about to leave, and trace, as exactly as poſſibly, how far we have proceeded. Our pupil had at firſt only ſenſations, at preſent he has ideas; he once did nothing but perceive, he can now form a judgement of things. It is from the compariſon made between ſeveral ſucceſſive or ſimultaneous ſenſations, and the judgement formed thereon, that a kind of complex or mixed ſenſation ariſes, which I call an idea.

The peculiar manner in which we form ideas, is that which conſtitutes the genius and character of the mind. To form our ideas of things on their actual relations only, betokens a ſolid underſtanding; whereas, to be contented with their apparent relations, betrays a ſuperficial one. To conceive theſe relations as they really exiſt, diſplays a right judgement; to conceive, miſtaken notions of them, denotes a wrong one. Thoſe who ſee imaginary relations, that have neither reality nor appearance, are madmen, while thoſe who make no compariſon between them are ideots. The leſs or greater aptitude to compare theſe ideas and diſcover ſuch relation, is what conſtitutes a greater or leſs degree of genius and underſtanding.

Simple ideas are only the reſult of comparative ſenſations. A judgement is to be formed from ſimple as well as from complex ſenſations;

and this I call a ſimple idea. In judging of our ſenſations, the judgement is merely paſſive; it deduces only the perception of what is immediately perceived. But in the ideas ariſing from thoſe ſenſations, the judgement is active; it collects, compares, and determines thoſe relations which the ſenſes could not. This is all the difference, but this is very conſiderable. Nature never deceives us; we are always deceived by ourſelves.

A child, eight years old, hath ſome freezing milk ſet before him. He puts the ſpoon up to his mouth without knowing what it is, and no ſooner doth the ice touch his lips than he cries out "*he is burnt.*" He feels a very acute ſenſation, and knowing none more ſharp and painful than that of heat, he imagines that to be the cauſe. He is nevertheleſs miſtaken; the ſudden cold may hurt, but it does not burn him, nor are the ſenſations of heat and cold alike, thoſe who are moſt accuſtomed to both never confounding them together. It is not the ſenſation, therefore, that deceives him, but the judgement he forms of it.

We are liable to the ſame kind of deception the firſt time we ſee a mirrour, or make uſe of any optical machine; when we go into a vault in the depth of winter or in the height of ſummer; when we put a very warm or cold hand into water of a middle temperature; or when we hold a round ball between the finger and thumb of each hand held croſſwiſe. Should we con-

tent ourſelves, in any of theſe caſes, with declaring ſimply what we perceive or feel, the judgement would be merely paſſive; but when we judge of the thing itſelf by its appearance, the judgement is active; it compares, and reaſons on, thoſe relations which are not perceived, and thence we become liable to deception. It is from experience only we learn to prevent, or correct ſuch errors.

Show your pupil in the night the clouds paſſing over the moon, and he will at firſt think the moon moves the contrary way, and that the clouds ſtand ſtill. He will conclude ſo from a precipitate induction, becauſe he is more accuſtomed to ſee little objects move than great ones, and the clouds appear to him much bigger than the moon, of whoſe diſtance he cannot judge. When ſtanding ſtill in a ſhip in full ſail, he views the ſhore at a ſmall diſtance, he falls into a contrary error; the trees and houſes on the beach appearing to move, becauſe not perceiving his own motion he conceives the ſhip and the ſea as one immoveable object, of which the leſs objects on ſhore are only a part.

The firſt time a child ſees a ſtick plunged half-way into the water, he ſees it broken; he is not deceived by his ſenſation, which is a true one, and would be ſo were we even ignorant of the cauſe of this phenomenon. If you aſk him, therefore, what he ſees, he will tell you a broken ſtick, and it is very true, for it is very certain ſuch is the object of his perception. But, if deceived

ceived by his judgment, he ſhould go farther, and, after having affirmed that he ſees a broken ſtick, maintain that what he ſees is actually ſuch, or that the ſtick ſo placed in the water is really broken, he would then maintain a falſehood. And why ſo? Becauſe then his judgement becomes active, he judges not from immediate inſpection, but rational deduction, in affirming what he does not perceive, viz. that the conception ſuggeſted by one ſenſe would be confirmed by another.

All our miſtakes thus ariſing from error in judgement, it is clear that, if we were under no neceſſity of judging, we ſhould have no occaſion to learn any thing; we ſhould never be liable to be deceived, and ſhould be much happier in our ignorance than we can be in our knowledge. We do not deny that the learned know a thouſand things to be true, of which the ignorant will never know any thing. Are the learned, therefore, nearer the truth in general? Quite the contrary; the more they advance, the farther off they find themſelves; becauſe the vanity of judging of things making greater progreſs than our abilities to judge, we form an hundred erroneous concluſions for one that is juſt. Nothing is more evident than that the learned ſocieties of Europe are publick ſchools of falſehood; and it is very certain that the academy of ſciences have adopted more errors than are to be found among the whole nation of Hurons.

Since our errors thus increaſe with our knowledge, the only method to avoid error is to remain in ignorance. So long as you ſuſpend your judgement, you will not be deceived. This leſſon is inculcated by nature as well as authoriſed by reaſon. If we except a very few of thoſe ſtriking relations, which things immediately bear to ourſelves we have naturally a very great indifference for all the reſt. A ſavage will not ſtep a foot out of his way to view the mechaniſm of the fineſt machine, or the moſt aſtoniſhing phenomenon of electricity. *What is it to me?* is a phraſe the moſt familiar with the ignorant, and the moſt proper for the learned.

Unhappily, however, this phraſe is now uſeleſs. Every thing is ſomething to us, ſince we are become dependent on all things; and our curioſity neceſſarily extends with our deſires. For this reaſon I attribute great curioſity to a philoſopher, and none at all to a ſavage. The latter ſtands in need of nobody and the former of every one, and particularly of numerous admirers.

Will it be ſaid that I here deviate from nature? I deny it. Natural maxims, it is true, are founded on neceſſity and not opinion; but our neceſſities vary with our ſituations. There is a great deal of difference between the natural man in a ſtate of ſolitude, and the natural man in a ſtate of ſociety. Emilius is not a ſavage, deſtined to prowl in the woods, but to inhabit towns and cities. It is requiſite for him, there-

fore,

fore, to know how to manage his fellow-citizens, and to live among, if not like, them.

Amidſt the variety of connexions and dependencies of ſuch a ſtate, he will be under a neceſſity of forming various judgements concerning them: let us inſtruct him, therefore, to judge of them aright.

The beſt way to effect this, is that which tends to reduce our experience to bare matters of fact, and enables us even to proceed, though wanting ſuch experience, without falling into errour. Hence it follows that, after we have long accuſtomed ourſelves to explain and confirm the evidence of one ſenſe by another, we ſhould further learn to verify the teſtimony of each ſenſe by itſelf, without having recourſe to the others; by which means every ſenſation will ſtand in the place of an idea, and that idea will be always conformable to truth. Such are the acquirements which I have pointed out for this third ſtage of human life.

This manner of proceeding, I own, requires a degree of patience and circumſpection of which few tutors are capable; and without which the pupil will never learn to judge properly. If, for example, when the latter is deceived in the appearance of the broken ſtick, you are in haſte to convince him of his errour, by precipitately taking it out of the water, you may undeceive him, it is true; but what will you teach him by it? Nothing but what he would ſoon have as well learned of himſelf. This,

therefore, is not the thing you are to do. The point aimed at is leſs to teach him what is actually and particularly true, than to teach him how to diſcover the truth in general, or at any other time. To inſtruct him properly on this occaſion, therefore, you ſhould not undeceive him ſo ſoon. Let Emilius and his tutor ſerve for your example.

In the firſt place, I ſuppoſe that a child educated in the ordinary manner, on being aſked, if the ſtick be broken, will readily anſwer in the affirmative. I very much doubt, however, if Emilius will be ſo ready to determine it. As he ſees no neceſſity either to be or to appear knowing, he is in no haſte to judge of the matter: his judgement of things is founded on evidence, and he who ſo well knows how liable we are to deception in the objects of ſight, is very far from thinking the evidence in the preſent caſe ſufficient. Add to this, that knowing from experience that the moſt frivolous queſtions I put to him have always ſome material object, though not immediately perceived, he is not uſed to reply careleſsly and without thinking. On the contrary, he is ſuſpicious and attentive, examining ſuch queſtions very carefully before he ventures to anſwer them. Hence he never makes me a reply that he is not well ſatisfied with himſelf, and it is no eaſy matter to ſatisfy him in this particular. In a word, neither he nor I pique ourſelves on knowing the truth of things, but only in not falling into errour. We ſhould be much

much more aſhamed of ſitting down ſatisfied with an inſufficient reaſon for a thing, than of our incapacity to find any reaſon for it at all. "*I don't know*," is an anſwer ſo ſatisfactory to both, and which we repeat ſo often, that it now coſts us nothing. But, whether ſuch an abſurd affirmative ſhould eſcape, or he ſhould avoid it by our convenient negative *I don't know*, my reply to him would be ſtill the ſame; our way ſhould be to look and examine.

The ſtick, half immerſed in water, ſtands, we will ſuppoſe, in a vertical poſition: to know whether it be really broken as it appears, we have many things to do before we take it out of the water, or even touch it with the hand.

In the firſt place, we ſhould move round the ſtick, and in ſo doing we ſhould ſee the apparent fracture turn with us; the eye appearing to occaſion the change; but it is well known our looks cannot alter the form of the ſtick.

Secondly, we ſhould look down it from end to end, in which caſe we ſhould not ſee it broken or crooked. But can our eye have reunited or ſtraightened it?

Thirdly, I would give the water an undulating motion, when we ſhould ſee the apparent fracture take different ſides, the ſtick appearing to bend backwards and forwards with the motion of the water. Now can we think the motion given to the water ſufficient to break, ſoften, or bend the ſtick?

Fourthly, we take and pour out the water; by doing which we ſee the ſtick become gradually whole and ſtraight in proportion as the water decreaſes. Can any thing further be required, to explain the nature of this fact, and lead us to the diſcovery of the refraction? It is not true, therefore, that the ſight deceives us; ſince we have no need to uſe any other ſenſe, to rectify thoſe errors we attribute to it.

But ſuppoſe a child ſo great a blockhead as not to perceive the reſult of theſe experiments; in ſuch a caſe it will be proper to call in the touch to the aſſiſtance of the ſight. Inſtead, however, of taking the ſtick out of the water, let it remain ſome time in the ſame ſituation, and let the child carry his hand down it from the top to the bottom, by doing which he will find there is no angle; the ſtick is not bent or broken.

You will tell me, perhaps, this is not ſimply forming a judgement of things, but reaſoning on them in form. It is very true; but do not you ſee plainly, that as ſoon as we arrive at ideas, to form a judgement of any thing is to reaſon upon it?

The conſcioufneſs of a ſenſation is a propoſition, an opinion; and as ſoon as we compare one ſenſation with another we reaſon. The arts of judging and of reaſoning are one and the ſame.

Emilius can never learn dioptricks, if I cannot teach it him by means of this ſtick. He ſhall

ſhall not, to this end, diſſect inſects, or count the ſpots in the ſun; he ſhall not even know the uſe of microſcopes and teleſcopes. More polite and learned pupils may poſſibly laugh at his ignorance; for before he knows how to make uſe of theſe things, I purpoſe that he ſhall invent them; and this you doubt if he will compaſs ſo ſoon.

You ſee here the ſpirit that governs my ſyſtem. If a child holding a little ball between the fingers croſs-wiſe, imagines he holds two, I would not permit him to look, before he had otherwiſe convinced himſelf that he held but one.

Theſe explanations I imagine will ſuffice to denote preciſely the progreſs of my pupil's underſtanding, and the route he hath taken. But you are alarmed, perhaps, at the multitude of objects which have been preſented him. You are afraid his underſtanding ſhould be depreſſed or bewildered by ſuch a variety of knowledge. On the contrary, however, I have taught him to be ignorant of many more things than he knows. I have opened for him a way to ſcience, ſmooth and eaſy indeed, but long, extenſive, and tedious. I have inſtructed him at his firſt ſetting out, that he might know the entrance; but I ſhall never permit him to go very far.

Obliged to learn of himſelf, he makes uſe of his own reaſon and not of that of others; for to give no influence to prepoſſeſſion, no weight ſhould be given to authority; and it is certain that

that our errors ariſe leſs from ourſelves than from others. From this continual exerciſe of the underſtanding will reſult a vigour of mind, like to that which is acquired by the body from conſtant labour and fatigue. Another advantage is, that we advance in knowledge only in proportion to our capacity of digeſting it. The mind may be overloaded as well as the body. But when the underſtanding makes every thing perfectly clear and familiar, before it commits it to the memory, whatever it deduces thence afterwards is properly its own. Whereas in over-charging the mind with the remembrance of a heap of confuſed ideas, we expoſe ourſelves to the inconvenience of never recollecting any thing that can properly be called our own.

Emilius has but little knowledge; but what he has is truely his own; he knows nothing by halves. Among the few things he knows and with which he is well acquainted, the moſt important is, that there are many things he is now ignorant of, which he may one day know; that there are many more which others know and he will never be acquainted with; and that there is an infinity of others which neither he nor any body elſe will ever know. He poſſeſſes an univerſal capacity, not in point of actual knowledge, but in the faculties of acquiring it; an open, intelligent genius, adapted to every thing, and, as Montaigne ſays, if not inſtructed, capable of receiving inſtruction. It is ſufficient for me that he knows how to diſcover the utility

utility of his actions, and the reaſon for his opinions. Once again, I ſay, my object is not to furniſh his mind with ſcience, but to teach him the method of acquiring it when he has occaſion for it; to inſtruct him how to hold it in eſtimation, and to inſpire him, above all, with a love for truth. By this method, indeed, we make no great advances; but then we never take an uſeleſs ſtep, nor are we obliged to turn back again.

Emilius is acquainted with no other ſcience than that which is merely phyſical. He knows not even the name of hiſtory, nor what is meant by metaphyſicks and morality. He hath ſtudied the eſſential relations between men and things, but no moral relations between man and man. He is ill qualified to generaliſe his ideas, or form abſtract notions of things; contenting himſelf with obſerving the general qualities of certain bodies, without reaſoning on thoſe qualities themſelves. He has a notion of abſtract ſpace, by the help of geometrical figures; and of abſtract quantity, by means of the ſigns in algebra. Thoſe figures and ſigns, however, are the ſupport of thoſe abſtractions, on which he reſts without ſeeking any farther. He does not endeavour to find out the eſſence of things, or what they are in their own nature; but only their relations, and particularly thoſe in which he is intereſted. He holds nothing external in eſtimation, but from its relation to himſelf; but then the degree of this eſtimation

mation is very juſt and exact. The caprice of cuſtom, or general agreement, ſtamp no value on any thing with him. He holds that in the higheſt eſtimation which is the moſt uſeful; and, never departing from this method of eſtimating the value of things, pays no regard to fancy or prepoſſeſſion. Emilius is laborious, temperate, patient, reſolute, and bold. His imagination never exaggerates danger; he is ſuſceptible of few evils; and knows how to ſuffer with patience, becauſe he has never learned to contend againſt deſtiny. With reſpect to death, he is hardly ſenſible what it is; but, accuſtomed to yield without reſiſtance to neceſſity, when it is his lot to die, he will ſubmit to his fate without murmur or complaint.

This is the utmoſt that our nature will permit in that dreadful moment. To live independent and unattached to life by human connexions, is the beſt way to learn to die.

In a word, Emilius is virtuous in every thing relating to himſelf. To poſſeſs the ſocial virtues alſo, he only requires to be made acquainted with thoſe relations that give riſe to them; he only wants that information, which his mind is already formed to receive.

At preſent, he conſiders himſelf as entirely unconnected with others. He requires nothing of any one, and thinks no one hath a right to require any thing of him. He ſtands alone and independent in the midſt of ſociety. Indeed his pretenſions to independency are better

founded than thoſe of any other; as he is in himſelf every thing man is capable of being, at his age. He lies under no errours but thoſe which are inevitable; he has no vices but ſuch as no mortal was ever free from. He hath an healthy conſtitution, agility of body, perſpicuity of mind, and a diſpaſſionate heart. Self-love, the firſt and moſt natural of all the paſſions, as yet hardly exerts itſelf. Without diſturbing the repoſe of others, he has hitherto lived as content, happy, and free as was poſſible for his nature. Do you think a youth, thus arrived at his fifteenth year, hath miſemployed the term of his infancy?

END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

BOOK

BOOK IV.

HOW rapid is our courſe upon this
The firſt quarter of our life is fled
we are ſenſible of its uſe; during the la
are incapable of enjoyment. Three fou
the intermediate ſpace are conſumed in
labour, pain, conſtraint, and troubles of
kinds. Life is ſhort becauſe of the littl
we have for enjoyment, rather than from t
brevity of its duration. To what purpo
it to remove the hour of death farther fr
of our birth, ſince life will always be to
when the intermediate time is ill emp
Man, if I may uſe the expreſſion, is born
firſt to exiſt, and then to live; once as
cies, and again with regard to ſex.
who conſider women as imperfect me
certainly miſtaken, though exterior reſem
favours the opinion. Till the age of p
there is little apparent difference betw
ſexes, in children; countenance, ſhape
plexion, tone of voice, are all nearly
girls are children, ſo are boys; the ſame d
nation ſerves for both. Thoſe males, i
the progreſs of the ſex is impeded, preſer
conformity all their lives; they are alwa

cl

children; and women, who never loſe it, ſeem, in many reſpects, to be little more.

But man in general was not born to remain in a ſtate of childhood; nature marks a time when he emerges from infancy, and this critical moment, though ſhort, is attended with a long train of conſequences.

As the roaring of the ſea precedes the tempeſt, ſo the murmuring of the paſſions portends this ſtormy revolution. The foaming ſurge foretels the approach of danger. A change of diſpoſition, frequent ſtarts, and a continual agitation of mind, render the pupil intractable. He becomes deaf to the voice of his preceptor; like a lion in his fury, he diſdains his guide, and will no longer ſubmit to be governed.

Theſe moral indications of a changing diſpoſition are accompanied by a viſible alteration in the perſon. His features aſſume a character; the thin ſoft down upon his chin begins to gather ſtrength. His voice is loſt between hoarſneſs and ſqueaking: for, being neither man nor boy, he has the tone of neither. His eyes, thoſe organs of the mind hitherto inexpreſſive, learn to ſpeak; animated with a lively flame, their looks, though more expreſſive, are yet pure and innocent; but they have loſt their primitive dullneſs and inſipidity. He already feels their power of expreſſion, he learns to caſt them down and bluſh. He perceives his ſenſibility before he knows what he feels; he is reſtleſs without knowing the cauſe of his diſquietude.

Perhaps

Perhaps theſe ſymptoms may ſteal on ſlowly, and leave you time to guard againſt the danger; but if his vivacity renders him too impatient; if his tranſports become unruly; if he is one moment exaſperated and the next ſoftened; if he ſheds tears without cauſe; if his pulſe beats high, and his eye reddens when he approaches certain objects, which grow dangerous to his repoſe; if he trembles at the touch of a female hand; if he is uneaſy and intimidated in the fair one's preſence; Ulyſſes, O ſage Ulyſſes! beware! thoſe paſſages which you endeavoured, with ſo much care, to cloſe, are ſtill wide open. The winds are already let looſe; quit the helm but a moment, and all is loſt!

Here commences the ſecond birth I was ſpeaking of; at this age man is truely born to live, and enters into full poſſeſſion of the powers of human nature. Our care hitherto has been little more than children's play: it now becomes of real importance. This æra, where common education ends, is properly the time where our's ſhould begin; but, in order to convey a proper idea of our plan, it will be neceſſary to take a retroſpective view of a more early period.

Our paſſions are the principal inſtruments of our preſervation; therefore, to endeavour to deſtroy them is equally vain and abſurd; it is to find fault with nature, to attempt to reform the works of God. Should the almighty require man to annihilate thoſe paſſions which he had given him, he would not know his own mind,

mind, he would not contradict himſelf; but the Almighty never gave ſuch a ridiculous command; and the heart of man has received no ſuch injunction; and whatever is required of him, is not made known to him by the mouth of another; God himſelf imprints it on his heart.

To ſuppreſs the paſſions, in my opinion, is almoſt as abſurd as intirely to deſtroy them; whoever imagines this to have been my intention, has groſly miſtaken my meaning.

But becauſe it is in the nature of man to have paſſions, is it therefore rational to conclude, that all the paſſions which we feel within ourſelves, and which we perceive in others, are natural? Their ſource indeed is natural, but that ſource is increaſed by a thouſand adventitious ſtreams; it is a great river continually augmenting, in which it would be very difficult to find one drop of the original ſpring. Our natural paſſions are extremely limited; they are, however, the inſtruments of our liberty, and tend to our preſervation. Such paſſions as are prejudicial, and by which our reaſon is ſubdued, ſpring from ſome other ſource; nature does not give them to us, we adopt them to the prejudice of nature.

The ſource of our paſſions, the origin and chief of every other, that which alone is born with man, and never leaves him while he lives, is SELF-LOVE: this is the original paſſion, prior to every other, and of which, in one ſenſe, all the reſt are only modifications. In this ſenſe they

they may be conſidered as natural. The greater part of theſe modifications proceed from adventitious cauſes, without which they would not exiſt; but theſe modifications are of no advantage to us; on the contrary, they are extremely detrimental; they change and counteract their firſt and principal object: in this caſe men become unnatural, and act in contradiction to themſelves.

True ſelf-love is always right, and always conſiſtent. Every individual being eſpecially charged with his own preſervation, his firſt, and greateſt anxiety is, and ought to be, to watch over it continually; and how can he do this if he does not make it his principal concern?

We muſt therefore love ourſelves for own preſervation; conſequently we love that which contributes towards it. Children are particularly attached to their nurſes. Thus Romulus ought to have been attached to the wolf that gave him ſuck; for this attachment is at firſt merely phyſical. Whatever contributes to the welfare of an individual engages his affection, whatever is likely to deſtroy it he will repel. This is merely inſtinct; but what transforms inſtinct into ſentiment, attachment into love, averſion into hatred, is a manifeſt intention either to injure or to ſerve us. We are not indeed over-ſolicitous concerning thoſe inanimate beings, which are only capable of acting as they are influenced by others: but thoſe from whoſe diſpoſition

ſition and will we may expect good or evil, thoſe in whom we perceive a power to ſerve us, inſpire the ſame ſentiments in us, with regard to themſelves which they diſcover towards us. We ſeek thoſe who are able to be of uſe to us, but we love thoſe who are actually willing to be ſo: we fly from thoſe who have the power to injure us, but thoſe who ſeem diſpoſed to offend us we hate.

The firſt ſentiment of a child is to love himſelf, and the ſecond, which may be deduced from the former, is to love thoſe who are employed about him; for in his preſent helpleſs ſtate his knowledge of perſons is founded on the aſſiſtance which he receives from them. His attachment to his nurſe or his governeſs is merely habitual. He looks for them becauſe they are neceſſary, and he finds them convenient; but this is rather acquaintance than affection. It requires a much longer time to make him ſenſible that they are not only uſeful, but deſirous of ſerving him; as he grows ſenſible of this, he begins to love them.

A child, therefore, is naturally inclined to benevolence becauſe he ſees every body round him ready to give him aſſiſtance; and from this conſtant obſervation he learns to think favourably of his ſpecies; but in proportion as he extends his connexions, his neceſſities, his active and paſſive dependencies, the idea of his relation to others, awakens and produces ſentiments of duty and preference. The child then becomes imperious, jealous, and vindictive. If you educate him to be ſubmiſſive and obedient, not perceiving the uſe

of

of your commands, he attributes them to a capricious deſign to torment him, and becomes mutinous. If, on the contrary, you generally comply with his humours, as ſoon as ever he meets with oppoſition he conceives a ſpecies of rebellion in every intention to oppoſe him, and revenges himſelf even upon the chairs and tables for diſobeying his commands. Self-love, which regards our own perſonal good only, is contented when our real wants are ſupplied; but ſelf-intereſt, or that ſelf-love which ſtands in competition with the good of others, cannot poſſibly be contented, becauſe as it prefers ourſelves to others, it expects that others ſhould likewiſe give us the preference; which is impoſſible. Thus we ſee how the ſoft and affectionate paſſions ariſe from ſelf-love, and the hateful and iraſcible ones from ſelf-intereſt. That which renders man eſſentially good, is to have few wants, and ſeldom to compare himſelf with others; that which renders him eſſentially wicked, is to have many wants, and to be frequently governed by opinion. Upon this principle it is eaſy to perceive, that all the paſſions of men or children may be ſo directed, as to produce good or evil. True it is, as we cannot always live in ſolitude, it will be difficult for us to continue uniformly good: this difficulty muſt neceſſarily increaſe in proportion to our connexions; and therefore the dangers of ſociety render our care more indiſpenſable, to prevent in the human heart

heart the depravation which proceeds from increaſing neceſſities.

The proper ſtudy of man is that of his connexions and dependencies. During his mere phyſical exiſtence, he ſhould ſtudy only his relation to things. This is the employment of his infancy; when he begins to be ſenſible of his moral exiſtence, his relation to mankind ſhould then be the object of his contemplation; this is the proper employment of his whole life, beginning at the period to which we are now arrived.

As ſoon as man has need of a companion, he is no longer an unſocial being: his heart is no longer ſingle. All his connexions with his ſpecies, all the affections of his ſoul are born with this ſenſation. His firſt paſſion ſoon ferments the other into being.

The peculiar tendency of inſtinct is indeterminate. One ſex attracts the other; ſo far it is the operation of nature. Choice, preference, perſonal attachment; theſe are the produce of knowledge, prejudice, and cuſtom. Time and experience are neceſſary to render us capable of affection: we love only after having judged, and there can be no preference without compariſon. This judgement is formed unknown to ourſelves, nevertheleſs it is real. True love, let men ſay what they pleaſe, will always be honoured by mankind; for, however its extravagance may lead us aſtray, though it does not exclude every vicious quality from the heart, it ſuppoſes ſome

eſtimable ones, without which it could not exiſt. That choice which we put in competition with reaſon is, in fact, the effect of reaſon. We have made love blind, becauſe he has better eyes than ourſelves, and ſees things which to us are imperceptible. To one who has no idea of merit and beauty, every woman muſt be alike, and the firſt he beholds will be the moſt amiable. Love is ſo far from being the child of nature, that he reſtrains and regulates her inclinations: under his influence, if we except the beloved object, each ſex becomes indifferent to the other. The preference which we beſtow we expect ſhould be returned; love ought to be reciprocal. In order to be beloved we muſt render ourſelves amiable; to be preferred we muſt render ourſelves more amiable than another, more amiable than every other perſon; at leaſt in the eyes of the beloved object. Hence we firſt regard our fellow-creatures, hence we firſt compare them with ourſelves, and hence proceeds emulation, rivalſhip, and jealouſy. A heart overflowing with a new ſenſation, is glad to diffuſe itſelf to its utmoſt extent; the want of a miſtreſs ſoon produces the want of a friend; having experienced the pleaſure of being beloved, we wiſh to be beloved by all the world, and this univerſal deſire of preference muſt neceſſarily be productive of much diſcontent.

From the love of friendſhips proceed diſſenſions, envy, and hatred. On the foundation of theſe various paſſions, I ſee opinion erect its

its immoveable throne; and ſenſeleſs mortals, ſubmitting to its empire, found their own exiſtence on the judgement of each other.

Extend theſe ideas, and we ſhall ſee whence ſelf-intereſt acquires that form which we ſuppoſe to be natural, and how ſelf-love, ceaſing to be a natural ſentiment, becomes pride in great ſouls, in little ſouls vanity, and in all, is continually cheriſhed at the expence of ſociety. The ſeeds of theſe paſſions not having exiſtence in the heart of an infant, they cannot grow ſpontaneouſly; we plant them there ourſelves, and they never take root but by our own fault. In the heart of a youth, of a certain age, the caſe is very different; there they will take root in ſpite of us. It is time therefore to change our method.

Let us begin by making ſome important reflexions on that critical ſtate of which we are now ſpeaking. The ſtep from childhood to the age of puberty is not ſo poſitively determined, as not to vary according to the temperament of individuals, and with regard to people according to climate. Every one knows the difference obſervable in this particular between the hot and cold countries, and it is generally allowed, that warm conſtitutions arrive at the age of maturity ſooneſt; but we may be deceived as to the cauſe; and may frequently attribute to a phyſical, what ought to be aſcribed to a moral ſource, which is one of the moſt common miſtakes in the philoſophy of the preſent age. The inſtructions of nature are late and tedious, thoſe of man

are almoſt always premature. In the firſt caſe, the ſenſes rouſe the imagination, in the ſecond the imagination awakens the ſenſes, and gives them a too early activity, which cannot fail to enervate individuals, and in time the ſpecies. That the age of puberty in both ſexes is always more forward in a poliſhed and enlightened people, than amongſt the ignorant and ſavage, is a more general and certain obſervation*. Children have a ſingular ſagacity in ſeeing, through the affectation of decorum, the vices which it is intended to conceal. The refined language which we are pleaſed to dictate, our lectures on decency, the myſterious veil formally held before their eyes, are ſo many ſpurs to their curioſity. It

* In great towns, ſays M. de Buffon, and amongſt people in affluence, children accuſtomed to eat plentifully and upon ſucculent food, arrive ſoon at maturity; in the country, and amongſt poor people, their food being leſs nouriſhing, they require at leaſt three years more.—Hiſt. Nat. T. iv. p. 238.

I admit the juſtice of the obſervation, but not of the cauſe aſſigned for it; for in countries where the inhabitants live extremely well, and eat a vaſt deal, as in the Valais, and even in ſome of the mountainous provinces of Italy, the age of puberty in both ſexes comes as late as in great cities; where, to indulge their pride, they frequently eat ſparingly. One is ſurpriſed to ſee, amidſt theſe mountains, boys as robuſt as men, with female voices and beardleſs chins; and to find girls tall and perfectly formed, who have not the periodical diſtinction of their ſex. This difference, I am of opinion, is owing to their ſimplicity of manners; the imagination remaining longer in tranquillity, is later before it ferments the blood, and accelerates the circulation.

it is evident from the effects, that by endeavouring to keep children in ignorance we really inſtruct them, and that, of all the inſtructions they receive, this makes the greateſt impreſſion.

Experience will inform you, how greatly this ridiculous method accelerates the work of nature, and ruins the conſtitution. It is one of the principal cauſes of mankind's degenerating in great towns. The young folks early exhauſted continue diminutive, feeble, ill-made, and grow old inſtead of robuſt; like the vine which is compelled to bear fruit in the ſpring, and droops and dies before autumn.

One muſt have lived in the midſt of ruſtick ſimplicity, to be able to form any judgement to what age a happy ignorance may prolong the innocence of children. It is a pleaſing ſight, to behold the two ſexes engaged in the harmleſs ſports of childhood, though in the bloom of youth and beauty; and evincing, even by their familiarity, the purity of their pleaſures. When theſe amiable young people arrive at a proper age for marrying, the huſband and wife, mutually ſacrificing their firſt fruits, become dearer to each other. A race of healthy and robuſt children are the pledges of an unalterable union, and the happy conſequence of their innocence in early life.

If the period when man becomes conſcious of his ſex, is as much determined by education as by nature; conſequently this period may be accelerated or retarded: and if the body gains or

loſes ſolidity, in proportion as this progreſs is forwarded or delayed; it follows that the longer it is retarded, the ſtronger we grow. I am now ſpeaking of mere phyſical effects; we ſhall ſoon perceive that there are other conſequences.

By theſe reflexions I am enabled to ſolve this queſtion, ſo frequently the ſubject of debate: Whether it would be proper to gratify the curioſity of children betimes, or to put them off with ſome little piece of modeſt deceit? In my opinion both ſhould be avoided. Firſt, as we ourſelves are the cauſe of this curioſity, we ſhould endeavour to prevent it; and ſecondly, when there is no neceſſity for reſolving their queſtions, you are not obliged to deceive them. You had much better impoſe ſilence, than anſwer a child with a lie: he will not be ſurpriſed at ſuch a command, if he has been uſed to ſubmit in matters of indifference. In ſhort, if you chooſe to reply let your anſwer be plain, without myſtery, and without embarraſſment, and without a ſmile. There is much leſs danger in ſatisfying than in exciting the curioſity of children.

Let your anſwers be always conciſe, ſerious, and determined, without ſeeming to heſitate. It is needleſs to add, that they ſhould be ſtrictly true; one cannot teach children the danger of telling lies to men, without perceiving the greater danger of deceiving children. A ſingle falſehood averred by the maſter to his pupil will for ever deſtroy the fruits of education.

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A total ignorance of certain things were, perhaps, the moſt to be wiſhed; but they ſhould learn betimes what it is impoſſible always to conceal from them. Either their curioſity ſhould not be at all excited, or it ſhould be ſatisfied before the time of danger. Your conduct with regard to your pupil greatly depends on his particular ſituation; the people by whom he is ſurrounded, and many other circumſtances. It is of importance to leave nothing to chance; and if you are not poſitively certain that you can keep him ignorant of the difference of ſex till the age of ſixteen, be careful to let him know it before the age of ten.

I cannot approve of ſpeaking to children in a language too refined, nor of palpable circumlocution, only to avoid calling things by their proper names. Virtuous innocence knows no diſguiſe; but an imagination polluted by vice renders the ear delicate, and obliges us to a continual refinement of expreſſion. Mere words can be of no conſequence; laſcivious ideas are what we ſhould guard againſt.

Though modeſty is natural to the human ſpecies, yet children have it not from nature. A ſenſe of ſhame proceeds only from the knowledge of evil, and how can children who neither have, nor ought to have this knowledge, ſhow its effects? To read them lectures on ſhame and decency, is to teach them that there are things ſhameful and immodeſt; it is inſpiring them with a ſecret deſire of knowing theſe things. Sooner

or later they arrive at this knowledge, and the firſt ſpark which catches the imagination, is ſure to ſet the paſſions in a flame. Whoever bluſhes is already culpable; real innocence can never be aſhamed.

Children, though they have not the ſame deſires with men, are, like them, liable to that uncleanlineſs which offends the ſenſes, and for that reaſon may receive the ſame leſſons concerning decency. Let us, in this reſpect, imitate nature, who placing the organs of ſecret pleaſure and thoſe of diſguſting neceſſity, in the ſame parts of the body, ſuggeſts to us the ſame attention at different ages, firſt by one idea, and then by another; to man by the idea of modeſty, and to children by that of cleanlineſs.

I ſee but one certain method of preſerving the innocence of children; namely, that it be cheriſhed and reſpected by thoſe who ſurround them: otherwiſe the artifice and reſerve with which they are treated will, ſooner or later, infallibly be diſcovered. A ſmile, a glance, or a ſingle geſture, is ſufficient to diſcover to them all we intended to conceal, and effectually to betray our deſign of deceiving them. The delicacy of expreſſion uſed by polite people in the preſence of children, ſuppoſing a kind of knowledge which they ſhould not have, is extremely injudicious; but, in converſingwith them, if you pay a proper regard to their innocence, you will naturally uſe thoſe terms which are moſt proper. There is a certain ſimplicity of expreſſion which is ſuita-

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ble and pleaſing to innocence, and this I take to be the beſt method of diverting the dangerous curioſity of children. By ſpeaking to them plainly of every thing, you leave them no room to ſuſpect that there is any thing more to ſay. By uniting to indelicate words the diſguſting ideas which they excite, you ſuppreſs the firſt fire of the imagination: you do not hinder them from pronouncing theſe words, and having theſe ideas but you extinguiſh, unknown to themſelves, the deſire of recollecting them. And what a world of embarraſſment do you avoid by thus expreſſing your ideas without circumlocution or diſguiſe!

"*How are children made?*" This, though an embarraſſing queſtion, may naturally be aſked by a child, whoſe conduct and health, during his whole life, may poſſibly depend, in a great meaſure, on the anſwer. The ſhorteſt method which a mother can deviſe to extricate herſelf, without deceiving her ſon, is to impoſe ſilence: this might do well enough, if he had been, for ſome time, accuſtomed to it, in queſtions about indifferent things, and that he ſuſpected no myſtery from this new command. But a mother ſeldom ſtops here. "*This* (ſays ſhe) *is the ſecret of married people; little boys ſhould not be ſo curious.*" In this manner ſhe may indeed extricate herſelf; but let me tell her, the little boy, piqued at the appearance of contempt in her reply, reſts not a moment till he learns the ſecret of married people, and he will not long remain in ignorance.

Permit me to relate a very different anſwer which I remember to have heard given to the ſame queſtion, and which ſtruck me the more as it proceeded from a woman as modeſt in her diſcourſe as in her behaviour, but who was wiſe enough, for the advantage of her ſon, and for the ſake of virtue, to diſregard the pleaſantry of fools. It happened, a little while before, that the child had voided a ſmall ſtone, which tore the paſſage; but the pain being over was ſoon forgotten. "*Mama* (ſays the boy) *How are children made?*"—"*Child* (replied the mother, without heſitation) *women make them in their water, as you did the ſtone, with ſuch terrible pain that it ſometimes coſts them their lives.*"—Let fools laugh, and blockheads be offended; but let the wiſe recollect whether they have ever heard a more judicious and pertinent anſwer.

The idea of any thing myſterious is inſtantly abſorbed in that of a natural neceſſity already known to the child. The acceſſory ideas of pain and death caſt a veil of ſadneſs over the imagination, and ſtifle curioſity: his thoughts centre, not upon the cauſe, but the conſequence of child-birth. The infirmities of human nature, images of diſguſt and horrour, ſuch will naturally ariſe from the explanation of this anſwer, if he has any inclination to be further inquiſitive. How can the inquietude of deſire be produced by ſuch a converſation? nevertheleſs we have not deviated from the truth, nor have we, inſtead of inſtructing, deceived our pupil. Your chil-

dren read, and thus acquire knowledge which otherwiſe they would not have obtained: if they ſtudy, the imagination catches fire even in the calm obſcurity of the cloſet. If they mix with the world, they hear a ſtrange jargon of words, they are ſtruck with a variety of examples; and being perfectly perſuaded that they are men, every thing which men do in their preſence they will endeavour to imitate; it being natural for them to model their actions by thoſe of other people, when other people's judgement ſerves them as a law. Servants, who are their dependents, and who conſequently have an intereſt in pleaſing them, will make their court at the expenſe of their morals. A fooliſh, flirting governeſs, in the preſence of a child of four years old, will expreſs herſelf in terms which the moſt impudent woman would be aſhamed of before a boy of fifteen. She ſoon forgets the words ſhe has uttered, but they have made a laſting impreſſion upon the child. Looſe converſation is the harbinger of immoral actions. A vicious foot-boy will debauch the principles of a child, and the ſecrets of the one become ſecurity for thoſe of the other.

A child properly educated, according to his age, knows no attachments but thoſe of cuſtom; he loves his ſiſter as he loves his playthings, and his friend as his dog. He does not perceive himſelf to be of any ſex or any ſpecies; man and woman are equally unknown to him, and he applies nothing to himſelf which they either

ſay or do; he hardly ſees or hears them; and pays no more regard to their diſcourſe than to their example. He is not, by this method, led into an artificial errour; it is the ignorance of nature. The time will come when the ſame nature will take care to inſtruct her pupil, and ſhe will not, till then, enable him to profit by her inſtructions.

Such are my principles of education: a particular detail of rules is, at preſent, foreign to the ſubject, and the methods which I propoſe, with regard to other objects, may ſerve as examples in the preſent caſe.

If you mean to confine the growing paſſions within proper limits, prolong the time in which they are naturally diſplayed, that they may arrange themſelves in due order. Thus you will do nothing more than ſuffer nature to diſpoſe her own work. Your taſk would be eaſy if your pupil were alone; but every thing about him inflames his imagination. He is hurried away by the torrent of prejudice; in order to ſtop him, you muſt endeavour to carry him againſt the ſtream. The imagination ſhould be governed by ſentiment, and reaſon ſilence the voice of publick opinion. Senſibility is the ſource of all the paſſions, and their bias is determined by the imagination. Every being, who perceives his connexions, will naturally be affected when theſe connexions alter, and when he imagines, or thinks he imagines, others more ſuitable to his nature. The paſſions of finite beings,

beings, even of angels themſelves, if they have any, are transformed into vices, by theſe errours of the imagination; for they muſt neceſſarily be acquainted with the nature of all beings before they can know what connexions are moſt ſuitable to their own.

All human wiſdom, as far as it concerns the uſe of the paſſions, conſiſts firſt, in perceiving the true relations of man, both with regard to the ſpecies and to the individual; and ſecondly, in regulating the different affections of the mind according to theſe relations.

But it may be aſked, whether man has it in his power to regulate his affections according to this or that particular relation? Moſt certainly he has, if it be in his power to direct his imagination to any particular object, or to give it this or that particular turn. Beſide, the preſent queſtion does not ſo much regard man's power over himſelf, as what may poſſibly be done with our pupil, by a proper choice of the circumſtances in which he is placed.

Whilſt his ſenſibility is confined merely to himſelf, there can be nothing moral in his actions; it is only when he begins to extend to others that he acquires the perception and idea of good and evil, which conſtitutes him really man, and an integral part of his ſpecies; to this period therefore let us confine our obſervations. Poſſibly it may be attended with ſome difficulty, becauſe we ſhall be obliged to reject the examples which are before our eyes, and go in

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ſearch of others, where the faculties of the mind gradually diſplay themſelves in their natural order.

A child educated in the accompliſhments of the polite world, who waits only for the power of putting in practice the premature inſtructions he has received, never miſtakes the moment when that power begins. But, inſtead of waiting for that period, accelerates its progreſs; he knows what will be the object of his deſires, long before they exiſt. Nature, when ſhe makes him a man, has nothing more to teach him. He was a man in idea long before he became one in effect.

The real progreſs of nature is gradual and ſlow; the motion of the blood quickens; the ſpirits begin to ferment, and the conſtitution forms by ſlow and more certain degrees. The ſagacious artiſt, who directs the machine, takes care that each part ſhall be perfect before it is put in motion; a long inquietude precedes our firſt deſires, a long ignorance diverts them various ways, and we deſire we know not what: the blood flows quick, the pulſe beats high, and a ſuper-abundance of life ſeems impatient to extend its limits. The eye acquires vivacity, and inquiſitively explores all other beings; we begin to have an intereſt in thoſe by whom we are ſurrounded; we begin to perceive that we were not made to live alone. Thus the heart begins to open to human affections, and becomes capable of attachment.

The firſt ſentiment of which a youth, carefully educated, is ſuſceptible, is not love, but friendſhip. The firſt act of his youthful imagination is to inform him that there are beings ſimilar to himſelf, and the ſpecies affects him before the ſex. Another advantage ariſing from prolonging his innocence is, that it enables us, by means of his growing ſenſibility, to ſow the firſt ſeeds of humanity in his heart; an advantage of infinite importance, becauſe it is the only time of his life when this care will be attended with equal ſucceſs.

I have always remarked, that young people, early corrupted, and addicted to debauchery, are inhuman and cruel; the heat of their conſtitution renders them impatient, vindictive, and impetuous: their imagination, engroſſed by one particular object, rejects every other; they have neither tenderneſs nor pity, and would ſacrifice father, mother, and all the world, to the moſt trifling gratification. On the contrary, a youth educated in ſimplicity and innocence, is inclined to the tender paſſions by the firſt impulſe of nature. His ſympathetick heart feels the ſufferings of his fellow-creatures; it leaps with joy at the unexpected ſight of a beloved companion, his arms fly open to embrace him with ardour, and his eyes overflow with gladneſs. He is ſenſible of ſhame for giving diſpleaſure, of regret for having offended. If the natural warmth of his conſtitution renders him haſty and paſſionate, you will immediately perceive the extreme goodneſs

neſs of his heart, in the effuſion of his repentance; he weeps, he ſighs over the wound he has given; he would gladly compenſate with his own blood, that which he had ſhed; his anger ſubſides, and his pride is humbled in the ſenſe of his fault. If he is offended, one ſingle word of apology diſarms him, though in the height of reſentment; he pardons the faults of others as willingly as he makes a reparation for his own. Youth is not the age of revenge and hatred; on the contrary it is that of compaſſion, clemency, and generoſity. I aver, and I fear no contradiction from experience, that a youth, not meanly bred, who has preſerved his innocence to the age of twenty, is at that period the moſt generous, the beſt, the moſt affectionate, and the moſt amiable of mankind. "Strange doctrine! (cries the reader) I never heard of it before."—Very poſſible: your philoſophers, educated in the corrupt notions of a college, know nothing of the matter.

Man is rendered ſociable by his weakneſs; it is our common miſery which inclines our heart to humanity. Every attachment is a ſign of inſufficiency: if we ſtood in no need of aſſiſtance, we ſhould hardly think of uniting ourſelves to each other, ſo that human felicity, uncertain as it is, proceeds from our infirmities. A being abſolutely happy, muſt be alone and independent: God only enjoys abſolute happineſs; but of that happineſs who can have any idea? If an imperfect being could be ſuppoſed to have

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an independent exiſtence, what, according to our ideas, would be his enjoyment? In being alone he would be miſerable. He who wants nothing will love nothing, and I cannot conceive that he who loves nothing can be happy.

Hence it follows, that our attachment to our fellow-creatures is rather owing to our ſympathiſing with their pains than with their pleaſures; for in the firſt we more evidently perceive the identity of our nature, and a ſecurity for their attachment to us. If our common neceſſities unite us from a principle of intereſt, our common miſeries unite us by affection. The ſight of a happy man is more apt to inſpire envy than love: we readily accuſe him of uſurping a privilege to which he has no excluſive right, and our ſelf-love ſuffers in the idea, that he has no need of our aſſiſtance. But who does not bemoan the unhappy ſufferer? who would not releaſe him from his misfortunes, if it coſt no more than a wiſh? It is eaſier to imagine ourſelves in the ſituation of the wretched than in that of the happy; becauſe we perceive ourſelves more nearly allied to the one than to the other. Compaſſion is a grateful ſenſation, becauſe, though we ſympathiſe with the ſufferer, we ſecretly rejoice that his pains are not our own. Envy, on the contrary, is painful, becauſe ſo far from ſympathiſing in the happineſs of others, we grudge them their enjoyments: the firſt ſeems to exempt us from the evil he ſuffers, and the latter to deprive us of the bleſſings he enjoys.

If

If you would encourage the firſt impulſes of a growing ſenſibility in the heart of a young man, and incline his diſpoſition, towards virtue and benevolence, be careful not to ſow the ſeeds of pride, vanity, and envy, by a falſe repreſentation of human felicity; let him remain unacquainted with the pomp of courts, the magnificence of palaces, and the charms of publick entertainments; let him not appear in polite circles and brilliant aſſemblies. Give him not a ſuperficial view of ſociety, till he is able to make a proper eſtimate of its intrinſick value. To ſhow him the world in general, before he knows ſomething of man in particular, would be to corrupt inſtead of forming his mind; to deceive inſtead of inſtructing him.

Men are not naturally opulent, courtiers, nobles, or kings. We come into the world naked and poor; we are all ſubject to the miſeries of life, to grief, neceſſity, and evils of various kinds: in ſhort, we are all condemned to die. Such is the true picture of man. Let us therefore begin by ſtudying thoſe things which are inſeparable from human nature, that which moſt eſſentially conſtitutes humanity. At the age of ſixteen we know what it is to ſuffer, for we ourſelves have already ſuffered; but we are hardly ſenſible of the ſufferings of other beings: to ſee without feeling them is not to know them, and, as I have frequently ſaid before, a child has no idea of what others feel; he knows no evils

evils but his own: but, when the firſt diſplay of his faculties kindles the fire of his imagination, he begins to perceive that he does not exiſt independent of his fellow-creatures; he feels their complaints, and ſympathiſes in their ſorrow. At this time the tragical picture of our exiſtence ſhould excite in his heart the feelings of humanity.

If this period is not eaſily diſcovered in your children, whom may we blame for it? You inſtruct them ſo early in the language of ſentiment, that they quickly learn to turn your own leſſons againſt you, and leave you no method of judging when they begin really to feel what they ſay. As for my Emilius, he has hitherto neither felt, nor pretended to feel. Having no idea of love, he has never been heard to ſay, "*I love you dearly:*" he was never inſtructed *how to look* on entering into the ſick chamber of his father, mother, or his governour; he was never ſhown how to affect a ſorrow which he did not feel; he feigns no tears at the death of his friends, for he knows not what death means. The inſenſibility of his heart is viſible in his behaviour. Indifferent to all except himſelf, like all other children, he is ſenſible of no attachment; he differs from them only in this, that he does not play the cheat as they do, or pretend to any thing that he does not feel.

Emilius, having beſtowed little reflexion on ſenſible beings, will be ſome time before he has any idea of ſuffering and death. Lamentation

and

and cries will gradually begin to excite his compaſſion, he will turn away his eyes at the ſight of blood; the convulſions of an expiring animal will create in him a kind of agony before he is ſenſible whence theſe emotions proceed. Had he continued indeed in a ſtate of barbarity, totally uncultivated, he would have known no ſuch feelings; if he had been further inſtructed, he would have known their ſource: he has compared ideas too often to have no feelings, but not ſufficiently to conceive what they are.

Hence proceeds compaſſion, the firſt relative ſentiment which touches the human heart, according to the order of nature. A child before he can be ſenſible of pity, muſt know that there are beings like himſelf, who are capable of feeling the ſame pain which he has already experienced. In ſhort, how ſhould we feel compaſſion, if not by being tranſported out of ourſelves, and uniting our own perſons, in imagination, to that of the ſuffering animal? by quitting, if I may ſay ſo, our own being for his? We ſuffer only in proportion as we think he ſuffers; it is not in ourſelves, but in him that we ſuffer: therefore our ſenſibility does not commence till the imagination warms and begins to carry us out of ourſelves.

To excite and nouriſh this growing ſenſibility, to guide or follow it in its natural propenſity, it will be neceſſary to throw ſuch objects in the way of our young pupil as will moſt effectually

effectually dilate his heart, extend it to other beings, and ſeparate him from himſelf; to hide carefully from his view thoſe objects which, on the contrary, tend to contract the heart and compreſs the ſpring of human ſelfiſhneſs: in other terms, to inſpire him with goodneſs, humanity, compaſſion, benevolence, and all the ſoft attractive paſſions which are ſo pleaſing to mankind; and to ſtifle envy and hatred and all thoſe cruel and inhuman appetites, which, if I may be allowed the phraſe, render ſenſibility not only null, but negative; becoming the torment of thoſe who poſſeſs them.

The preceding reflexions, I think, may be compriſed in two or three diſtinct and obvious maxims.

FIRST MAXIM.

It is not in the power of the human heart to ſympathiſe with thoſe who are happier than our ſelves, but with thoſe who are only more miſerable.

IF there are any exceptions to this maxim, they are rather apparent than real. We do not ſympathiſe with the rich or great to whom we are attached. Even in our moſt ſincere attachment we only appropriate a part of their well-being. Sometimes we really love people in their misfortunes; but ſo long as they are in proſperity, they have no ſincere friends, except ſuch as are not dupes to appearances, and who rather

pity than envy them, notwithſtanding their condition.

We ſympathiſe in the happineſs of rural ſimplicity, becauſe the pleaſure of contemplating the felicity of the honeſt ruſticks is not imbittered by envy. We find ourſelves really intereſted in their pleaſures; and why? Becauſe we think it in our power to deſcend to their ſtate of peace and innocence, and to enjoy the ſame happineſs: it is a laſt reſource which excites none but agreeable ideas, and of which our will alone is ſufficient to put us in poſſeſſion. We have a ſatisfaction in contemplating this aſylum, though we never intend to enjoy it.

Hence we may conclude that if we mean to inſpire the heart of a youth with humanity, we are not to dazzle his eyes with the ſplendour of the rich and fortunate, but to diſplay them ſuch as they often are, gloomy and diſcontented, ſo that he may rather dread than envy their ſituation. Thus, having no temptation to follow the ſteps of other men in his purſuit of happineſs, he will naturally ſtrike out a path of his own.

SECOND MAXIM.

We pity in others thoſe evils only, from which we think ourſelves not exempt.

Non ignarâ mali, miſeris ſuccurrere diſco.

WHAT

WHAT can be more beautiful, more affecting, and more true than this line!

Why have kings no compaſſion for their ſubjects? Becauſe they never intend to become men.—Why are the rich ſo obdurate to the poor? Becauſe they are not afraid of poverty.—Why are the lower claſs of people deſpiſed by the nobility? Becauſe the nobles are in no danger of becoming plebeians.—Why are the Turks, in general more humane, more hoſpitable than we are? Becauſe their government being arbitrary, and conſequently the fortune and grandeur of particulars precarious, they are not entirely out of the reach of poverty and diſtreſs*; he who is to-day the moſt powerful, may to-morrow be in the ſituation of the beggar he relieves. This reflexion, which ſo frequently recurs in the oriental romances, makes them infinitely more affecting than all our dry morality.

Do not therefore accuſtom your pupil to look haughtily down upon the ſufferings of the unfortunate, and the labour of the poor: he cannot be taught to pity them while he looks upon them as almoſt of a different ſpecies. Let him underſtand that the lot of thoſe miſerable wretches may poſſibly be his own; that he is by no means exempt from their misfortunes, and that a thouſand inevitable events may plunge him into equal miſery. Teach him to place no

* At preſent indeed, the caſe is a little altered; rank becoming daily more fixed and durable among them they grow accordingly more deſtitute of compaſſion.

no confidence in birth, health, or riches; ſhow him all the viciſſitudes of fortune; point out to him the many frequent examples of people, who, from a ſituation more exalted than his, have fallen to the loweſt degree of poverty and diſtreſs; whether by their own fault or not, is at preſent out of the queſtion. What idea can he have of a fault? let us not attempt to diſturb the natural gradation of his knowledge, nor to enlighten his underſtanding by means above his comprehenſion. It requires no great learning, or capacity, to conceive, that all the prudence of man cannot poſitively inſure him the continuance of life for a ſingle hour to come; cannot promiſe him that before night comes on he ſhall not *be gnaſhing his teeth* in acute pain; that a month hence he ſhall not be reduced to poverty; that in leſs than a year he ſhall not be chained to the oar of an Algerine galley. But theſe things are not to be coldly repeated like his catechiſm. He muſt ſee, he muſt feel the calamities of human nature. Terrify his imagination with the perils by which mankind are continually ſurrounded, ſo that, in liſtening to the animated deſcription, he may preſs cloſe to your boſom for fear of falling into the abyſs. But, ſay you, this will make a coward of him. As to that, we ſhall conſider it in the ſequel. Let us firſt endeavour to teach him humanity; this, at preſent, is our principal concern.

THIRD MAXIM.

Our pity for the misfortunes of others, is not measured by the quantity of evil, but by the ſuppoſed ſenſibility of the ſufferer.

WE pity the wretched only in proportion as we believe them ſenſible of their own wretchedneſs. The mere phyſical ſenſation of evil is not ſo violent as it generally ſeems; it is the memory which makes us ſenſible of its continuance; it is the imagination extending it beyond the preſent moment which makes us really deſerving of compaſſion. Probably this may be the reaſon why we are leſs affected at the ſufferings of animals than of men. We do not pity a dray-horſe when we ſee him in the ſtable, becauſe we do not ſuppoſe that, in eating his hay, he remembers the inhumanity of his driver, or is apprehenſive of the fatigues which he muſt undergo. In like manner, we never pity a ſheep in its paſture, though we know it to be doomed to ſlaughter; becauſe we ſuppoſe it to have no fore-knowledge of its deſtiny. By extending theſe ideas, we alſo become indifferent to the ſufferings of our own ſpecies, and the rich excuſe their conduct towards the poor, by ſuppoſing them too ſtupid to be ſenſible of their own miſery. In general, I judge in what degree men eſtimate the happineſs of their fellow-creatures, by their manner of treating them. It is quite natural that we ſhould ſet little value on the feli-

city of beings we deſpiſe. Let us, therefore, not be ſurpriſed when politicians talk of the populace with ſo much diſdain, nor that the generality of philoſophers ſhould affect to make man ſo wicked a being.

It is the populace which compoſe the bulk of mankind: thoſe which are not in this claſs are ſo few in number, that they are hardly worth notice. Man is the ſame creature in every ſtate; therefore, that which is the moſt numerous ought to be moſt reſpected. To a man capable of reflexion, all civil diſtinctions are nothing: he obſerves the ſame paſſions, the ſame feelings, in the clown and the man of quality: the principal difference between them conſiſts in the language they ſpeak; in a little refinement of expreſſion: but, if there be any real diſtinction, it is certainly to the diſadvantage of the leaſt ſincere. The common people appear as they really are, and they are not amiable: if thoſe in high-life were equally undiſguiſed, their appearance would make us ſhudder with horrour.

There is, ſay our philoſophers, an equal allotment of happineſs and miſery to every rank of men, a maxim as dangerous as it is abſurd. If all mankind are equally happy, it would be ridiculous to give ourſelves any trouble to promote their felicity. Let each remain in his ſituation: let the ſlave endure the laſh, the lame his infirmity, and let the beggar periſh, ſince they would gain nothing by a change of ſituation. The ſame philoſophers enumerate the pangs of the rich, and expatiate on the vanity of their

their pleaſures: was there ever ſo palpable a ſophiſm! The pangs of a rich man are not eſſential to riches, but to the abuſe of them. If he were even more wretched than the poor, he would deſerve no compaſſion, becauſe he is the creator of his own miſery, and happineſs was in his power. But the ſufferings of the indigent are the natural conſequences of ſtate; he feels the weight of his hard lot; no length of time nor habit, can ever render him inſenſible of fatigue and hunger: neither wiſdom nor good humour can annihilate the evils which are inſeparable from his ſituation. What avails it an Epictetus to foreſee that his maſter is going to break his leg? doth that prevent the evil? on the contrary, his fore-knowledge adds greatly to his misfortune. If the populace were really as wiſe as we ſuppoſe them ſtupid, how could they act otherwiſe than as they do? Study this order of men, and you will find that in another language they will utter as much wit and more good ſenſe than yourſelf. Learn, therefore, to reſpect your ſpecies. Remember that the common people compoſe the moſt conſiderable part of mankind; and that if all the kings and philoſophers were to be taken away, the chaſm would be imperceptible, and things would go on juſt as well without them. In ſhort, teach your pupil to love mankind, and even thoſe by whom mankind are vilified. Let him not rank himſelf particularly in one, but among all claſſes of men. Speak to him of man with tenderneſs

and compaſſion, but never with contempt. Man! diſhonour not mankind.

By theſe, and the like methods equally uncommon, we muſt penetrate into the heart of youth, excite in it the firſt emotions of nature, and extend its benevolence to our whole ſpecies; and I will add, that in theſe operations, it is of infinite importance to ſtifle every ſelfiſh principle, and to guard as much as poſſible againſt the incurſions of vanity, emulation, glory, and all thoſe ſentiments which lead us to compare ourſelves with others; for ſuch compariſons are never made without ſome impreſſion of hatred to thoſe who diſpute the preference with us, even though it were only in our own eſtimation: ſo that we muſt either be blind to our own merit, or incenſed againſt our competitor; we muſt be either envious or inſenſible. Let us, if poſſible, avoid this dilemma. Theſe dangerous paſſions, I ſhall be told, will ſooner or later take root in ſpite of us. I don't deny it; all things have their proper time and place; I inſiſt only on our not aiding them in their growth.

Such, in general, is the method, in which we ought to proceed. A detail of particular examples would be uſeleſs, becauſe we now begin to branch out into an almoſt infinite variety of characters, and that each example would not ſuit above one in a hundred thouſand. At this age, alſo, if our tutor be a man of abilities, he will, with true philoſophical obſervation, whilſt he moulds the heart of his pupil, enquire into its

its inmoſt texture. Whilſt your pupil is yet unacquainted with diſguiſe, the impreſſion he receives from every object he ſees, may eaſily be read in his eyes and geſture: his countenance, the true index of his ſoul, diſcovers all its motions; by a careful obſervation of theſe, we learn, in time, to foreſee and, at laſt, to direct them.

It is generally remarked, that the ſight of blood or wounds, the ſound of cries and groans, the apparatus of painful operations, and all thoſe objects which excite the idea of ſuffering, make a more early and more general impreſſion upon mankind than that of death. The idea of final diſſolution, being more complex, is not ſo ſtriking. The image of death impreſſes our minds later, and more faintly, becauſe we have no experience to aſſiſt our conception. To form any idea of the agonies of death, we muſt firſt have beheld the conſequence thereof, in the lifeleſs body; but when once this image is perfectly formed in our minds, no ſpectacle can be more horrible; whether it proceeds from the appearance of total diſſolution, or from the reflection that, death being inevitable, we ourſelves ſhall, ſooner or later, be in the ſame ſituation.

Theſe impreſſions have their different modifications, and degrees, according to the character and habits of each individual; but the impreſſions themſelves are univerſal. There are other impreſſions which are ſlower and leſs gene-

ral, and which are peculiar to perſons of great ſenſibility. I mean thoſe which are received from the mental ſufferings, ſorrow, and affliction of our fellow creatures. There are people who are incapable of being moved, except by cries and tears; the long and ſilent grief of a heart torn with diſtreſs never drew a ſigh from their breaſts; they are not affected at the ſight of a dejected countenance, pale complexion, and hollow eyes exhauſted of their tears. On ſuch hearts the ſufferings of the mind have no effect. They are judges without feeling, from whom we have nothing to expect but inflexible rigour and cruelty. Poſſibly they may be juſt, but never humane, generous, or compaſſionate. I ſay, they may be juſt, if it be poſſible for man to be juſt without being merciful.

Let us not, however, be in haſte to form our judgement of youth by this rule, eſpecially thoſe who have had a proper education; it being impoſſible for them to have any idea of moral pain, which they have never experienced. They can ſympathiſe with the evils only which they have felt. But this ſeeming inſenſibility, proceeding merely from ignorance, will change into tenderneſs and compaſſion, as ſoon as they perceive that in human life there are a thouſand evils with which they were unacquainted. As for my Emilius, if he diſcovers ſimplicity and plain ſenſe in his infancy, I am very ſure he will not want ſenſibility in his youth; for the truth of our ſenſations depends greatly on the juſtneſs of our ideas,

But.

But, ſaid the reader, why this ſcene of affliction? Certainly you muſt have forgot your firſt reſolution, and the conſtant felicity which you promiſed to your pupil. Repreſentations of miſery and death: ſtrange felicity! wonderful enjoyment for an heart juſt entering into life!—This will be the language. No matter: I promiſed to make him really, not apparently, happy. Is it my fault that you, who are the conſtant dupes of appearance, miſtake it for reality?

Let us take two young boys, and ſuppoſe them, after the firſt ſtage of their education, entering the world through different ways, diametrically oppoſite to each other. One mounts up at once to the ſummit of Olympus, and mixes in the moſt brilliant ſociety. He is preſented at court, and introduced to the great; he becomes acquainted with the rich men and the fine women. We will ſuppoſe him univerſally entertained and careſſed, without examining into its effects upon his reaſon, which we will imagine to be in no danger. Pleaſures anticipate his deſires: every day preſents him with freſh amuſements, and he ſeems to enjoy them all. He appears attentive, eager, and curious. You are ſtruck with his firſt rapture. You think him happy; but look into the ſtate of his mind. You think he enjoys theſe ſplendid amuſements; I think he ſuffers under them.

His eyes no ſooner open than he perceives a multitude of pretended pleaſures which have entirely eſcaped him, and many others which,

from the ſhortneſs of their duration, ſeem to have preſented themſelves only to puniſh him with regret for their departure. Obſerve him ſurveying a palace, and you ſee, by his impatient curioſity, that he is aſking himſelf why his paternal manſion is not equally magnificent? All his queſtions indicate that he is continually comparing himſelf with the owner of the palace, and every mortifying circumſtance in the compariſon ſerves only to ſtimulate and excite his vanity. If, by chance, he meets a youth better dreſſed than himſelf, I hear him murmuring againſt the avarice of his parents. If, on the contrary, he happens to excel in point of dreſs, perhaps he has the mortification to find himſelf eclipſed by the birth or ſenſe of another, and all his finery humbled before a plain ſuit. If he ſhines at a ball or an aſſembly, and raiſes himſelf on tiptoe in order to be more conſpicuous, is there a man in the whole company who does not wiſh to mortify the young coxcomb? They ſoon unite againſt him: the contemptuous regards of the grave, and the raillery of the gay, cannot fail to render his ſituation diſagreeable; but were he to perceive himſelf deſpiſed only by one ſingle man, that were alone ſufficient to invalidate the applauſe of all the reſt.

But we will ſuppoſe him poſſeſſed of real merit, and every agreeable accompliſhment; that he is handſome, witty, amiable; that he is the favourite of the ladies; by anticipating his inclinations, however, they make a fool of him rather

rather than a lover. He will ſucceed in ſome affairs of gallantry; but he will have no paſſion, no tranſport for enjoyment. His deſires being continually prevented, in the lap of pleaſure he is tired with conſtraint. The ſex, which was created for the happineſs of the other, ſatisfies and diſguſts him, even before he knows the ſex. If he continues to viſit them, it is now merely out of vanity; but if, at laſt, he becomes ſincerely attached, he will find himſelf no longer the only young, ſprightly, amiable fellow in the world; his miſtreſſes will be no prodigies of fidelity.

I ſay nothing of the quarrels, treachery, vexation, and regret, which are inſeparable from this way of life: we know that experience will, in time, convince us of its folly, and give us a diſtaſte for it: I am now ſpeaking only of the laſting diſguſt attendant upon the firſt illuſion.

How different muſt this ſcene appear to one who, till now, had been wrapped up in the boſom of his family and friends, and was the ſole object of their care and attention, to enter at once into a world where he is of ſo little account, and to find that he is where he is loſt in a new ſphere, who was himſelf ſo lately the center of his own. How many affronts! how many humiliations muſt he experience, before he loſes the prejudice of his importance! Whilſt a child, he was obeyed and flattered; and now he is become a young man, he is obliged to ſubmit to all the world: or, if he ſhould happen to forget himſelf, and

aſſume his former airs, how mortifying are the leſſons which bring him back to reaſon! Being accuſtomed to obtain with eaſe the objects of his deſire, his deſires are many; conſequently ſo are his diſappointments. He covets every thing he ſees; he envies all mankind; he wiſhes to be univerſally obeyed. Puffed up with vanity, enflamed with lawleſs appetites, tormented by jealouſy, hatred, and every other devouring paſſion, he carries their agitation with him daily into the tumult of the world, and brings it back again every night. He comes home full of diſcontent. He lies down to reſt with a thouſand vain projects in his head, and his pride, even in his ſleep, paints on his imagination the chimerical pleaſures with which his deſires torment him, but which he will never enjoy. Such is the portrait of your pupil: let us now take a view of mine.

If the firſt object which preſents itſelf happens to exhibit a melancholy ſpectacle, the ſenſation is immediately ſucceeded by a pleaſing idea: perceiving himſelf exempt from the evils with which others are afflicted, he finds that he is happier than he imagined. He ſympathiſes in the ſufferings of his fellow creatures; but that ſympathy is voluntary and agreeable. He enjoys at once the compaſſion which he feels for their misfortunes, and his own happineſs in being exempt from their fate; he perceives in himſelf that power which extends us beyond ourſelves, and enables us to communicate to

others the activity which is ſuperfluous to our own well-being. To ſympathiſe in the misfortunes of others, doubtleſs it is neceſſary we ſhould know, though not that we ſhould feel them. Having ſuffered, or being apprehenſive of ſuffering, we pity thoſe who actually ſuffer; but as ſoon as the evil becomes our own, all our pity centers in ourſelves. Now all mankind being ſubject to the miſeries of life, if we grant to others that ſenſibility only of which we have no need on our own account, it follows that pity muſt be a very pleaſing ſentiment, becauſe it is a proof of our felicity; and that on the contrary, a man of no feeling muſt neceſſarily be unhappy, ſince the texture of his heart affords him no ſuper-abundant ſenſibility for the ſufferings of his fellow-creatures.

We are too apt to judge of happineſs by appearance; we ſuppoſe it to be where it very rarely exiſts; we ſeek it where it cannot be found. Mirth is a very equivocal ſign of happineſs. A merry fellow is often in reality an unhappy mortal, who, by laughing, endeavours to conceal and to forget his miſery. Thoſe gentlemen who in a polite circle appear ſo good humoured, ſo open, ſo ſerene, are generally moroſe and peeviſh at home: their domeſtics feel the want of that good-nature which they laviſh upon their companions. True contentment is never extremely gay or noiſy; its poſſeſſor, ever careful of ſo pleaſing a ſenſation, will not ſuffer it to evaporate, but enjoys the invaluable bleſſing

with deliberate taſte and reflection. The man who is really happy ſpeaks little, and ſeldom laughs: he, as it were, contracts his circle of felicity round his heart. Solitude and ſilence are friends to true pleaſure. Tender emotions and tears are the companions of enjoyment; and even exceſſive joy more frequently produces tears than laughter.

The number and variety of amuſements may poſſibly ſeem to contribute to happineſs, and the ſimplicity of an uniform life appear tireſome; but a more attentive obſervation will convince us, that the moſt perfect felicity of the ſoul conſiſts in moderation of enjoyment, ſo as to curb the violence of deſire, and prevent diſguſt. The inquietude of deſire produces curioſity and inconſtancy; laſſitude and diſcontent are the off-ſpring of turbulent pleaſures. We cannot be weary of our ſituation if we know not a better. Of all mankind, ſavages are the leaſt curious, and leaſt tired of their exiſtence. They look upon every object with indifference: they enjoy not the circumſtances of life, but life itſelf. They ſpend their whole time in doing nothing, and yet their time never hangs heavily on their hands.

The man of the world is entirely covered with a maſk; he is ſo accuſtomed to diſguiſe, that if, at any time, he is obliged, for a moment, to aſſume his natural character, his uneaſineſs and conſtraint are palpably obvious.

Reality

Reality is no part of his concern, he aims at nothing more than appearance.

I cannot help figuring to myſelf, in the face of the fine young fop above-mentioned, a certain impertinent ſmile of affectation, which, to men of rational ſimplicity, is inſupportable; and, on the contrary, in that of mine, methinks, I behold an intereſting, open countenance, ſtrongly expreſſive of the ſincerity of his mind, inſpiring eſteem and confidence, and ſeeming to wait only the overflowings of his heart, to give his friendſhip to all thoſe who approach him.

I think, we generally ſuppoſe the phyſiognomy, or countenance, to be formed by a ſimple diſplay of the traces already ſketched out by nature. For my part, I am of opinion, that beſides this natural diſplay of the features, they are inſenſibly faſhioned into phyſiognomy by the frequent impreſſion of certain affections of the mind. That theſe affections are impreſſed on the viſage is beyond doubt, and that ſuch impreſſions, by frequent repetition, muſt neceſſarily become durable. Hence, I ſuppoſe, it is, that a man's character may frequently be diſcovered in his face, without having recourſe to myſterious explications, which ſuppoſe a knowledge we are not endowed with.

In the countenance of a child there are only two affections which are ſtrongly impreſſed, namely joy and grief: he laughs, or he cries; the intermediate affections are nothing. He paſſes inceſſantly

ſantly from one emotion to the other; and this continual change prevents any permanent impreſſion which might form a phyſiognomy; but at an age when, becoming more ſenſible, he is more powerfully and frequently affected, the impreſſions are too deep to be eaſily effaced, and from the habitual ſtate of the mind reſults a certain arrangement of features which in time becomes unalterable. Nevertheleſs, I have ſeen men change their phyſiognomy at different ages; but whenever this happened, where it was in my power to obſerve them with attention, I have always remarked that there was a change alſo in their habitual paſſions. This ſingle obſervation, ſufficiently confirmed, ſeems to be deciſive, and not improperly urged in a treatiſe on education, which ought to teach us how to perceive the emotions of the ſoul by exterior ſigns.

Whether my pupil will be leſs amiable for not having learned the art of diſguiſing his ſentiments and of feigning ſenſations which he never felt, is not my buſineſs to determine. This I know, that he will be more loving, and I am much inclined to doubt whether he who loves himſelf alone, can act his part ſo well as to ſeem more deſerving of eſteem, than he whoſe happineſs, in ſome meaſure, conſiſts in his affection for others. But with regard to this ſentiment, I believe, I have already ſaid enough to guide a ſenſible reader, and convince him that I have uniformly adhered to my firſt principles.

I now return to my ſyſtem, and proceed. When this critical age approaches, exhibit to your pupil ſuch ſcenes as may reſtrain, rather than accelerate the growth of his paſſions. Carry him from the town, where the immodeſt dreſs and behaviour of the women anticipate the inſtructions of nature; where every ſcene preſents him with pleaſures, with which he ought to remain unacquainted, till he is able to chooſe with propriety. Carry him back to his firſt habitation, whoſe rural ſimplicity will ſuffer his paſſions to unfold in their natural gradation. But if a taſte for the arts ſhould attach him to the town, let that taſte ſerve to prevent a dangerous inactivity. Be extremely circumſpect in the choice of his companions, his employment, his pleaſures. Show him ſuch pictures as are affecting, but modeſt; ſuch as will nouriſh his ſenſibility, without enflaming his deſires. But let us not forget that whilſt we endeavour to avoid one extreme there is a poſſibility of falling into the other. It is not my intention to afflict my young pupil continually with objects of horrour and diſtreſs; to carry him from hoſpital to hoſpital, and from one priſon to another. We muſt not, by too frequent repetition, harden, inſtead of ſoftening, his heart, at the ſight of human woes. What we too often behold we ceaſe to imagine, and it is in imagination only that we feel the miſeries of others. Hence, from their conſtant viſits to the dying and the ſick, the hearts of the prieſts and phyſicians grow

grow callous and obdurate. Let your pupil, therefore, be made acquainted with the lot of man, and the ſufferings of his ſpecies; but let him not be too frequent a witneſs of ſuch calamity. A ſingle object, judiciouſly choſen, and ſhown at a proper time, will inſpire him with tenderneſs, and afford him reflexion for a whole month. It is not ſo much the object itſelf, as his return to it in idea, which determines his judgement; and the permanency of the impreſſion upon his mind depends alſo leſs upon the object, than the point of view in which it is recalled to his mind. By this management of our examples, leſſons, and images, we ſhall for a long time blunt the dangerous edge of inclination, and divert the attention of nature whilſt we follow her own dictates.

In proportion as he becomes more enlightened, let the ideas which you mean to excite be adapted to his underſtanding; and in proportion as his deſires take fire, make choice of ſuch objects as will moſt effectually ſtifle the flame. I remember to have been told by an old military gentleman, who was as much diſtinguiſhed for his morals as for his courage, that his father who was a ſenſible man, but extremely devout, ſeeing that he was naturally too much inclined to women, ſpared no pains to curb this propenſity; but finding, notwithſtanding all his care, that his ſon ſtill perſiſted in his vices, he carried him to an hoſpital eſtabliſhed for the cure of people in the venereal diſeaſe, and without

without any previous intimation of his deſign, led him into a gallery full of thoſe unhappy wretches, who were ſeverely expiating the folly which had brought them thither. At this hideous ſpectacle, ſo offenſive to all his ſenſes, the young man grew ſick. "*Go thou wretched debauchée* (ſaid the father, with a ſignificant look and emphaſis) *follow thy looſe inclinations; it will not be long before thou wilt think thyſelf happy in being admitted into this place, or perhaps, a victim to the moſt infamous ſufferings, thou wilt compel thy father to thank God for thy death.*"

Theſe few words, joined to the affecting ſcene before him, made an impreſſion upon the young man which time could never efface. Condemned, by his profeſſion, to ſpend his youth in garriſons, he choſe rather to bear the raillery of his companions than imitate their vices. "*I was a man* (ſaid he) *and have had my foibles; but during my whole life, I never could behold a publick proſtitute without horrour.*" Tutors! let me adviſe you to put little confidence in words; but learn to make a proper choice of time, place, and circumſtances: let examples be your lectures, and reſt aſſured of their effect.

During infancy, our employment is inconſiderable; the neglects or miſtakes of that age are not without remedy, and the good we imbibe might be communicated at a later period: but it is otherwiſe with regard to the age when man begins firſt really to live. This age is always too ſhort for the uſe which we ought to make of it,

it, and its importance requires an unwearied attention: for this reaſon I dwell upon the art of extending it beyond its natural duration. One of the firſt precepts in the art of cultivation, is to retard nature as much as poſſible, that her progreſs may be ſlow but certain. We muſt not ſuffer our youth to commence man the moment it is in his power. Whilſt the body is growing, thoſe ſpirits which give life to the blood, and ſtrength to the fibres, are yet unprepared and imperfect. If they be carried into a different channel, and that which was intended to complete an individual, be employed in the formation of another, they will both remain feeble, and the work of nature will be left imperfect. The operations of the mind are alſo influenced by this perverſion: the functions of the ſoul are as languid and ſpiritleſs as thoſe of the body. Robuſt limbs, indeed, do not conſtitute courage or genius; and I can conceive that ſtrength of mind will never accompany that of body, if the organs of communication between the body and mind are improperly diſpoſed: but how perfect ſoever they may be in this reſpect, they will always act feebly, if the blood which gives them motion be exhauſted, impoveriſhed, and devoid of that ſubſtance which ought to give life and power to every ſpring in the machine. I have generally obſerved more vigour of mind among thoſe people whoſe youth are preſerved from a premature corruption of manners, than in more civilized

civilized communities, where the diſorder commences with the power; and doubtleſs this is one of the reaſons why a people, whoſe manners are uncorrupted, ſurpaſs their profligate neighbours in valour and good ſenſe. The latter ſhine only in certain ſubtile qualities which they call wit, ſagacity, cunning; but thoſe grand and noble functions of wiſdom and reaſon which, in great actions, diſtinguiſh and honour mankind, are rarely to be found except among the former.

Our inſtructors complain that the natural fire of this age renders youth ungovernable. Very true; but is it not entirely their own fault? Can they be ignorant that when they have once ſuffered this fire to make its way through the ſenſes, it is not in their power to divert its courſe? will the tedious, frigid ſermons of a pedant efface from the mind of his pupil, the idea of pleaſure which he has conceived will they baniſh from his heart the deſires which torment him? Will they quench the ardour of a flame of which he already knows the uſe? will he not be enraged at thoſe obſtacles which oppoſe the only happineſs of which he has any idea? and in the ſevere law preſcribed without explanation, what can he diſcover except the caprice and hatred of a man who chooſes to torment him? Is it, therefore, wonderful that he ſhould oppoſe and hate the pedagogue in his turn?

It is eaſy to conceive that by relaxing his ſeverity a tutor may render himſelf leſs diſagreeable to his pupil, and yet preſerve an apparent authority; but I cannot perceive the uſe of that authority which ſerves only to foment the vices which it ought to repreſs: it is much the ſame as if a rider, in order to tame an unruly horſe, were to leap him down a precipice.

This fire of youth, ſo far from being an obſtacle in his education, is the proper inſtrument of its accompliſhment; it is that which gives you an advantage over the heart of your pupil, when he ceaſes to be leſs powerful than yourſelf. His firſt affections are the reins with which you ſhould direct all his motions. He was before at liberty; but now he is enſlaved. Whilſt he was incapable of affection, he was dependent only on himſelf and his neceſſities; but the moment he loves, he depends on his attachments. Thus are formed the firſt bonds which unite him to his ſpecies; but we are not to ſuppoſe that his new-born ſenſibility will be univerſal, or that he will conceive any meaning in the word Mankind. No! that ſenſibility will firſt be confined to his equals, and his equals are thoſe only with whom he is acquainted; thoſe whom cuſtom has rendered dear to him, or uſeful; thoſe in whom he perceives a ſimilitude of ideas and ſenſations; thoſe who are expoſed to the pains, and are ſenſible of the pleaſures, which he has experienced; in a word, thoſe in whom the more manifeſt identity of nature increaſes his diſpoſition

diſpoſition to ſelf-love. It is not till after having cultivated his diſpoſition in a thouſand forms, after much reflexion on his own ſentiments, as well as thoſe of others, that he will be able to generalize his notions under the abſtract idea of humanity, and add to his particular affections thoſe which are to unite him to the whole ſpecies.

In becoming capable of attachment, he becomes ſenſible of it in others*, and therefore attentive to the ſigns of this attachment. Thus, you ſee, what a new empire you acquire over him; you enſlave his heart before he is aware of it. What muſt be his ſenſations, when, turning his eyes upon himſelf, he diſcovers the ſervices you have done for him; when he compares himſelf with other young people of his own age, and you with other tutors? I ſay, when he diſcovers, for let it never be urged: if you once hint the obligation, from that inſtant he will ceaſe to perceive it. If you exact obedience in return for your ſervices, he will ſuſpect that he has been deceived; he will conclude that under pretence of ſerving him, you have bound him in a contract to which he never conſented. In vain you will urge, that what you exact is entirely for his own good; it

* Attachment may exiſt without a return, but friendſhip cannot: the latter is an exchange, a contract, like any other, only more ſacred. The word friendſhip has no *correlative*. Every man who is not the friend of his friend is doubtleſs a cheat; for friendſhip can only be obtained by friendſhip, either real or apparent.

it is ſufficient that it is exacted; and that in return for what was done without his conſent.

When an unhappy wretch accepts a ſhilling ſuppoſing it to be a gift, and afterwards finds himſelf to be inliſted, do we not exclaim againſt the injuſtice? and are you not equally unjuſt to demand a return for obligations which your pupil never accepted?

Ingratitude would be more rare, if benefits upon uſury were leſs common. Nothing can be more natural than to love thoſe who do us ſervice. The heart of man is ſelf-intereſted, but never ungrateful; and the obliged are leſs to be charged with ingratitude than their benefactors with ſelf-intereſt. If you ſell me your favours let us ſettle the price; but if you pretend to give, and afterwards expect to make terms with me, you are guilty of fraud; it is their being given gratis which renders them ineſtimable. The heart will receive laws only from itſelf; by endeavouring to enſlave it you give it liberty, and by leaving it at liberty it becomes your ſlave.

When the fiſherman throws his bait into the water, the fiſh aſſemble, and continue round him without ſuſpicion; but when caught by the concealed hook they perceive him draw the line, they then endeavour to eſcape. Is the fiſherman their benefactor, or are the fiſh ungrateful? Do we ever ſee a man, who is forgotten by his benefactor, forget the benefactor? On the contrary, he ſpeaks of him with pleaſure, and never thinks

thinks of him without emotion: and if by chance he has it in his power to make any return for the favours he has received, with what joy he ſnatches the opportunity; with what rapture he exclaims, now it is my turn to oblige; ſuch is the true voice of nature. A real benefit can never produce ingratitude.

If, therefore, gratitude, be a natural ſentiment, and you do not, by your own fault, deſtroy its effects, be aſſured that your pupil, beginning to perceive the benefits he receives from your care, will be ſenſible of his obligation, provided you yourſelf have not fixed a price on theſe benefits; thus you will acquire an authority over his heart which nothing can poſſibly ſubvert. Till it is time to treat him as a man, let there be no mention of his obligations to his tutor, but to himſelf. If you mean to make him docile and tractable, let him have full liberty; leave him frequently to himſelf and he will fly to you for aſſiſtance; inſpire him with the noble ſentiment of gratitude, by ſpeaking to him of his own intereſt. I avoided this argument ſo long as he was unable to comprehend it; becauſe ſeeing in it nothing further than the dependence of his tutor, he might poſſibly miſtake him for his valet: but now he begins to have ſome idea of affection, he perceives thoſe endearing ties by which a man may be united to a particular object; and in your unwearied zeal for his welfare, he no longer beholds the attachment of a ſlave, but the affection

tion of a friend. Nothing has ſo much influence over the human heart as the voice of undoubted friendſhip; we know that our friend may poſſibly be miſtaken, but we are certain he cannot intend to deceive us; we may differ from him in opinion, but we cannot treat his councils with contempt.

Having completed the ſecond period of our phyſical exiſtence, we now enter upon the ſyſtem of our moral relations. If this were the proper place, I ſhould endeavour to ſhow in what manner the firſt ſuggeſtions of conſcience proceed from the firſt emotions of the heart; and how our notions of good and evil are the offspring of our ſentiments of love and hatred. I could demonſtrate that *juſtice* and *goodneſs* are not merely abſtract ideas, having only a moral exiſtence in the underſtanding; but that they are real affections of the ſoul enlightened by reaſon, and proceeding in regular progreſſion from our primitive affections; that reaſon, independent of conſcience, would be unable to eſtabliſh any one natural law; and that the law of nature is a mere chimera, if it is not founded on ſome innate principle in the human heart*. But I am not

* Even the precept of doing as we would be done by has no true foundation except in conſcience and ſenſibility. Where is the preciſe reaſon for my acting as if I were another, eſpecially, if I am morally certain that I ſhall never be in his ſituation? Who will be anſwerable, provided I obſerve this maxim, that others will not act upon the ſame principle with me? The villain reaps advantage from the probity of the juſt, and from his own

not writing a treatiſe of morals or metaphyſicks, not a courſe of ſcience of any kind: I intend only to trace the order and progreſs of our knowledge and ſentiments relative to our natural conſtitution. Poſſibly others may demonſtrate what I have choſen in this place only to indicate.

My Emilius, having hitherto regarded only himſelf, no ſooner begins to conſider his fellow-creatures, than he compares himſelf with them, and the firſt ſentiment excited by this compariſon is the deſire of preference. This is the period when the natural love of himſelf changes into ſelfiſhneſs, and when all its attendant paſſions begin to exiſt; but, in order to determine what particular paſſions will be predominant in his character, whether he will incline to humanity, compaſſion, benevolence, or to envy, revenge, and cruelty it is neceſſary to know, to what rank of men he imagines himſelf to belong,

injuſtice: he would be glad that all the world were juſt except himſelf. This maxim, ſay what we will, is by no means advantageous to honeſt men. But when the force of an expanſive mind makes me, as it were, identically the ſame perſon with my fellow-creature, I prevent his ſuffering for my own ſake, and in this I follow nature who inſpires me with the deſire of my own well-being in all ſituations. Hence, I conclude that the precepts of natural law are not founded merely upon reaſon: they reſt upon a more certain and ſolid baſis. The love of mankind derived from ſelf-love is the great principle of human juſtice. The ſummary of all morality is given in the goſpel under that of the law.

and what kind of obſtacles he will have to remove, before he can arrive at the place which he intends to occupy.

In order to direct him in his choice, after having ſhown him mankind by the accidents common to the ſpecies, you will then ſhow them by their differences. Hence will ariſe the meaſure of natural and civil inequality, and a juſt picture of the whole order of ſociety.

We muſt ſtudy ſociety by ſtudying men, and men by ſtudying ſociety. Thoſe who treat morals and politicks ſeparately, will never be acquainted with either. By firſt conſidering man's primitive relations, we perceive in what manner they ought to affect him, and what paſſions they ought to produce: we diſcover that it is reciprocally as the progreſs of the paſſions that theſe relations multiply or diminiſh. It is not ſo much their power, as their moderation, which renders mankind independent. He whoſe deſires are few, has few attachments; but, confounding our luxuriant deſires with our phyſical neceſſities, thoſe who have conſidered the latter as the foundation of human ſociety, have miſtaken the effect for the cauſe, and have conſequently purſued a continued chain of falſe reaſoning.

There is, in the ſtate of nature, an equality of real and unalterable right; for it is impoſſible that in ſuch a ſtate, the difference between man and man ſhould be ſo great as to render one dependent on the other. In the ſtate of civil

ſociety,

ſociety, there is a chimerical equality of right; for the means intended to maintain that right ſerve only to deſtroy it, and the ſtrength of the publick being added to that of the ſtronger in order to oppreſs the weak, deſtroys the equilibrium in which mankind were placed by nature*. From this firſt contradiction proceed all the others which we obſerve, in civil ſociety, between appearance and reality. The many will always be ſacrificed to the few, and publick intereſt to that of particulars. The ſpecious names of juſtice and ſubordination will be made the inſtruments of violence and the weapons of iniquity. Hence it follows, that thoſe diſtinguiſhed orders of men, which pretend to be uſeful to the reſt, are in reality, at the expence of the reſt, uſeful only to themſelves; and hence may be determined what conſideration they deſerve according to the laws of reaſon and juſtice. We are now to enquire whether the rank which they have aſſumed contributes more to their own happineſs, that hence we may know what judgement we ought each of us to form of our own lot. This is the proper object of our preſent enquiry; but it will be neceſſary firſt to make ourſelves acquainted with the human heart.

* The univerſal ſpirit of laws, in all countries, is to favour the ſtrong in oppoſition to the weak, and to aſſiſt thoſe who have poſſeſſions againſt thoſe who have none. This inconveniency is inevitable, and without exception.

If man is to be ſhown to our pupil only in maſquerade, we might ſave ourſelves that trouble, for he will ſee enough of that without our aſſiſtance; but ſince the maſk is not the man, and as youth ought not to be deceived, let us paint mankind as they really are; but let them be exhibited in ſuch a light as may excite his compaſſion rather than his contempt. That compaſſion which implies a reſolution to avoid their follies, is the moſt laudable ſentiment a man can entertain with reſpect to his ſpecies.

With this intention, we muſt now take a different route from that which we have hitherto purſued, and inſtruct our pupil rather by the experience of others, than by his own. If men deceive him, he will hate them; but if, whilſt he is reſpected, they deceive each other, they will excite his compaſſion. "A view of the world (ſaid Pythagoras) is like that of the Olympick games. Some carry on trade and are attentive only to their profit, others expoſe their perſons in purſuit of glory, whilſt others again are mere ſpectators of the ſports, and theſe perhaps are not the worſt employed.

It were to be wiſhed, that the companions of our pupil were ſo choſen as to make him think well of thoſe with whom he converſes, and that it were poſſible to give him ſo juſt a knowledge of the world as to make him think ill of all its tranſactions. He ſhould know that man is naturally good, he ſhould perceive it in his own heart, and judge of his neighbour by himſelf; but

but let him obſerve how mankind are depraved and perverted by ſociety: ſhow him that their prejudices are the ſource of all their vices. Let him be inclined to eſteem each individual, but to deſpiſe the multitude. Make him ſenſible, that all men wear nearly the ſame maſk; but that there are ſome faces much handſomer than the maſks by which they are diſguiſed.

This method, it muſt be confeſſed, has its inconveniencies, and is ſomewhat difficult in practice; for, by making him ſo early an obſerver, by teaching him to ſcan the actions of men ſo minutely, you will render him ſlanderous and ſatyrical, peremptory and uncharitable in his judgement. He will grow familiar with the ſight of vice; and, as by cuſtom we loſe our ſenſibility for the wretched, he will ſoon contemplate the actions of the wicked without horrour. He will ſoon conſider the general depravity as an example for his imitation, rather than as a leſſon of inſtruction, and will ſee no reaſon why he ſhould endeavour to be better than the reſt of mankind.

If, on the contrary, you mean to proceed methodically and whilſt you diſplay the human heart, ſhow him the application of thoſe external cauſes which convert our natural inclinations into vices; by thus tranſporting him from ſenſible to intellectual objects, you employ a metaphyſical proceſs which he cannot comprehend; you fall into the error, which we have hitherto ſo carefully avoided, of teaching by leſ-

ſons which have the appearance of mere precept, and of ſubſtituting the experience and authority of the maſter, in the room of his own experience and the natural progreſs of his reaſon.

To obviate theſe objections, and to bring him acquainted with the human heart, without endangering his own, I would ſhow him mankind at a diſtance, in other times and other places; ſo that he might be a ſpectator of the ſcene without having it in his power to become an actor. This is the proper time to introduce hiſtory; there he will read the heart of man, without the aſſiſtance of philoſophical lectures; there he will behold mankind, not as their accomplice or accuſer, but as their impartial judge.

If we would know men, it is neceſſary that we ſhould ſee them act. Our cotemporaries expoſe their words, and conceal their actions; but hiſtory lifts the veil, and we found our judgement upon facts. In hiſtory even the words of men ſerve to aſcertain their character; for by comparing them with their actions, we ſee at once what they really are, and what they would appear to be: the more they diſguiſe themſelves, the better they are known.

Unfortunately, the ſtudy of hiſtory is not without its dangers and inconveniencies of various kinds. It is a very difficult matter to place one's ſelf in ſuch a point of view, as to be able to judge equitably of our fellow-creatures. It is one of the common vices of hiſtory, to paint

man in a diſadvantageous, rather than a favourable light. Revolutions and fatal cataſtrophes being moſt intereſting, ſo long as a people have continued to increaſe and proſper in the calm of a peaceable government, hiſtory hath remained ſilent; it ſpeaks of nations only when, growing inſupportable to themſelves, they begin to interfere with their neighbours, or to ſuffer their neighbours to interfere with them: it begins not to make them illuſtrious till they are already on the decline: in ſhort, all our hiſtories begin where they ought to end. We are favoured with very exact accounts of thoſe nations which verge towards deſtruction; but of thoſe which have been flouriſhing we have no hiſtory at all: they have been ſo wiſe and ſo happy as to furniſh no events worth recording. Even in our own times we ſee that thoſe governments which are beſt conducted are leaſt mentioned. Only bad men are celebrated, whilſt the good are forgotten, or turned into ridicule: thus hiſtory, as well as philoſophy, never ceaſes to calumniate mankind.

But the hiſtorical relation of facts is by no means an accurate delineation of them, as they really happened: they change their aſpect in the brain of the hiſtorian, they bend to his intereſt, and are tinctured by his prejudices. What hiſtorian ever brought his reader to the ſcene of action, and ſhowed the event exactly as it happened? Every thing is diſguiſed by ignorance or partiality. How eaſy it is, by a different

repreſentation of circumſtances, to give a thouſand various appearances to the ſame facts? Show an object in different points of view, and we hardly believe it to be the ſame, and yet nothing is changed, except the eye of the ſpectator. Is it ſufficient for the honour of truth, to exhibit a real fact in a falſe light? How often has it happened that a few trees more or leſs, a hill upon the right or left, or a ſudden cloud of duſt, have turned the ſcale of victory, without the cauſe being perceived? Nevertheleſs the hiſtorian will aſſign a reaſon for the victory or defeat with as much confidence as if he had been at the ſame inſtant in every part of the battle. Of what conſequence are mere facts, or what am I to learn from a relation of events of whoſe cauſes I am totally ignorant? The hiſtorian, it is true, aſſigns cauſes, but they are of his own invention: even criticiſm itſelf, is nothing more than the art of conjecturing; the art of ſelecting, from a number of lies, that which bears the neareſt reſemblance to truth.

Probably you have read Cleopatra, or Caſſandra, or other books of the ſame kind. The authour makes choice of a known event, which he accommodates to his deſign, adorns with circumſtances of his own invention, and perſonages which never exiſted, crowding fiction upon fiction to make his ſtory more entertaining. Now, I ſee little difference between thoſe romances and our real hiſtories, except that the romance-writer gives a greater ſcope to his own imagination,

and

and the hiſtorian accommodates himſelf more to that of other people: to which I may add, that the former has a moral object in view, either good or bad, about which the latter gives himſelf no concern.

It will be urged, that the veracity of hiſtory is of leſs conſequence than the truth of manners and characters; provided we have a faithful delineation of the human heart, no matter whether events are truely reported or not; for, after all, what concern have we with facts that happened two thouſand years ago? You are quite in the right, if your hiſtorian has painted his manners and characters from nature; but, ſince they are chiefly creatures of his own imagination, are we not falling into the very error we endeavoured to avoid, by giving that credit to the hiſtorian which we refuſed to our tutor? If my pupil is to ſee nothing but ideal repreſentations, I would chooſe to ſketch them with my own hand, as, in that caſe, they will probably be better adapted.

The worſt hiſtorians, for a young reader, are thoſe who *favour* us with their judgement. A plain narrative of facts is all he wants: let him judge for himſelf, and he will learn to know mankind. If he is conſtantly guided by an authour's opinion, he ſees only with the eyes of another; and when theſe are taken from him he does not ſee at all.

I throw aſide modern hiſtory, not only becauſe it has no characteriſtick, and that all our

men exactly reſemble each other; but becauſe our hiſtorians, intent only on diſplaying their talents, think of nothing but painting portraits highly coloured, and which frequently bear no reſemblance to any thing in nature*. The ancients, in general, abound leſs in portraiture, and ſhow leſs wit, but more ſenſe in their reflexions; yet even the ancients are very different from each other: we ſhould at firſt rather prefer the moſt ſimple, than the moſt profound and judicious. I would neither put Polybius nor Salluſt into the hands of a boy; as for Tacitus, he is intelligible only to old men. We muſt learn to read, in the actions of men, the outlines of the human heart, before we attempt to fathom it to the bottom. We muſt learn to read facts before maxims. Philoſophy, laid down in maxims, belongs only to experience. Youth ought to generalize nothing: all our inſtructions ſhould be derived from particular examples.

Thucydides, in my opinion, is the beſt model for hiſtorians: he relates facts without judging of them; but he omits no circumſtance which may ſerve to direct the judgement of his reader. He preſents every object to our ſight; and ſo far from interpoſing his authority, he carefully conceals himſelf from us: we do not ſeem

* See Davila, Guicciardini, Strada, Solis, Machiavel, and ſometimes even Thuanus himſelf. Vertot is almoſt the only one who has not fallen into this vicious practice of portrait-painting.

ſeem to read events, but actually to ſee them. Unfortunately his conſtant ſubject is war, and a recital of battles is, of all things, the leaſt inſtructive. Xenophon's retreat of the ten thouſand, and Cæſar's Commentaries, are remarkable for the ſame prudence and the ſame defect. Honeſt Herodotus, without painting, without maxims, but flowing, ſimple, and full of pleaſing and intereſting particulars, would be perhaps the beſt hiſtorian, if his details did not frequently degenerate into puerility, more likely to vitiate than improve the taſte of youth: it requires diſcernment to read Herodotus.—I take no notice of Livy at preſent, except that he is a politician, a rhetorician, and every thing that is improper at this age.

Hiſtory is generally defective in recording only thoſe facts which are rendered conſpicuous by name, place, or date; but the ſlow progreſſive cauſes of thoſe facts, not being thus diſtinguiſhed, remain for ever unknown. How frequently do we find a battle, loſt or won, mentioned as the cauſe of a revolution, which was become inevitable before the battle was fought? War is generally nothing more than a manifeſtation of events already determined by moral cauſes, of which hiſtorians are ignorant.

The ſpirit of philoſophy has, in like manner, infected many of the writers in this age; but I am in doubt whether truth gains any thing by their labours. A madneſs for ſyſtem having got poſſeſſion of them all, they never en-

deavour to ſee things as they really are, but as they beſt agree with their favourite hypotheſes.

To theſe reflections we may add, that hiſtory is a repreſentation of actions rather than of men, who are ſhown only at certain intervals, in their veſtments of parade: we ſee man only in publick life, after he has put himſelf in a proper poſition for being viewed. Hiſtory follows him not into his houſe, into his cloſet, among his family and friends: it paints him only when he makes his appearance: it exhibits his dreſs and not his perſon.

I ſhould rather chooſe to begin the ſtudy of the human heart by reading the lives of particular men: for there it is impoſſible for the hero to conceal himſelf a moment. The biographer purſues him into his moſt ſecret receſſes, and expoſes him to the piercing eye of the ſpectator; he is beſt known when he believes himſelf moſt concealed. "I like (ſays Montagne) thoſe biographers who give us the hiſtory of counſels, rather than events; who ſhow us what paſſes within, rather than without: therefore Plutarch is the writer after my own heart."

I confeſs the genius of a people is very different from that of man conſidered as an individual, and that we ſhall be imperfectly acquainted with mankind if we neglect the ſtudy of the multitude; but it is alſo true, that we muſt begin by ſtudying man in order to know mankind; and that if we know the propenſities of each individual, it will not be difficult to foreſee

oreſee their effects when combined in the body of the people.

Here again we are obliged to have recourſe to the ancients, partly for the reaſons already urged, but more eſpecially becauſe all familiar and low, though true and characteriſtick details, are inconſiſtent with the polite ſtyle of the moderns; hence men are equally adorned and diſguiſed in private as in publick life. Decency, no leſs ſevere in deſcription than in action, permits us to *ſay* nothing in publick which we are not allowed to *do*; and as men are to be ſhown only in diſguiſe, we learn as little of them in books as from our theatres. We may write and rewrite the lives of kings as often as we pleaſe, but we ſhall never ſee another Suetonius*.

Plutarch's excellence conſiſts chiefly in thoſe very minutiæ into which we dare not enter. There is an inimitable gracefulneſs in his manner of painting great men engaged in trivial employments, and he is ſo happy in the choice of his incidents, that frequently a ſingle word, a ſmile, a geſture, is ſufficient to characteriſe his hero. Hannibal with a judicious piece of pleaſantry, re-animates his diſheartened troops, and leads them ſmiling to the battle which opened to him the gates of Italy. In Ageſilaus aſtride upon

* Only one of our hiſtorians, who has imitated the grand ſtrokes of Tacitus, has dared to copy Suetonius, and ſometimes to tranſcribe Comines, in their details; but he has been condemned by the criticks for this circumſtance, which really adds merit to his book.

upon a ſtick, I admire the conquerour of a great monarch. Cæſar, in paſſing through a poor village, and talking familiarly with his friends, diſcloſes, without intending it, the deceiver, who before pretended he only wanted to be on an equality with Pompey.

Alexander ſwallows a medicine without ſpeaking a word; this was the moſt brilliant moment of his life: Ariſtides writes his own name upon a ſhell, and thus juſtifies his ſirname: Philopœmen throws aſide his robe and cleaves wood in the kitchen of his hoſt. This is the true art of painting. We ought not to judge of phyſiognomy by the ſtrongeſt lines in the face, nor of the characters of men by their great actions. Publick tranſactions are either too common or too much ſtudied and prepared; yet theſe are the only incidents worthy the dignity of modern hiſtory.

Marſhal Turenne was inconteſtably one of the greateſt men of the laſt age. The writer of his life has had the courage to render it intereſting by relating ſome minute particulars which make his hero known and beloved; but how many was he not obliged to ſuppreſs, which would have taught us to know and love him ſtill more! I ſhall inſtance only one, which I have from good authority, and which Plutarch would by no means have omitted, but which Ramſay, if he had known it, would not have dared to relate.

The Marſhal happened, one hot day, to be looking out at the window of his ante-chamber in a white waiſtcoat and night-cap. A ſervant entering the room, deceived by his dreſs, miſtakes him for one of the under cooks. He comes ſoftly behind him, and with a hand, which was not of the lighteſt, gives him a violent ſlap on the breech. The Marſhal inſtantly turns about, and the fellow frightened out of his wits, beholds the face of his maſter: down he drops upon his knees—"*Oh! My lord! I thought it was George*"—"*And ſuppoſe it had been George* (replied the Marſhal rubbing his backſide) *you ought not to have ſtruck quite ſo hard.*" Such are the ſtrokes our modern daubers dare not attempt. Go on, and remain for ever deſtitute of nature, void of ſenſibility! ſteel your hearts with your wretched decorum; and by your formality render yourſelves deſpicable! But, thou honeſt young man, who readeſt this anecdote, and who feeleſt with tenderneſs all that ſweetneſs of diſpoſition which it immediately indicates, and which is ſo rarely found in our firſt emotions; read alſo the minutiæ of this great man when his birth and name were in queſtion. Remember it is the ſame Turenne who conſtantly gave place to his nephew, ſo that one might always perceive the child to be a ſovereign prince. Compare theſe contraſts, love nature, deſpiſe opinion, and know mankind.

There are few people capable of conceiving the effect which reading, thus directed, will have

have upon young minds. Accuſtomed, from our infancy, to grow dull by poring over books, and to read without thinking, we are ſtill leſs affected by what we read; for having within ourſelves the ſame paſſions and prejudices with which hiſtory abounds, every tranſaction appears natural, becauſe we ourſelves have deviated from nature, and we judge of others accordingly. But let us, on the contrary, imagine a youth educated according to my principles; my Emilius, for example, in whom, to preſerve a ſound judgement and integrity of heart, has been the object of eighteen years aſſiduity. Let us ſuppoſe him, when the curtain is drawn up, caſting his eyes, for the firſt time, on the ſtage of the world; or rather, placed behind the ſcenes, obſerving the actors dreſs and undreſs, and counting the cords and pullies, by the groſs deluſion of which the eyes of the ſpectators are deceived. His firſt ſurpriſe will ſoon be ſucceeded by emotions of ſhame, and diſdain of his ſpecies: he will, with a juſt contempt, behold mankind their own dupes, debaſing themſelves by ſuch puerile occupations; but he will weep to ſee his brethren tear each other in pieces for mere ſhadows: not ſatisfied with being men, becoming beaſts of prey.

Certainly, with the diſpoſitions natural to our pupil, if our tutor has any judgement in the choice of books, or capacity to direct the youth in his reflexions, his reading will be in effect, a courſe of practical philoſophy; better and more

more intelligible than the idle ſpeculations which confound the ſenſes of our young people in the ſchools.

Cyneas, having followed Pyrrhus through all his romantick projects, aſks him what real benefit he would reap from the conqueſt of the whole world, ſince he could not enjoy that which he already poſſeſſed, without ſo much trouble and anxiety? We ſee nothing in this queſtion, except a ſlight flaſh of wit which immediately vaniſhes; but Emilius perceives in it a wiſe reflexion, which he himſelf might have made, and which can never be effaced from his mind, becauſe it meets with no oppoſite prejudice to hinder the impreſſion. When in reading the life of this madman, he finds afterwards that all his grand deſigns led him only to die by the hand of a woman; inſtead of admiring his pretended heroiſm, what will he behold, in all the exploits of ſo great a general, and all the intrigues of ſo ſubtle a politician, but ſo many ſteps in queſt of that unlucky tile, which was to terminate all his ſchemes by an inglorious death?

All conquerours have not been killed; all uſurpers have not fallen in their enterpriſes; many of them have appeared happy in the ſuperficial opinion of the vulgar; but one who, not impoſed on by appearances, judges of men's happineſs by the ſtate of their hearts, will diſcover miſery even in their ſucceſs, corroding anxiety and inſatiable deſires increaſe with their fortune,

fortune, and will ſee them gaſping for breath as they advance, without ever reaching the prize. He will compare them to travellers, who in their firſt attempt to paſs the Alps, think every mountain the laſt, and when they reach the top, are diſcouraged, to find ſtill higher mountains before them.

Auguſtus having ſubjected his fellow-citizens, and deſtroyed his rivals, governed during forty years the greateſt empire that ever exiſted; but did this immenſe power hinder him from beating his head againſt the wall, and filling the palace with his cries, when he deſired of Varus his exterminated legions? If he had even conquered all his enemies, what would his vain triumphs have ſignified, ſo long as his troubles were daily increaſing, his deareſt friends attempting his life, and he himſelf reduced to bewail the infamy or death of all his relations? The poor wretch would govern the world, and was not able to govern his own family! What was the conſequence? He ſaw his nephew, his adopted ſon, and his ſon-in-law, periſh in the flower of their age; his grand-ſon was reduced to eat his bed-ſtraw, to prolong his miſerable exiſtence a few hours; his daughter and his grand-daughter finiſhed their infamous lives, one in miſery and want on a deſert iſland, the other in priſon by the hand of an executioner. At laſt, the great Auguſtus himſelf, the ſolitary remnant of his unhappy family, is reduced by his own wife to leave the government of his empire to that monſter

ſter Tiberius. Such was the lot of this mighty ruler of the world, ſo univerſally celebrated for his glory and felicity: can I believe that any one of thoſe who are captivated by ſuch phantoms, would purchaſe them at the ſame price?

I have choſen ambition for an example; but the effects of all the human paſſions afford the ſame leſſon to thoſe who ſtudy hiſtory with a deſign to know themſelves, and to learn wiſdom from the dead. The time draws near, when the life of Antoninus will afford more inſtruction to a young man than that of Auguſtus. Emilius may poſſibly be a little bewildered among the variety of objects which this new ſtudy will preſent; but, perceiving that mankind have, in all ages been blinded by their paſſions, he will learn to ſee through their illuſion before they exiſt in himſelf.

Theſe inſtructions I own, are not well adapted to him; and poſſibly they may alſo be found too late and inſufficient: but you will pleaſe to recollect, that theſe are not the leſſons which I intended to inculcate by this method of ſtudying hiſtory. I had another object in view, which muſt certainly be attained, if it is not the fault of the teacher.

Let us remember, that ſelf-love no ſooner diſplays itſelf, than perſonal intereſt begins to act; that our young man compares himſelf with every one he obſerves: it is therefore neceſſary, that we ſhould know what rank he aſſumes among

among his fellow-creatures, after having examined them. In the common method by which children are taught to read hiſtory, they are to be transformed alternately into the various characters, as they ariſe: thus the pupil is now a Cicero, now a Trajan, and by and by an Alexander. Thus he is mortified upon reflexion, and regrets that he is only himſelf. I do not deny that this method may have its advantages; but with regard to my Emilius, if in his compariſons it ſhould ever happen that he had rather be another than himſelf, were it even Socrates or Cato, all is loſt. He, who begins to be eſtranged from himſelf, will ſoon forget himſelf entirely.

Men are not beſt known by the philoſophers; who view them through the prejudices of philoſophy, and there is no claſs of people more prejudiced. A ſavage judges more rationally of mankind than a philoſopher: the firſt is ſenſible of his own vices, is angry at our's, and ſays to himſelf, we are all knaves: the latter regards us without emotion, and cries, you are all fools. He is in the right for we none of us purſue vice for its own ſake. My Emilius is the ſavage, with this difference only, that having more reflexion, being more accuſtomed to compare ideas, and to view our errours with more circumſpection, he places a ſtronger guard over himſelf, and judges only from what he knows.

We are irritated by our own paſſions againſt thoſe of others. It is ſelf-intereſt which makes us hate the wicked: if they had done us no evil,

we

ve ſhould feel for them more pity than hatred. The evil which the wicked do to us, makes us forget that which they do to themſelves. We ſhould more readily pardon their vices, if we knew how ſeverely they are puniſhed by their own hearts. We perceive the offence, but we do not ſee the puniſhment: the advantages are apparent, but their ſufferings inviſible. He who thinks he enjoys the fruits of vice, feels no leſs torment than if he had not been ſucceſsful; the object is changed, but his inquietude is the ſame: in vain he makes a diſplay of his good fortune, and conceals his heart; it is viſible through his conduct, but viſible to thoſe only whoſe hearts are of a different mould.

We are ſeduced by thoſe paſſions which we participate, and offended with thoſe which oppoſe our intereſt; and hence we blame in others that which we ourſelves would imitate. This ſeduction and averſion are inevitable, when we are obliged to ſuffer from others thoſe evils which we in their ſituation ſhould perpetrate.

What then is required towards an accurate obſervation of men? An ardent deſire to know them, impartiality in our judgement, and ſenſibility of heart ſufficient to conceive all the variety of human paſſions, yet ſo calm as not to be under their influence. If there be any period of life peculiarly favourable to this ſtudy, it is certainly the preſent age of Emilius: if we ſuppoſe him younger, mankind are above his comprehenſion; if older, he would reſemble the

the reſt. Opinion, whoſe univerſal empire he contemplates, has hitherto acquired no dominion over him. The paſſions, whoſe effects he perceives, have not yet inflamed his heart. As a man, he feels for his brethren; but as a judge of his peers, he is juſt, and therefore cannot poſſibly wiſh himſelf in the place of any other man, becauſe the general aim of all human diſquietude, being founded on prejudices to which he is a ſtranger, muſt neceſſarily appear chimerical. As to his part, all his deſires are within his reach. He has ſtrength, health*, moderation, few wants, and thoſe few he has the power of ſatisfying. Educated in the moſt extenſive liberty, he has no conception of any evil greater than ſervitude. He pities the wretched kings who are ſlaves to thoſe by whom they are obeyed; he is ſorry for thoſe pretended ſages, who are dupes to their vain reputation; he feels compaſſion for the rich fools, who are martyrs to pomp and pageantry; he deplores thoſe ſeeming voluptuaries, who languiſh through a tedious life, merely for the ſake of being deemed men of pleaſure: he will alſo pity his moſt inveterate enemy; "for (ſays he) the unhappy man fooliſhly makes his own fate dependent on mine."

One ſtep farther, and we reach the goal. Self-intereſt is an uſeful but dangerous inſtrument; it often cuts the hand that holds it, and ſeldom produces

* I believe I may ſafely number health and a good conſtitution among the effects of his education, or rather among the gifts of nature preſerved by his education.

luces good without evil. Emilius, reflecting on his ſuperiority among the human ſpecies, will be tempted to ſuppoſe the work of your reaſon to be the produce of his own, and to attribute his happineſs to his merit. Mankind, ſays he to himſelf, are fools, but I am wiſe. Whilſt he pities others he deſpiſes them; in congratulating himſelf, he increaſes his ſelf-eſteem, and perceiving that he is happier than the reſt of the world, he imagines himſelf more deſerving. This errour is moſt of all to be dreaded, becauſe it is moſt difficult to remove. Should he continue in this ſituation, he would reap but little advantage from all our labour. Were I to chooſe, I think I ſhould prefer the illuſion of prejudice to that of pride.

Truely great men are not miſtaken in their ſuperiority; they ſee, they feel it, and are not leſs modeſt. The more they poſſeſs, the more ſenſible they are of what they ſtill want. They are leſs proud of their elevation above us, than humbled by the ſenſation of their own miſery; and with regard to the excluſive advantages they poſſeſs, they are too wiſe to be vain of what they had no merit in acquiring. A good man has ſome reaſon to be proud of his virtue; but why ſhould a man of natural talents be vain? What had Racine done that he was not Pradon? or Boileau, that he was not born Cotin?

Here again the caſe is different, let us continue in the common courſe of things. I neither ſuppoſe my pupil a ſuperlative genius, nor a blockhead.

blockhead. I take him from the claſs of common underſtandings, becauſe I mean to try the power of education. Extraordinary caſes have nothing to do with rules. If Emilius, in conſequence of my care, ſhould prefer his own being, his own perception of things to that of other men, he is in the right; but when he therefore concludes himſelf to have been born a peculiar favourite of nature, he is certainly wrong. He is in an errour and muſt be undeceived; or rather let us endeavour to prevent the errour, leſt it ſhould not afterwards be in our power to remove it.

There is no folly of which a man, who is not a fool, may not be cured, except vanity; as to this if any thing will do, it muſt be experience: at leaſt if taken in time this may prevent its growth. It were ridiculous to loſe your labour in demonſtrating to your pupil, that he is a man like others, and ſubject to the ſame frailties: he muſt perceive it himſelf, or your arguments will be to no purpoſe. This is another exception to my own rules: it is that of expoſing my pupil to every accident which may ſerve to convince him that he is not wiſer than the reſt of mankind. Our adventure with the juggler muſt be repeated in a thouſand different ſhapes. Let flatterers take every advantage of him; if he ſuffers himſelf to be led into folly and extravagance by young rakes, I let him riſk the danger; if he falls into the ſnares of gamblers

blers, I ſuffer him to become their dupe*; I let them flatter him, and rob him of his money; and when after entirely exhauſting his purſe, they finiſh by making him the ſubject of their mirth, I return them thanks, in his preſence, for the excellent leſſon which they have taught my pupil. The only decoys into which I ſhall prevent his falling are thoſe of proſtitutes; in other inſtances, all I ſhall do for him will be to partake his danger, and ſubmit to all the affronts to which he is expoſed. I ſhall bear every thing with patience, without uttering a ſingle word of reproach, and you may be certain, if my diſcretion be properly ſuſtained, that what I have undergone upon his account will make a deeper impreſſion on his heart than all that he himſelf has ſuffered.

* Not that our pupil will be much expoſed to this danger, becauſe he will be in no want of variety of amuſements, and is hardly acquainted with the uſe of money. The two ſprings by which children are generally moved are intereſt and vanity, and theſe are alſo uſed by ſharpers and courtezans in the ſequel. When you ſee their avarice excited by rewards, and hear them applauded, at ten years old, for their performance in ſome publick exerciſe in the academy, you juſt ſee how they will leave their purſe in a gaming houſe at twenty, and their health in a brothel. I would always lye a wager that the beſt ſcholar in his claſs will turn out the greateſt debauchee. It muſt be always remembered, however, that it is my conſtant maxim to conſider things in the worſt light. At firſt, indeed, I endeavour to prevent vice, and afterwards ſuppoſe it committed, in order to point out the remedy.

I cannot help taking notice of the ridiculous dignity of ſome tutors, who, in order to appear wonderfully wiſe, degrade the underſtanding of their pupil, affect to treat him as a child, and to diſtinguiſh themſelves from him in every tranſaction. So far from thus depreſſing his juvenile ſpirit, you ought to omit nothing that may tend to elevate your pupil's mind. That his may become your equals, treat them as ſuch; ſince you cannot lift them up to your level, deſcend without ſcruple to their's. Remember that your honour is no longer in yourſelf but in your pupil; to inſpire him with courage partake his faults; and to efface his ſhame you muſt take it upon yourſelf: imitate that brave Roman who, finding it impoſſible to rally his flying army, put himſelf at their head, and retreating with the reſt, cried aloud: "*they do not fly, they only follow their leader.*" Was he diſhonoured by this conduct? by no means: by thus ſacrificing his glory he increaſed its luſtre. The force of duty and the charms of virtue command our approbation, in ſpite of ourſelves, and overturn all our irrational prejudices. If I were to receive from Emilius a box on the ear in conſequence of performing my duty to him, ſo far from reſenting the affront, I ſhould boaſt of it wherever I came; and I am of opinion there are few people in the world baſe enough not to eſteem me the more on that very account.

Not that our pupil ought to ſuppoſe his tutor as ignorant as himſelf, and as eaſy to be impoſed on.

on. Such an opinion might do in a mere child, who, being incapable of comparing ideas, brings mankind to a level with himſelf, and gives his confidence to thoſe only who know how to reduce themſelves to his ſtandard. But a youth of the age of Emilius, and of his ſenſe, is not to be thus impoſed on. His confidence in his governour is of another kind: it is founded on the authority of reaſon and ſuperiority of knowledge, on advantages which are obvious to the pupil, and of whoſe utility to himſelf he has no doubt. Long experience has convinced him that he is beloved by his tutor; that his tutor is a prudent, ſenſible man, who has both the inclination and power to promote his happineſs; and therefore it is his intereſt to liſten to his advice.

But, if the tutor ſuffers himſelf to be as eaſily deceived as his pupil, will he not loſe his credit and forfeit the right of adviſing? Or would it not be equally improper for our youth to ſuppoſe that his tutor laid ſnares for his ſimplicity, and deſignedly ſuffered him to be impoſed on? What then muſt be done to avoid theſe two inconveniencies? The beſt method, and the moſt natural, is to imitate his ſimplicity and truth, warn him of the dangers to which he is expoſed, point them out with preciſion and perſpicuity, but without exaggeration, ill-humour, or pedantry; and eſpecially avoid delivering your advice in the ſtyle of commands, leſt that imperious tone ſhould in time become neceſſary. If, nevertheleſs, he ſhould perſiſt, which doubt-

leſs will ſometimes be the caſe, ſay not a word, leave him at full liberty, follow him, imitate him, and that with all the good humour you can poſſibly aſſume. If the conſequences ſhould grow too dangerous, you can ſtop them whenever you think proper. In the mean while, there can be no doubt but your former advice and preſent compliance will have their effect on the mind of your pupil. His faults are ſo many reins in your hands to ſtop his courſe as often as it ſhall be neceſſary. The great art, therefore, of the tutor is ſo to manage his opportunities, and apply his exhortations, that he may be able to foreſee when his pupil will comply and when he will perſiſt; thus he will be conſtantly ſurrounded by leſſons of experience, without being expoſed to too much danger.

Point out the evil conſequence of his faults before he commits them: but never reproach him for what is paſt, becauſe that will anſwer no other purpoſe than to rouſe and inflame his ſelf-love. Nothing can be more idle than the phraſe, *I told you what would happen.* The beſt method to make him remember what you ſay, is to ſeem to forget it yourſelf. When you perceive him aſhamed of not having followed your advice, raiſe him gently from his humiliation by words of candour and encouragement. Nothing will more certainly conciliate his affection than to find that, on his account, you are unmindful of yourſelf; and that, inſtead of exulting, you conſole him. If, on the contrary,

you

you add reproaches to his chagrin, he will infallibly hate you, and will determine to liſten to you no longer, were it only to convince you that he differs from you in opinion with regard to the importance of your advice.

Even your conſolations may be ſo ordered as to convey inſtruction, which will have the better effect for not having the appearance of a lecture. For inſtance, by ſaying that many others have committed the ſame fault, you throw him off his guard, you correct whilſt you ſeem only to pity him: for to him, who thought himſelf above the generality of young people, to conſole him with their example muſt be a mortifying circumſtance; it is to inſinuate that all the excuſe he can pretend to, is that they are no better than himſelf.

The age of faults is the age of fables. In cenſuring the culpable under a borrowed maſk, you inſtruct without offending; your pupil perceives that the moral is no lie, by the truth of its application to himſelf. A child who has never been deceived by flattery will not comprehend the fable which I heretofore examined; but the forward youth, who has been duped by a ſycophant, perceives immediately that the raven was a fool. Thus from a fact he draws a maxim; and the experience, which otherwiſe he would ſoon have forgotten, is, by a fable, deeply impreſſed on his memory. There is no moral inſtruction which may not be acquired either by our own experience or by that of others. In

caſes where this experience may be attended with danger, it muſt be learnt from hiſtory. When it may be done with ſafety, it is beſt to let youth make the experiment; and then inſtead of the moral, we reduce to maxims the particular caſes with which they are acquainted.

I do not mean that theſe maxims ought to be explained or even expreſſed. Nothing can be more abſurd than the morals with which fables generally end; as if the moral was not included in the fable, ſo as to appear obvious to the reader: why then ſhould we deprive him of the pleaſure of finding it himſelf? The great art of inſtruction is to render it pleaſing to your pupil, and, at the ſame time, not ſo palpably explicit, as to leave his mind entirely inactive. The pride of the tutor ſhould leave ſomething for that of the pupil; let him ſay to himſelf, I conceive, I penetrate, I act, I inſtruct myſelf. One of the reaſons why the Pantaloon in the Italian comedy is ſo extreemely tireſome, is his taking ſo much pains to explain his low wit to the audience. I would not have a tutor to be a Pantaloon, and much leſs an authour. We ſhould ſpeak and write ſo as to be underſtood, but we are not to ſay all: he that ſays all, ſays very little in effect, for he will ſoon be diſregarded. Of what conſequence are thoſe four lines which La Fontaine adds to the fable of the frog and the ox? Was he afraid it would not be underſtood? Could it be neceſſary for ſo great a painter to write

write their names under his figures? So far from rendering his moral, by this means, general, he makes it particular, and by confining it to the object in queſtion, prevents the reader from applying it to any other. Before I put the fables of this inimitable writer into the hands of my pupil, I would certainly curtail each fable of its concluſion, in which the authour takes the trouble of explaining what he has before ſo clearly and agreeably related. If the learner does not underſtand the fable without explication, be aſſured he will never underſtand it all.

Theſe fables ought to be diſpoſed in a manner more inſtructive, and better adapted to the capacity of youth. Nothing can be more ridiculous than to follow the order in which they happen to be placed, without any regard to circumſtance or occaſion: firſt the raven, then the graſshopper, then the frog, then the two mules, and ſo on. Theſe two mules have made a particular impreſſion on my mind, becauſe I remember to have known a boy, who was intended for an employment in the revenue, read, get by heart, and repeat this fable a thouſand times, without ever conceiving the leaſt objection to the occupation for which he was intended. I not only do not remember ever to have known children make a ſolid application of the fables they had learnt, but I do not even recollect ever to have ſeen any body trouble their heads about the matter. Moral inſtruction is the pretence of this ſtudy; but the real intention both of the parent and

the child, is, by his repeating the fables, to excite the admiration of the company: therefore, when he grows up, having no longer occaſion to recite them, they all eſcape his memory, at that very time when he ought to profit by them. In ſhort, fables are calculated for the inſtruction of men only: it is therefore now the proper time for Emilius to begin.

Not chooſing to be too explicit, I have pointed out, at a diſtance, thoſe paths which diverge from the right road; being known, they may eaſily be avoided. By purſuing that which I have traced out, I believe, your pupil will purchaſe the knowledge of himſelf, and of mankind, at the cheapeſt rate poſſible; that he will be able to contemplate the ſport of fortune without envying her favourites; and will be ſatisfied with himſelf, without thinking other people leſs wiſe. We have begun to make him act, in order to qualify him for a ſpectator: let us finiſh our taſk. From the pit we ſee the objects as they ſeem; but from the ſcenes we behold them as they really are. If we mean to ſurvey the whole, we muſt fix ourſelves in the proper point of view; but we muſt come nearer the object, when we deſign to examine its parts. But under what pretenſions can a ſtripling enter into the affairs of the world? What right has he to be initiated into theſe dark myſteries? The intrigues of pleaſure are inconſiſtent with his intereſt at that age: he can diſpoſe only of himſelf, and he might as well have nothing to diſpoſe

diſpoſe of. Man is the worſt of all merchandiſe: among all our important rights of property, that of our perſons is the leaſt conſiderable.

When I obſerve that during the age of the greateſt activity, young people are generally confined to ſtudies which are merely ſpeculative; and that they are afterwards ſuddenly puſhed into the world without the leaſt experience, I find it to be a practice contrary both to reaſon and nature, and am no longer ſurpriſed that ſo few men are capable of conducting themſelves through life. Can any thing be more unaccountable than to ſpend ſo much time in teaching us things which are quite uſeleſs, whilſt the great art of acting is entirely neglected. Under a pretence of forming us for ſociety, we are inſtructed as if each individual were deſtined to ſpend his whole life in chimerical ſpeculations alone in a cell. You teach your children a certain form of words, and a few contorſions of the body, and then you conclude them perfectly acquainted with the art of living. I too have taught my Emilius how to live; for I have inſtructed him how to live by himſelf, and have alſo taught him how to earn his bread: but this is not enough. In order to live in the world, it is neceſſary that we ſhould know how to deal with mankind, and the means by which advantages are obtained; we muſt know how to calculate the action and reaction of particular intereſt in civil ſociety, and ſo far to foreſee events,

as not to be often deceived, but always to embrace the moſt probable means of ſucceſs. The laws do not permit children to tranſact their own affairs nor diſpoſe of their fortunes; but why this precaution? If till the age preſcribed they can acquire no experience, they will be no wiſer at twenty-five than they were at fifteen. Without doubt it is neceſſary to take care that a youth, blinded by ignorance and deceived by his paſſions, commits no folly the conſequences of which might be fatal; but at all ages we are capable of beneficence, and, under the guidance of a prudent man, may certainly aſſiſt the unhappy.

A child becomes attached to his mother and his nurſe by their peculiar care of him. The practice of the ſocial virtues roots the love of humanity in the bottom of our hearts. By doing good actions we become good ourſelves: I know of no method more certain. Employ your pupil in every good action within his power; teach him to conſider the intereſt of the indigent as his own; let him not only aſſiſt them with his purſe but with his care; he muſt protect them, and dedicate his perſon and time to their ſervice; he is their ſteward, he can never be more nobly employed. How many poor wretches groaning under oppreſſion, who would never have been heard, will obtain juſtice when demanded by him with that intrepidity which the exerciſe of virtue inſpires; when he forces open the gates of the rich

and great; when he penetrates, if neceſſary, even to the throne, and pleads the cauſe of thoſe to whom all admittance was rendered impoſſible by their miſery, and who were fearful of complaining, leſt they ſhould be puniſhed for the ills with which they were oppreſſed.

But are we to make a knight errant, a Don Quixote of our Emilius? Shall he intrude into publick affairs, play the Sage, and the defender of the laws among the great, a ſollicitor to the judges, and a pleader in courts of juſtice? I know nothing of all this. Ridiculous appellations make no alteration in the nature of things. Emilius muſt do every thing which he knows to be uſeful and good; he will do no more, and he knows that nothing can be uſeful and good for him, which is not ſuitable to his age. He knows that his firſt duty is towards himſelf, that youth ought to be diffident, circumſpect, reſpectful to age, cautious of ſpeaking without cauſe, modeſt in matters of indifference, but intrepid in doing well, and reſolute in ſpeaking the truth. Such were the illuſtrious Romans, who, before they were admitted to publick employments, ſpend their youth in oppoſing vice and defending innocence, without any other advantage than that of inſtructing themſelves, in ſupport of juſtice and morality.

Emilius likes no riot or quarelling, neither among men*, nor in the brute creation. He

* But ſuppoſe any one ſhould reſolve to quarrel with him, how muſt he behave? I anſwer, his conduct will

will never ſet dogs to worry each other, nor encourage them to purſue a cat. The ſpirit of peace is the natural effect of his education; his ſelf-opinion not having been fomented, he ſeeks no pleaſure in dominion, nor in the misfortunes of others.

be ſuch that he will never be expoſed to quarrels. But, ſay you, who can be ſecure from a ſlap in the face, or from not having the lie given him by ſome brutal drunkard, or hectoring bravo, who for the pleaſure of killing his man begins by affronting him? The caſe is different: neither the honour, nor life, of a worthy member of ſociety ought to be at the mercy of ſuch wretches, and we can no more be ſecure from ſuch an accident than from the fall of a tile. A ſlap in the face, or the lie, received and endured, will be attended with conſequences to ſociety, which no wiſdom can prevent, and for which no tribunal can avenge the perſon injured. Therefore, the inſufficiency of the laws in this caſe reſtores to him his liberty, and he becomes the ſole magiſtrate, the ſole judge between the offender and himſelf; he muſt interpret and execute the law of nature; he owes himſelf juſtice, he can receive it from no other hand, and there can be no government on earth ſo ſenſeleſs as to puniſh him for having taken it. I do not ſay he ought to fight; that were madneſs: I ſay he owes himſelf juſtice, and he is the only diſpenſer of it. Without ſo many edicts againſt duelling, were I a ſovereign prince, I would be anſwerable to put an entire ſtop to affronts of this kind, and that by a very ſimple method with which the courts of juſtice ſhould have no concern. Be that as it may, Emilius, if the caſe ſhould happen, knows the juſtice he owes himſelf, and the example he ought to ſet to perſons of honour. It is not in the power of the braveſt man to prevent his being inſulted; but it is certainly in his power to prevent the perſon inſulting him from long making a boaſt of it.

others. He ſuffers when he ſees others ſuffer; it is a natural ſenſation. The hearts of youth are hardened by vanity; when they receive pleaſure from the torment of a ſenſible being, it is becauſe they believe themſelves exempted from ſuch pains, by their wiſdom or ſuperiority. Thoſe, who are early taught to think otherwiſe, are in no danger of falling into this vice. Emilius loves peace. The appearance of happineſs gives him pleaſure; and that pleaſure is an additional motive for him to endeavour to promote it. I never ſuppoſed that he would behold the unhappy with that fruitleſs, cruel, compaſſion, which contents itſelf with bewailing the evils which it might remove. His active beneficence produces a knowledge which, with a more obdurate heart, he would have acquired much later, or perhaps not at all. If diſcord reigns among his companions, he endeavours to reconcile them; if he ſees his fellow-creatures in affliction, he enquires into the cauſe; if the wretched groan under the oppreſſion of the great and powerful, he will not reſt till he has detected the iniquity of the oppreſſor; in ſhort, the means of alleviating diſtreſs he always conſiders as a matter of importance. How then ſhall we proceed, in order to make a proper uſe, according to his age, of theſe favourable diſpoſitions? We muſt regulate his attention and knowledge, and endeavour to augment them by a proper application of his zeal.

I cannot

I cannot repeat it too often: let your leſſons to youth conſiſt in action rather than words; they muſt learn nothing from books which may be taught by experience. Can any thing be more abſurd than to make them harangue without a motive; to ſuppoſe it poſſible to make them feel all the energy of the language of the paſſions, and the power of perſuaſion, without having any intereſt in perſuading? All the precepts in the art of rhetorick ſeem a mere jumble of words to thoſe who do not perceive the advantage of uſing them. What is it to a ſchool-boy how Hannibal prevailed on his troops to paſs the Alps? If, inſtead of theſe magnificent harangues, you were to teach him how to prevail on the maſter to give him a holiday, be aſſured he would be more attentive to your inſtructions.

Were I to teach rhetorick to a youth whoſe paſſions were perfectly ripened, I would conſtantly throw ſuch objects in his way as would excite them, and I would then conſider with him what language is moſt likely to perſuade mankind to favour his deſires. But my Emilius happens not to be in a ſituation ſo favourable to the art of oratory. Confined almoſt to mere phyſical neceſſities, he has leſs need of mankind than others have of him; and having nothing to aſk for himſelf, he is not intereſted enough in any cauſe to be violently affected. Hence it follows that his language will be ſimple; he generally ſpeaks to the point, and only with

with a deſign to be underſtood; he is not ſententious, becauſe he has not learnt to generalize his ideas; he uſes few metaphors, becauſe his paſſions are ſeldom enflamed.

Not that Emilius is quite flegmatick and cold; this, neither his age, his manners, nor his taſte will permit. In the fire of youth the animal ſpirits, retained and mingled with his blood, convey to his young heart a fervour which ſparkles in his eyes, enlivens his converſation, and influences all his actions. He acquires an emphaſis in ſpeaking, and ſometimes vehemence. The noble ſentiments with which he is inſpired give him force and elevation; influenced by his great humanity, when he ſpeaks he expreſſes the emotions of his ſoul; there is a generous unreſervedneſs in his manner, which is more perſuaſive than the artificial eloquence of others; or rather, he alone is truely eloquent, for he needs only diſplay his own feelings, to communicate them to his hearers.

The more I reflect, the more I am convinced, that by thus employing the principle of benevolence, and by drawing, from our good or bad ſucceſs, reflexions on their cauſes, there is little uſeful knowledge which may not be cultivated in the mind of a youth; and that to the real learning of the ſchools may be added that which is much more important, namely, its application to the uſes of life. Thus intereſted in the welfare of his fellow-creatures, he will ſoon learn to eſtimate their actions, their taſte, their

pleaſures,

pleaſures, and in general to fix a truer value on what will promote or deſtroy human felicity, than thoſe who know no intereſt ſeparate from their own, and who act only for themſelves. Such men are too ſtrongly biaſſed to judge rationally. Applying every thing to themſelves, and forming their ideas of good and evil by their own advantages, they fill their minds with a thouſand ridiculous prejudices, and every attempt that claſhes with their intereſt ſeems to threaten deſtruction to the univerſe.

If we extend this ſelf-love to other beings, it becomes a virtue, and there exiſts not a human heart in which it may not be found. The leſs immediately the object of our care is attached to ourſelves, the leſs the illuſion of ſelf-intereſt is to be apprehended; the more we generaliſe that intereſt the more equitable it becomes, and the love of mankind will be no other than the love of juſtice. If, therefore, we intend that Emilius ſhall be virtuous, let us endeavour in all his tranſactions to detach him from himſelf. The more he devotes his time and attention to the happineſs of others, the more rational will be his conduct, and the leſs he will be deceived in his judgement of good and evil; but he muſt indulge no capricious partiality. Why ſhould he injure one to ſerve another? It is of little conſequence to him, who has the greateſt ſhare of fortune, provided it concurs in augmenting the general felicity: that is the firſt concern of a wiſe man, next to his private intereſt; for

each is a part of his ſpecies, and not of another individual.

To prevent compaſſion from degenerating into weakneſs, it muſt extend to all mankind: we ſhall then carry it no farther than is conſiſtent with juſtice; becauſe, of all virtues, juſtice contributes moſt to man's happineſs. From reaſon, and from a regard to ourſelves, our love to our ſpecies ſhould over-balance that to our neighbour: there can be no greater cruelty to mankind than to indulge compaſſion for the wicked.

Upon the whole, let it be obſerved that all the means by which I detach my pupil from himſelf, have ultimately a direct tendency towards him; and will not only afford him pleaſure upon reflexion, but whilſt he is employed in acts of benevolence to others he himſelf inſenſibly imbibes inſtruction.

Having preſcribed the means, let us now obſerve the effect. What vaſt deſigns I ſee gradually forming in his mind! How do his ſublime ſentiments prevent the ſeeds of every groveling paſſion from taking root in his heart! How clear his judgement! How juſtly he is enabled to reaſon from his regulated deſires, and from that experience which confines the wiſhes of a great ſoul within the narrow limits of poſſibility, and induces ſuperior minds (unable to elevate the notions of the multitude) to let themſelves down to the common level! The true principles of rectitude, the juſt model of the Beautiful, the moral

ral relations of beings, and all the ideas of order are impreſſed on his underſtanding; he ſees how every thing ought to be, and the reaſon why it is otherwiſe; he knows what will be productive of good, and what will have a contrary effect; without having experienced the human paſſions, he is ſenſible of their conſequence, and their illuſion.

Hurried on by the natural force of things, I am carried perhaps a little precipitately forward; without any intention, however, of impoſing on the judgement of my readers. It is long ſince they have imagined me to be wandering in the land of chimeras; and I as conſtantly ſee them miſled in that of prejudices. In departing ſo far from vulgar opinions, they are, nevertheleſs, inceſſantly preſent to my mind. I examine and meditate on them, neither with a vieiw to adopt or reject them; but to weigh them in the balance of right reaſon. The moment I am obliged to depart from them, I take it, on known experience, for granted, that nobody will follow me: I know that people in general, perſiſting in the reality and propriety only of what they ſee before their eyes, will take my pupil for an imaginary and fantaſtick being, becauſe he differs from all thoſe with whom they compare him; without thinking that he ought to be ſo different, on account of his different mode of education. Thus having taught him contrary maxims and affected him with different ſentiments, it would be more ſurpriſing that he ſhould reſemble, than that

that he ſhould differ from ordinary pupils. Mine is not an artificial, but a natural man. There certainly ſhould appear a difference between him and us.

At the commencement of this work, I made no ſuppoſition of any thing which the whole world might not obſerve as well as myſelf. The birth of man is a term from which we all ſet out alike: but the farther I advance, in the cultivation of our nature, and you in the depravation of it, the farther we neceſſarily depart from each other. My pupil, at ſix years of age, differed but little from your's; as you had not then had time enough to ſpoil him; but the age at which the former is now arrived ought to repreſent him in a very different form, if I have not thrown my time and pains away. The quantity of information or number of acquirements may be the ſame, both on the one part and on the other; but the nature of that information or the knowledge acquired is very different. You are aſtoniſhed to find in your pupils thoſe ſublime ſentiments of which mine has not the leaſt notion or idea; but you are to conſider that the former were philoſophers and theologiſts, before Emilius knew what philoſophy was, or even heard talk of a deity.

If any perſon ſhould object, therefore, and tell me that nothing which I have ſuppoſed has any real exiſtence, that young people are not ſo formed, that they have ſuch or ſuch paſſions; that they do ſo or ſo; what is all this? They might

might as well deny that an apple-tree is ever a large ſtandard tree, becauſe we ſee nothing but dwarfs in our gardens.

I muſt take the liberty to deſire thoſe perſons, who are ſo ready to cenſure, to conſider that I know every thing they can ſay on this head as well as they; that I have reflected on this ſubject, in all probability much longer than they; and that, having no intereſt to impoſe on them, I have a right to expect they will not precipitately condemn me, without taking proper time to examine wherein I may be miſtaken. Let them inveſtigate firſt the conſtitution of man; let them trace the developements of the human heart in ſuch or ſuch circumſtances, in order that they may know, how much one individual may differ from another on account of education: let them then compare my ſyſtem with the effects I attribute to it, and, if they demonſtrate that I have reaſoned falſely, I have nothing further to ſay.

I am the more poſitive, and think myſelf the more excuſable for being ſo, on this head, as I have indulged myſelf as little as poſſible in ſyſtematick reaſoning; but have reſted my whole cauſe on obſervation. I lay no ſtreſs on what I have imagined, but on what I have ſeen. It is true that I have not confined my obſervations within the walls of a city, nor to any one order of men; but, after having taken a comparative view of as many ranks and degrees of people as I have met with, during a whole life ſpent in obſerving

obſerving them, I have thrown aſide, as artificial, all the peculiarities of particular nations, ranks, and conditions; and have regarded thoſe things only, as inconteſtibly belonging to man, which are common to men of all countries, ages, and circumſtances of life.

Now, if adopting this method, you trace, from his infancy, the ſteps of a young man, who ſhould receive no particular form, but be influenced as little as poſſible by the authority and opinion of others, which, do you think, he would moſt reſemble? my pupil or your's? This ſeems to me the preciſe queſtion to be reſolved by thoſe, who would determine whether or not I am miſtaken.

Men do not eaſily begin to think, but when they begin they never ceaſe to think afterwards. The underſtanding, once accuſtomed to reflexion, can never remain inactive. It may hence be ſuſpected that I have, in this reſpect, done either too much or too little; that the human mind is not naturally ſo ready to diſplay its faculties as I have ſuppoſed, and that after having given it a premature facility of exerting them, I reſtrain them too long within ſo narrow a circle of ideas.

But conſider, in the firſt place, that there is a wide difference between educating a man for ſociety, according to the principles of nature, and the rearing a ſavage, to be ſent afterwards to inhabit the woods. It is ſufficient that my pupil, ſecluded within the vortex of ſociety, is prevented

prevented from being infected by the contagion of the paſſions and prejudices of mankind; that he ſee, and feel himſelf governed by no other authority than that of his own reaſon. In this ſituation it is evident that he will be ſtruck by a multitude of objects, that he will be affected by a variety of ſentiments; all which, with the various means ſuggeſted to provide for his real wants, will furniſh him with a multiplicity of ideas which he would otherwiſe never have had, or at leaſt would have acquired much later. The natural progreſs of the underſtanding is indeed accelerated but not perverted. The ſame man, who would have remained ſtupid if ſtrolling about a foreſt, would have become a reaſonable creature if living in a city, even though only a ſimple uninſtructed ſpectator.

Nothing is more proper to render a man ſenſible and prudent than the follies he ſees practiſed, without partaking of them; nay, even the participation of them is ſtill farther improving, provided he is not made a dupe to them, and does not adopt the errours of thoſe who are principally concerned in committing them.

It ſhould be conſidered, alſo, that, as we are confined by our faculties to ſenſible objects, we are not eaſily influenced to conceive abſtract notions of philoſophy, and ideas purely intellectual.

To acquire theſe, it is neceſſary, either to diſengage ourſelves from the body to which we are ſo firmly attached; to make a ſlow and gradual progreſs from object to object, or in ſhort to take

take at once a gigantick ſtep from the material to the intellectual world, of which a child is incapable. To get over the interval between them requires indeed, for men, a ladder of many rounds, expreſsly made for that purpoſe. The firſt abſtract idea we conceive, is the firſt of theſe rounds; but I cannot eaſily apprehend how they are combined and conſtructed.

The incomprehenſible being, in whom every thing is comprehended, who gives motion to the material, and life to the animal, ſyſtem, is neither viſible to the ſight nor palpable to the touch: he eſcapes the inveſtigation of all our ſenſes. The work is diſplayed at large, but the artiſt is concealed. It is not a little point attained, even to know that he exiſts; and when we have got ſo far, and would enquire farther what he is, and where! our underſtanding ſoon bewilders itſelf, and we no longer know what to think of him.

Locke would have us begin our ſtudies with the inveſtigation of ſpirits, and to paſs from thence to that of bodies. This method is that of ſuperſtition, prejudice, and errour; it is not that of reaſon, nor even of nature rightly diſpoſed: this would be to ſhut our eyes in order to learn to ſee. It is requiſite to ſtudy the nature of bodies a long time to acquire a true notion of ſpirits, or even to ſuſpect that they exiſt. By proceeding in a contrary order we only proceed to eſtabliſh materialiſm.

As our ſenſes are the primary inſtruments of our knowledge, perceptible and corporeal objects

jects are the only ones of which we have the immediate idea. The word ſpirit has no meaning with thoſe who have never philoſophiſed. With children, and with ordinary people, a ſpirit is nothing more than a body. Do not they conceive that ſpirits talk, fight, and make a noiſe? It muſt be acknowledged therefore that ſuch ſpirits, having arms and tongues, muſt greatly reſemble human bodies. This is the reaſon why all the people in the world, not excepting the Jews themſelves, have worſhiped corporeal deities. Even we, chriſtians, with our theological terms of Spirit, the Trinity, and the perſons of the Godhead, are, for the moſt part, real anthropomorphites. I own indeed we are taught to ſay, that God is every where preſent: but we believe alſo that air is diffuſed thoughout the univerſe, at leaſt thoughout our atmoſphere; and the word Spirit in its original ſignification, ſtands for *breath* or *wind*. If once people are brought to uſe words of which they do not underſtand the meaning, it is eaſy, after that, to make them ſay what we pleaſe.

The ſenſe of our action on other bodies ſhould, very naturally, at firſt make us believe, that when they acted on us it muſt be in a ſimilar manner. Thus man began to ſuppoſe all thoſe beings animated, of whoſe action he became ſuſceptible. Peceiving alſo that moſt of thoſe beings had more ſtrength than he had, he ſuppoſed that ſtrength to be unlimited, and thus made

made as many deities as he became acquainted with bodies. During the firſt ages of the world, man, being apprehenſive of danger from every object, beheld nothing dead or inanimate in nature. He was not longer in acquiring the abſtract idea of matter than that of ſpirit. Thus did mankind ſtock the univerſe with material divinities. The ſtars, winds, mountains, rivers, trees, even houſes, every thing was poſſeſſed of a ſoul, and had its deity. The monkeys of Laban, the manitou of the ſavages, the fetiches of the Negroes, the works of art as well as nature, have been formerly eſteemed as Gods by mankind. Polytheiſm was the firſt religion in the world, and the firſt worſhip was idolatry. Men could not arrive at the acknowledgment of one God, till, generaliſing their ideas by degrees, they were enabled to recur to a firſt cauſe, to unite the whole ſyſtem of beings in one idea, and to give a meaning to the word *ſubſtance*, which is in fact the greateſt of abſtractions. Every child who believes in God is, therefore, neceſſarily an idolater, or at leaſt an anthropomorphite; and when even the imagination hath attained a view of the deity, it is very ſeldom that the underſtanding can form any conception of him. This is the very errour into which the order preſcribed by Mr. Locke will neceſſarily lead us.

Having fallen, I hardly know how, on the abſtract idea of ſubſtance, it is plain that in order to admit of the exiſtence only of one ſimple

ſubſtance, we muſt ſuppoſe it poſſeſſed of qualities that are incompatible, and reciprocally excluſive of each other, ſuch as thoſe of thought and extenſion, one of which is eſſentially diviſible, and the other incapable of diviſibility. Thought, or, if you will, ſentiment, is, beſide, ſuppoſed to be a primitive quality and inſeparable from the ſubſtance to which it belongs; that it bears the ſame relation to it as even its extenſion. Hence it is to be concluded that thoſe beings which loſe either of theſe qualities loſe the ſubſtance alſo to which it belongs; that, of conſequence, death is only a ſeparation of ſubſtances, and that Beings, in which theſe two qualities are united, are compoſed of the two ſubſtances to which theſe two qualities appertain.

Now, reflect on the vaſt difference that ſtill remains between the notion of theſe two ſubſtances and that of the divine nature; between the incomprehenſible idea of the action of the ſoul on the body: and the idea of the action of God on all created beings. The ideas of a creating and annihilating power, omnipreſence, eternity, omnipotence, are thoſe of the divine attributes, which ſo ſmall a part of mankind are capable to form, confuſed and indiſtinct as they are, and which nevertheleſs do not appear obſcure at all to the common people, becauſe they form nothing of them. How is it poſſible to preſent theſe ideas in all their force, that is to ſay, in their full obſcurity, to thoſe

youthful underſtandings which are as yet totally occupied with the primary operations of the ſenſes, and are hardly able to conceive any thing but what they feel. It is in vain the vaſt abyſs of infinity is thrown open before us; a child cannot be ſtruck and confounded at the unfathomable void, its feeble opticks cannot pierce its immenſe profundity. Every thing appears infinite to children, they know not how to preſcribe bounds to any thing; not becauſe they extend the limits of nature beyond meaſure, but becauſe the rule of their underſtanding is ſo ſhort. I have even obſerved that they place infinity more often within, than without, the limits which are even known to them. They eſtimate a ſpace to be immenſe, rather by their feet than their eyes; infinity does not extend farther than they can ſee, but only farther than they can go. If we ſpeak to them of the power of the deity, they think him almoſt as ſtrong as their father. Their knowledge in all caſes, being to them the meaſure of poſſibilities, they judge every thing that is told them to be leſs, and inferior to what they know. Such are the concluſions natural to ignorance and weakneſs of underſtanding. Ajax was afraid to encounter Achilles, and yet challenged Jupiter: this was becauſe he knew the ſtrength and proweſs of Achilles, and was ignorant of the omnipotence of Jove. Should we endeavour to give a Swiſs peaſant, who imagines himſelf the wealthieſt of mankind,

the idea of a king, he will aſk us, with an air of purſe-proud ſelf-ſufficiency, if a king has an hundred cows grazing on the mountains?

I foreſee how much my readers will be ſurpriſed to find I have attended my pupil throughout the whole firſt age of life, without once ſpeaking to him of religion. He hardly knows, at fifteen years of age, whether or not he hath a ſoul; and perhaps it will not be time to inform him of it when he is eighteen; for if he learns it too ſoon, he runs a riſk of never knowing it at all.

If I were to deſign a picture of the moſt deplorable ſtupidity, I would draw a pedant teaching children their catechiſm; and were I reſolved to crack the brain of a child, I would oblige him to explain what he ſaid when he repeated his catechiſm. It may be objected, that the greater part of the dogmas of chriſtianity being myſterious, to expect the human mind ſhould be capable of conceiving them, is not ſo much to expect children ſhould be men, but that man ſhould be ſomething more. To this I anſwer, in the firſt place, that there are myſteries, which it is not only impoſſible for man to comprehend but alſo to believe; and I do not ſee what we get by teaching them to children, unleſs it be to learn them betimes to tell lies. I will ſay further, that before we admit of myſteries, it is neceſſary for us to comprehend, at leaſt, that they are incomprehenſible, and children are not even capable of this. At an age when every thing

thing is myſterious, there are no ſuch things properly ſpeaking as myſteries.

Believe in God and thou ſhalt be ſaved. This dogma, miſunderſtood, is the principle of ſanguinary perſecution, and the cauſe of all thoſe futile inſtructions which have given a mortal blow to human reaſon, by accuſtoming it to be ſatisfied with words. Doubtleſs, not a moment is to be loſt when we are running the race of eternal ſalvation: but if, to obtain this important prize, it be ſufficient to learn to repeat a ſet form of words, I do not ſee what ſhould hinder us from peopling heaven with magpies and parroquets as well as with children.

To impoſe an obligation of believing ſuppoſes the poſſibility of it. The philoſopher who does not believe is certainly in the wrong; becauſe he miſuſes the underſtanding he has cultivated, and is capacitated to comprehend the ſublime truths he rejects. But, though a child ſhould profeſs the chriſtian religion, what can he believe? He can believe only what he conceives, and he conceives ſo little of what is ſaid to him, that if you tell him directly the contrary, he adopts the latter dogma as readily as he did the former. The faith of children, and indeed of many grown perſons, is merely an affair of geography. Are they to be rewarded in heaven becauſe they were born at Rome and not at Mecca. One man is told that Mahomet was a prophet ſent by God, and he accordingly ſays that Mahomet was a prophet ſent by God:

the other is told that Mahomet was an impoſter, and he in like manner alſo ſays Mahomet was an impoſter. Had theſe two perſons only changed places, each would alſo have changed his tone, and affirmed what he now denies. Can we infer from two diſpoſitions ſo much alike, that one will go to heaven and the other to hell? When a child ſays he believes in God, it is not in God he believes, but in Peter or James, who tell him there is ſomething which is called God; thus he believes in the manner of Euripides, when Jupiter was thus addreſſed in one of his tragedies*;

O Jupiter! Though nothing I know of thee but thy name—

We proteſtants hold that no child, who dies before he arrives at the age of reaſon, is deprived of ſalvation: the Roman Catholicks believe the ſame of every child that is baptiſed, though it ſhould never once have heard the name of God. There are ſome caſes therefore in which men may be ſaved without believing in God, as in infancy or imbecility of mind, as in ideots and madmen, where the underſtanding is incapable of the operations requiſite to infer an acknowledgement of the deity. All the difference that I ſee here between me and my readers is, that you think children of ſeven years of age capacitated to believe in God, and I do not think

* The tragedy of Menalippus, which at firſt began with this line; but the clamours of the Athenians obliged Euripides afterwards to alter it. *Plutarch.*

think them capable of it even at fifteen. Whether I am right or wrong in this particular, it is not in itſelf an article of faith, but only a ſimple obſervation in natural hiſtory.

On the ſame principles, it is evident that if a man ſhould arrive at old age without believing in God, he would not be deprived of his preſence in the other world, provided his infidelity was not wilful; and this I ſay may ſometimes happen. You will admit that, with reſpect to madmen, a malady deprives them of their intellectual faculties, but not of their condition as men, nor of courſe of their claim to the beneficence of their creator. Why, then, will you not admit the ſame claim in thoſe, who, ſequeſtered in their infancy from all ſociety, have lived the real life of a ſavage, deprived of that information which is to be acquired only by converſation with mankind*? For it is a demonſtrable impoſſibility that ſuch a ſavage ſhould ever raiſe his ideas to the knowledge of the true God. Reaſon tells us that man is puniſhable only for his wilful errours, and that invincible ignorance can never be imputed to him as a crime. Hence it ſhould follow that, in the eye of eternal juſtice, every man who would have believed had he had the opportunities of information, will appear as a believer; and that none will be puniſhed for infidelity but thoſe whoſe hearts refuſe to admit the truth.

* See the firſt part of my diſcourſe on the inequality of mankind; wherein I treat of the natural ſtate of the human mind and the ſlowneſs of its progreſs.

Let us beware of divulging the truth to thoſe who are incapable of underſtanding it: for this is the way to ſubſtitute errour in the room of it. It were better to have no idea of God at all, than to entertain thoſe which are mean, fantaſtical, injurious, and unworthy a divine object: it is a leſs crime to be ignorant of, than inſult, him. I had much rather, ſays the amiable Plutarch, that people ſhould believe there is no ſuch perſon as Plutarch in the world, than that they ſhould ſay he is unjuſt, envious, jealous, and ſo tyrannical as to require of others what he has not left them power to perform.

The great evil of thoſe prepoſterous images of the Deity, which we may trace in the minds of children, is, that they remain indelible during their whole life; and that when they are men they have no better conceptions of God than they had when they were children. I once knew a very worthy and pious woman in Switzerland ſo well ſatisfied of the truth of this maxim, that ſhe would give her ſon no early inſtructions about religion, leſt he ſhould content himſelf with ſuch imperfect ideas as he was then only able to conceive, and neglect the acquiſition of more perfect ones when he grew up. This child never heard the name of God pronounced but with awe and reverence; and whenever he began to ſpeak of him was immediately ſilenced, as if the ſubject was too great and ſublime for his comprehenſion. This reſerve excited his curioſity, and his ſelf-love aſpired after the time when

when it ſhould be proper for him to be made acquainted with the myſtery that was ſo carefully concealed from him. The leſs he was ſpoken to of God, the leſs he was ſuffered to ſpeak of him, the more his thoughts were employed on this unknown object. He ſaw God in every thing around him; and what I ſhould fear moſt from this air of myſtery carried to extremes, would be, that, in overheating the imagination of a young man, it would turn his head, and that in the end it would make him a fanatick inſtead of a believer.

We need be under no ſuch apprehenſions, however, with reſpect to Emilius, who, conſtantly refuſing to pay any attention to objects above his capacity, hears with the moſt perfect indifference thoſe things he doth not underſtand. There are ſo many of theſe, of which he is accuſtomed to ſay, "this matter is not my concern," that he will not be embarraſſed about any one that may be propoſed to him; and even when he begins to intereſt himſelf in theſe important queſtions, it is not becauſe he may have happened to hear them propoſed, but when the progreſs of his underſtanding leads him to ſuch diſquiſitions.

We have ſeen by what means a cultivated underſtanding makes its approaches to the knowledge of theſe myſteries, and I readily agree that it does not naturally arrive at ſuch knowledge, even in the midſt of ſociety, before we reach a very advanced age. But, as there are

numerous and inevitable cauſes in ſociety, from which the progreſs of the paſſions is accelerated; if the progreſs of the underſtanding, which ſerves to regulate thoſe paſſions, be not accelerated in the ſame proportion, then it is that we depart from the order of nature, and that the equilibrium between our reaſon and our paſſions is deſtroyed. If we are not ſufficiently our own maſters to moderate a too rapid developement of certain faculties, it is neceſſary to hurry on with the ſame rapidity thoſe which ought to correſpond with them, ſo that the order in which they ſhould all be naturally diſplayed be not perverted; that thoſe which ought to go together be not ſeparated; and that man, as the ſame conſcious individual during every moment of his life, ſhould not be advanced to a certain degree by one of his faculties, and to a different degree by another.

What a difficulty do I ſee here riſing up againſt me! a difficulty by ſo much the greater as it depends leſs on the things themſelves, than on the puſillanimity of thoſe who dare not venture to reſolve it. Let us begin at leaſt by daring to propoſe it. A child ſhould be educated in the religion of his father; it is always eaſy to convince him that ſuch a faith, be it what it will, is the only true one; and that all others are abſurd and extravagant. The force of our arguments on this head depends abſolutely on this point, to wit, on the country in which they are propoſed. Let a Turk, who finds

Chriſtianity

Chriſtianity ſo ridiculous at Conſtantinople, go and ſee how ridiculous Mahometaniſm is at Paris. Cuſtom and prejudice triumph particularly in matters of religion. But how ſhall we, who, on all occaſions, pretend to ſhake off its yoke; we, who pay no regard to the authority of opinion; who would teach our pupil nothing but what he might have learned himſelf, in any country; in what religion ſhall we educate Emilius? To what ſect ſhall we unite the man of nature? The anſwer appears to me very ſimple; we ſhall unite him neither to one nor another; but place him in a proper ſituation, and qualify him to make choice of that which the beſt uſe of his reaſon may induce him to adopt.

Incedo per ignes
Suppoſitos cineri doloſo.

No matter; my zeal and ſincerity have hitherto ſtood me in the ſtead of prudence. I hope theſe, my ſecurities, will not forſake me in neceſſity. Fear not, readers, that I ſhall take any precautions unworthy a friend to truth: I ſhall never loſe ſight of my motto; but certainly I may be permitted to diſtruſt my own judgement. Inſtead of telling you what I think myſelf, I will give you the ſentiments of a man of greater weight than I am. I anſwer for the veracity of the facts which are here related: they really happened to the authour of the paper I am going to tranſcribe. It is your buſineſs to ſee if any uſeful reflexions may be drawn from it relative

to the ſubject of which it treats. I neither propoſe the ſentiments of myſelf or another as a rule for you, but only ſubmit them to your examination.

"ABOUT thirty years ago, a young man, who had forſaken his own country and rambled into Italy, found himſelf reduced to circumſtances of great poverty and diſtreſs. He had been bred a Calviniſt: but, in conſequence of his miſconduct, and of being unhappily a fugitive in a foreign country, without money or friends, he was induced to change his religion for the ſake of ſubſiſtence. To this end he procured admittance into an houſe eſtabliſhed for the reception of proſelytes. Here, the inſtructions he received concerning ſome controverſial points, excited doubts he had not before entertained, and brought him firſt acquainted with the evil of the ſtep he had taken. He was taught ſtrange dogmas, and was eye-witneſs to ſtranger manners; and to theſe he ſaw himſelf a deſtined victim. He now attempted to make his eſcape, but was prevented, and more cloſely confined; if he complained, he was puniſhed for complaining; and, lying at the mercy of his tyrannical oppreſſors, found himſelf treated as criminal, becauſe he could not without reluctance ſubmit to be ſo. Let thoſe, who are ſenſible how much the firſt act of violence and injuſtice irritate young and unexperienced minds, judge of the ſituation of this unfortunate youth. Swoln with indignation, the tears of

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rage burſt from his eyes. He implored the aſſiſtance of heaven and earth in vain; he appealed to the whole world, but nobody attended to his plea. His complaints could reach the ears only of a parcel of vile domeſticks, ſlaves to the wretch by whom he was thus treated, or accomplices in the ſame crime; who ridiculed his nonconformity and endeavoured to excite his imitation. He had been doubtleſs entirely ruined had it not been for the good offices of an honeſt eccleſiaſtick, who came to the hoſpital on ſome buſineſs, and with whom he found an opportunity of a private conference. The good prieſt was himſelf poor, and ſtood in need of every one's aſſiſtance; the oppreſſed proſelyte, however, ſtood yet in greater need of him: the former did not heſitate, therefore, to favour his eſcape, at the riſk of making himſelf a powerful enemy.

"Having eſcaped from vice only to return to indigence, this young adventurer ſtruggled without ſucceſs againſt his deſtiny: for a moment, indeed, he thought himſelf above it, and at the firſt proſpect of good-fortune, his former diſtreſſes and his protector were forgotten together. He was ſoon puniſhed, however, for his ingratitude, as his groundleſs hopes ſoon vaniſhed: his youth ſtood in vain on his ſide; his romantick notions proving deſtructive to all his deſigns. Having neither capacity nor addreſs to ſurmount the difficulties that fell in his way; ſtranger to the virtues of moderation and the

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arts of knavery, he attempted ſo many things that he could bring none to perfection. Hence, fallen into his former diſtreſs, in want of food and lodging, and ready to periſh with hunger, he recollected his benefactor.

"To him he returned, and was well received; the ſight of the unhappy youth brought to the poor vicar's mind the remembrance of a good action: a remembrance always grateful to an honeſt mind. This good prieſt was naturally humane and compaſſionate, his own misfortunes had taught him to feel for thoſe of others, nor had proſperity hardened his heart; in a word, the maxims of true wiſdom and conſcious virtue had confirmed the goodneſs of his natural diſpoſition. He cordially embraced the young wanderer, provided him a lodging, and ſhared with him the ſlender means of his own ſubſiſtence. Nor was this all: he went ſtill farther, giving him both inſtruction and conſolation, in order to teach him that difficult art of ſupporting adverſity with patience. Could you believe, ye ſons of prejudice! that a prieſt, and a prieſt in Italy too, could be capable of this?

"This honeſt eccleſiaſtick was a poor Savoyard, who, having in his younger days incurred the diſpleaſure of his biſhop, was obliged to paſs the mountains, in order to ſeek that proviſion which was denied him in his own country. He was neither deficient in literature nor underſtanding; his talents, therefore, together with an engaging appearance, ſoon procured him

him protectors, who recommended him to be tutor to a young man of quality. He preferred poverty, however, to dependence; and, being a ſtranger to the manners and behaviour of the great, he remained but a ſhort time in that ſituation. In quitting this ſervice, nevertheleſs, he did not loſe the eſteem of his patron; and, as he behaved with great prudence, and was univerſally beloved, he flattered himſelf he ſhould in time regain the good opinion of his biſhop, and obtain ſome little benefice in the mountains, where he hoped to ſpend the reſt of his days. This was the height of his ambition.

"Intereſted, by a natural propenſity, in favour of the young fugitive; he examined very carefully into his character and diſpoſition. In this examination, he ſaw that his misfortunes had already debaſed his heart; that the ſhame and contempt to which he had been expoſed had depreſſed his courage, and that his diſappointed pride, converted into indignation, deduced from the injuſtice and cruelty of mankind the depravity of human nature, and the emptineſs of virtue. He had obſerved religion made uſe of as a maſk to ſelf-intereſt, and its worſhip as a cloak to hypocriſy. He had ſeen the terms heaven and hell proſtituted in the ſubtilty of vain diſputes; the joys of the one and pains of the other being annexed to a mere repetition of words. He had obſerved the ſublime and primitive idea of the Divinity diſfigured by the

the fantaſtical imaginations of men; and, finding that, in order to believe in God, it was neceſſary to give up that underſtanding he hath beſtowed on us, he held in the ſame diſdain as well the ſacred object of our idle reveries as thoſe reveries themſelves. Without knowing any thing of natural cauſes, or giving himſelf any trouble to think about them, he had plunged himſelf into the moſt ſtupid ignorance, mixed with the moſt profound contempt for thoſe who pretended to know more than himſelf.

"A neglect of all religious duties leads to a neglect of all moral obligations. The heart of this young libertine had already made a great progreſs from one toward the other. Not that he was conſtitutionally vicious; but, incredulity and misfortune having ſtifled by degrees the propenſities of his natural diſpoſition, they were hurrying him on to ruin; adding to the manners of the beggar the principles of the Atheiſt.

"His ruin, however, though almoſt inevitable, was not abſolutely completed. His education not having been neglected, he was not without knowledge. He had not as yet exceeded that happy term of life, wherein the fermenting blood ſerves to invigorate the mind without enflaming the paſſions. His were as yet unrelaxed and unexcited. A natural modeſty and timidity of diſpoſition had hitherto ſupplied the place of reſtraint; and had prolonged that term in which you endeavour ſo

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long to preſerve your pupil. The odious example of brutal depravity, and of vices without temptation, ſo far from animating his imagination, had mortified it. Diſguſt had long ſupplied the place of virtue in the preſervation of his innocence; to corrupt this required more powerful ſeductions.

"The good prieſt ſaw the danger and the remedy. The difficulties which appeared in the application did not deter him from the attempt: he took a pleaſure in his deſign, and reſolved to complete it; by reſtoring to virtue the victim he had ſnatched from infamy.

"To this end he ſet out at a diſtance in the execution of his project; the merit of the motive increaſed his hopes, and inſpired means worthy of his zeal. Whatever might be the ſucceſs, he was certain he ſhould not throw away his labour: we are always ſure ſo far to ſucceed in well doing.

"He began with ſtriving to gain the confidence of the proſelyte, by conferring on him his favours diſintereſtedly; by never importuning him with exhortations, and by deſcending always to a level with his ideas and manner of thinking. It muſt have been an affecting ſight to ſee a grave divine become the comrade of a young libertine; to ſee virtue affect the air of licentiouſneſs, in order to triumph the more certainly over it. Whenever the heedleſs youth made him the confident of his follies, and unboſomed himſelf freely to his benefactor, the

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good prieſt liſtened attentively to his ſtories, and, without approving the evil, intereſted himſelf in the conſequences. No ill-timed cenſure ever indiſcretely checked his communicative temper. The pleaſure with which he thought himſelf heard, increaſed that which he took in telling all his ſecrets. Thus he was induced to make a free and general confeſſion without thinking of his confeſſing any thing.

"Having thus made himſelf maſter of his ſentiments and character, the prieſt was enabled to ſee clearly that, without being ignorant for his years, he had forgot every thing of conſequence for him to know, and that the ſtate of meanneſs into which he was reduced, had almoſt ſtifled in him the ſenſe of good and evil. There is a degree of low ſtupidity, which deprives the ſoul as it were of life; the voice of conſcience alſo is little heard by thoſe who think of nothing but the means of ſubſiſtence. To reſcue the unfortunate youth from the moral death that ſo nearly threatened him, he began, therefore, by awakening his ſelf-love and exciting in him a due regard to himſelf. He repreſented to his imagination a more happy ſucceſs, from the future employment of his talents: he animated him with a generous ardour, by a recital of the commendable actions of others; and by raiſing his admiration of thoſe who performed them, excited in him a ſpirit of emulation, and a deſire of imitating them. In order to detach him inſenſibly from an idle and vaga-

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ond life, he employed him in copying extracts rom books; and under pretence of having occaſion for ſuch extracts, cheriſhed in him the noble ſentiment of gratitude to his benefactor. By this method alſo he inſtructed him indirectly by the books he employed him to copy; and induced him to recover ſo good an opinion of himſelf as to think he was not quite good for nothing, and to hold himſelf not ſo deſpicable in his own eſteem.

"A trifling circumſtance may ſerve to ſhew the art which this benevolent inſtructor made uſe of inſenſibly to elevate the heart of his diſciple, without appearing to think of giving him inſtruction. This good eccleſiaſtick was ſo well known and eſteemed for his probity and diſcernment, that many perſons choſe rather to entruſt him with the diſtribution of their alms than the richer clergy of the cities. Now it happened, that receiving one day a ſum of money in charge for the poor; the young man had the meanneſs to deſire ſome of it, under that title, for himſelf. 'No (replied his benefactor) you and I are brethren; you belong to me, and I ought not to apply the charity depoſited with me to my own uſe.' He then gave him the ſum he wanted out of his own pocket. Leſſons of this kind are hardly ever thrown away on young people, whoſe hearts are not entirely corrupted.

"But I will continue to ſpeak no longer in the third perſon, which is indeed a ſuperfluous caution;

caution; as you are very ſenſible, my dear countryman, that the unhappy fugitive I have been ſpeaking of is myſelf. I conceive myſelf far enough removed from the irregularities of my youth to dare to avow them; and think the hand which extricated me from them, too well deſerving my gratitude, for me not to do it honour, at the expenſe of a little ſhame.

"The moſt ſtriking circumſtance of all was to obſerve, in the retired life of my worthy maſter, virtue without hypocriſy, humanity without weakneſs, his converſation always honeſt and ſimple, and his conduct ever conformable to his diſcourſe. I never found him troubling himſelf whether the perſons he aſſiſted went conſtantly to veſpers; whether they went frequently to confeſſion, or faſted on certain days of the week: nor did I ever know him impoſe on them any of thoſe conditions, without which a man might periſh for want, and have no hopes of relief from the devout.

"Encouraged by theſe obſervations, ſo far was I from affecting, in his preſence, the forward zeal of a new proſelyte, that I took no pains to conceal my thoughts, nor did I ever remark his being ſcandalized at this freedom. Hence, have I ſometimes ſaid to myſelf, he certainly overlooks my indifference for the new mode of worſhip I have embraced, in conſideration of the diſregard which he ſees I have for that in which I was educated; as he finds my indifference is not partial to either. But what could

could I think when I heard him ſometimes approve dogmas contrary to thoſe of the Roman church, and appear to hold its ceremonies in little eſteem? I ſhould have been apt to conclude him a proteſtant in diſguiſe, had I ſeen him leſs obſervant of thoſe very ceremonies which he ſeemed to think of ſo little account; but, knowing that he acquitted himſelf as punctually of his duties as a prieſt, in private as in publick, I knew not how to judge of theſe ſeeming contradictions. If we except the failing which firſt brought him into diſgrace with his ſuperiour, and of which he was not altogether corrected, his life was exemplary, his manners irreproachable, and his converſation prudent and ſenſible. As I lived with him in the greateſt intimacy, I learned every day to reſpect him more and more; and as he had entirely won my heart by ſo many acts of kindneſs, I waited with an impatient curioſity, to know the principles on which a life and conduct ſo ſingular and uniform could be founded.

"It was ſome time, however, before this curioſity was ſatisfied. Before he would diſcloſe himſelf to his diſciple, he endeavoured to cultivate thoſe ſeeds of reaſon and goodneſs, which he had ſown in his mind. The greateſt difficulty he met with, was to eradicate from my heart a proud miſanthropy, a certain rancorous hatred which I bore to the wealthy and fortunate, as if they were made ſuch at my expenſe,

and had uſurped apparent happineſs from what ſhould have been really mine. The idle vanity of youth, which is oppoſed to all kind of humiliation, encouraged but too much my propenſity to indulge this ſplenetick humour; while that ſelf-love which my Mentor ſtrove ſo much to cheriſh, increaſing my pride, rendered mankind ſtill more deteſtable, and only added to my hatred of them the moſt egregious contempt.

" Without directly attacking this pride, he contented himſelf to prevent its degenerating into barbarity, and, without diminiſhing myſelf-eſteem, made me leſs diſdainful of my neighbours. In withdrawing the gaudy veil of external appearances, and preſenting to my view the real evils it covered, he taught me to lament the failings of my fellow-creatures, to ſympathiſe with their miſeries, and to pity inſtead of envying them. Moved to compaſſion for human frailties, from a deep ſenſe of his own, he ſaw mankind every where the victims either of their own vices or of thoſe of others: he ſaw the poor groan beneath the yoke of the rich, and the rich beneath that of their own prepoſſeſſions and prejudices. ' Believe me, ſaid he, our miſtaken notions of things are ſo far from concealing our misfortunes from our view, that they augment thoſe evils, by rendering trifles of importance, and making us ſenſible of a thouſand wants, which we ſhould never have known but from our prejudices.

:es. Peace of mind conſiſts in a contempt very thing that may diſturb it. The man gives himſelf the greateſt concern about is he who enjoys it leaſt; and he who :es the moſt earneſtly after happineſs is always noſt miſerable.'

Alas! (cried I with all the bitterneſs iſcontent) what a deplorable picture do you ent of human life! If we may indulge elves in nothing, to what purpoſe are born? If we muſt deſpiſe even happineſs f, who is there can know what it is to be oy?"—'I know' (replied, the good prieſt tone and manner that ſtruck me.) "You! I I.) ſo little favoured by fortune! ſo poor! ed! perſecuted! can you be happy? And, u are, what have you done to purchaſe hap- ſs?"—'My dear child (returned he) I will r readily tell you. As you have freely con- d to me, I will do the ſame to you. I will loſe to you (ſaid he, embracing me) all the iments of my heart. You ſhall ſee me, if ſuch as I really am, at leaſt ſuch as I think elf to be: and when you have heard my le profeſſion of faith, when you know fully ſituation of my heart, you will know why ink myſelf happy; and, if you think as I what you have to do to become ſo likewiſe: this profeſſion is not to be made in a moment: will require ſome time to diſcloſe to you my ughts on the ſituation of man, and the real e of human life;—we will take a proper

opportunity

opportunity for an hour's uninterrupted converſation on this ſubject.'

"As I expreſſed an earneſt deſire for ſuch an opportunity, it was put off only to the next morning. It was in ſummer time, and we roſe at break of day; when, taking me out of town, he led me to the top of a hill, at the foot of which ran the river Po, watering the fertile vales. That immenſe chain of mountains, the Alps, terminated the diſtant proſpect. The riſing ſun had caſt its orient rays over the gilded plains, and, by projecting the long ſhadows of the trees, the houſes and adjacent hills, deſcribed the moſt beautiful ſcene ever mortal eye beheld. One might have been tempted to think that nature had at this time diſplayed all its magnificence, as a ſubject for our converſation. Here it was that, after contemplating for a ſhort time the ſurrounding objects in ſilence, my guide and benefactor thus began:

The PROFESSION *of* FAITH *of a Savoyard Curate.*

"Expect not either learned declamations or profound arguments; I am no great philoſopher, and I give myſelf little trouble whether I ever ſhall be ſuch or not. But I perceive ſometimes the glimmering of good-ſenſe, and have always a regard for the truth. I will not enter into any diſputation, or endeavour to refute you; but only lay down my own ſentiments in ſimplicity of heart: conſult your own, during this expoſition

tion; this is all I require of you. If I am miſtaken, it is undeſignedly: which is ſufficient to clear me of all criminal errour; and if you are in like manner unwittingly deceived, it is of little conſequence: if I am right, reaſon is common to both; we are equally intereſted in liſtening to it: and why ſhould you not think as I do?

"I was born a poor peaſant, deſtined by my ſituation to the buſineſs of huſbandry; it was thought, however, much more adviſeable for me to learn to get my bread by the profeſſion of a prieſt; and means were found to give me a proper education. In this, moſt certainly, neither my parents nor I conſulted what was really good, true, or uſeful for me to know; but only that I ſhould learn what was neceſſary to my ordination. I learned therefore what was required of me to learn, I ſaid what was required of me to ſay, and accordingly was made a prieſt. I was not long, however, before I perceived too plainly that, in laying myſelf under an obligation to be no longer a man, I had engaged for more than I could poſſibly perform.

"Some will tell us that conſcience is founded merely on our prejudices, but I know, for certain, from my own experience, that its dictates conſtantly follow the order of nature, in contradiction to all human laws and inſtitutions. We are in vain forbid to do this thing or the other; we ſhall feel but little remorſe for doing

any thing to which a well-regulated natural inſtinct excites us, how ſtrongly ſoever prohibited by reaſon. Nature, my dear youth, hath in this reſpect been hitherto ſilent to you; may you continue long in that happy ſtate wherein her voice is the voice of innocence! Remember that you offend her more by anticipating her inſtructions than by refuſing to hear them. In order to know when to liſten to her without a crime, you ſhould begin by learning to check her inſinuations.

"I had always a due reſpect for marriage, as the firſt and moſt ſacred inſtitution of nature. Having given up my right to enter into ſuch an engagement, I reſolved, therefore, not to profane it: for, notwithſtanding my manner of education, as I had always led a ſimple and uniform life, I had preſerved all that clearneſs of underſtanding in which my firſt ideas were cultivated. The maxims of the world had not obſcured my primitive notions, and my poverty kept me at a ſufficient diſtance from thoſe temptations that teach us the ſophiſtry of vice.

"The virtuous reſolution I had formed, however, was the very cauſe of my ruin: my full determination not to violate the bed of another left my faults expoſed to detection. It was neceſſary to expiate the ſcandal; I was accordingly ſuſpended and baniſhed; falling a ſacrifice to my ſcruples rather than to my incontinence. From the reproaches alſo made me, on my diſgrace, I found that the way to eſcape puniſhment for a crime,

a crime, is often to aggravate the guilt, by committing a greater.

"A few inſtances of this kind go far with perſons capable of reflexion. Finding, by ſorrowful experience, the ideas I had formed of juſtice, honeſty, and other moral obligations, contradicted in practice, I began to give up moſt of the opinions I had received, till, at length, the few which I retained being no longer ſufficient to ſupport themſelves, I called in queſtion the evidence on which they were eſtabliſhed. Thus, knowing hardly what to think, I found myſelf at laſt reduced to your own ſituation of mind; with this difference only, that my infidelity being the later fruit of a maturer age, it was a work of greater difficulty to remove it.

"I was in that ſtate of doubt and uncertainty in which Deſcartes requires the mind to be involved, in order to enable it to inveſtigate truth. This diſpoſition of mind, however, is too diſquieting to laſt long; its duration being owing only to vice or indolence. My heart was not ſo corrupt as to ſeek ſuch indulgence; and nothing preſerves ſo well the habit of reflexion, as to be more content with ourſelves than with our fortune.

"I reflected therefore, on the unhappy lot of mortals, always floating on the ocean of human opinions, without compaſs or rudder; left to the mercy of their tempeſtuous paſſions, with no other guide than an unexperienced pi-

lot, ignorant of his courſe, as well as whence he came, and whither he is going. I ſaid often to my ſelf, I love the truth; I ſeek, yet cannot find it; let any one ſhow it me and I will readily embrace it: why doth it hide its charms from an heart formed to adore them?

"I have frequently experienced at times much greater evils; and yet no part of my life was ever ſo conſtantly diſagreeable to me as that interval of ſcruples and anxiety. Running perpetually from one doubt and uncertainty to another, all that I could deduce from my long and painful meditations was incertitude, obſcurity, and contradiction; as well with regard to my exiſtence as my duty.

"I cannot comprehend how any man can be ſincerely a ſceptick, on principle. Such philoſophers either do not exiſt, or they are certainly the moſt miſerable of men. To be in doubt, about things which it is important for us to know, is a ſituation too perplexing for the human mind; it cannot long ſupport ſuch incertitude; but will, in ſpite of itſelf, determine one way or other, rather deceiving itſelf than content to believe nothing of the matter.

"What added further to my perplexity was, that, being educated in a church whoſe authority being univerſally deciſive, admits not of the leaſt doubt; in rejecting one point, I rejected in a manner all the reſt; and the impoſſibility of admitting ſo many abſurd deciſions, ſet me againſt thoſe which where not ſo. In being

ing told I muſt believe all, I was prevented from believing any thing, and I knew not where to ſtop.

"In this ſituation I conſulted the philoſophers; I turned over their books, and examined their ſeveral opinions; in all which I found them vain, dictatorial, and dogmatical, even in their pretended ſcepticiſm; ignorant of nothing, yet proving nothing; ridiculing one another; and in this laſt particular only, wherein they were all agreed, they ſeemed to be in the right. Affecting to triumph, whenever they attacked their opponents, they wanted every thing to make them capable of a vigorous defenſe. If you examine their reaſons, you will find them calculated only to refute: if you number voices, every one is reduced to his own ſuffrage: they agree in nothing but diſputing: to attend to theſe, therefore, was not the way to remove my uncertainty.

"I conceived that the weakneſs of the human underſtanding was the firſt cauſe of the prodigious variety I found in their ſentiments, and that pride was the ſecond. We have no ſtandard with which to meaſure this immenſe machine; we cannot calculate its various relations; we neither know the firſt cauſe nor the final effects; we are ignorant even of ourſelves; we neither know our own nature nor principle of action; nay, we hardly know whether man be a ſimple or compound being; impenetrable myſteries ſurround us on every ſide; they ex-

tend beyond the region of ſenſe; we imagine ourſelves poſſeſſed of underſtanding to penetrate them, and we have only imagination. Every one ſtrikes out a way of his own acroſs this imaginary world; but no one knows whether it will lead him to the point he aims at. We are yet deſirous to penetrate, to know, every thing. The only thing we know not, is to remain ignorant of what it is impoſſible for us to know. We had much rather determine at random, and believe the thing which is not, than confeſs that none of us is capable of ſeeing the thing that is. Being ourſelves but a ſmall part of that great Whole, whoſe limits ſurpaſs our moſt extenſive views, and concerning which its Creator leaves us to make our idle conjectures, we are vain enough to decide what is that Whole in itſelf, and what we are in relation to it.

"But were the philoſophers even in a ſituation to diſcover the truth which of them would be intereſted in ſo doing? Each of them knows very well that his ſyſtem is no better founded than thoſe of others; he defends it, nevertheleſs, becauſe it is his own. There is not one of them, who, really knowing truth from falſehood, would not prefer the latter, of his own invention, to the former, diſcovered by any body elſe. Where is the philoſopher who would not readily deceive mankind, to increaſe his own reputation? Where is he, who ſecretly propoſes any other object than that of diſtinguiſhing

diſtinguiſhing himſelf from the reſt of mankind? Provided he raiſes himſelf above the vulgar, and carries away the prize of fame from his competitors, what doth he require more? The moſt eſſential point is to think differently from the reſt of the world. Among believers he is an atheiſt, and among atheiſts he affects to be a believer.

"The firſt fruit I gathered from theſe reflexions was to learn to confine my enquiries to thoſe things in which I was immediately intereſted: to remain contented in a profound ignorance of the reſt, and not to trouble myſelf ſo far as even to doubt about what it did not concern me to know.

"I could ſee, further, that inſtead of clearing up any unneceſſary doubts, the philoſophers only contributed to multiply thoſe which moſt tormented me; and reſolved abſolutely none. I therefore applied to another guide, and ſaid to myſelf, let me conſult my innate inſtructor, who will deceive me leſs than I may be deceived by others; or, at leaſt, the errours I fall into will be my own, and I ſhall grow leſs depraved in the purſuit of my own illuſions, than in giving myſelf up to the deceptions of others.

"Taking a retroſpect, then, of the ſeveral opinions, which had ſucceſſively prevailed with me from my infancy, I found that, although none of them were ſo evident as to produce immediate conviction, they had nevertheleſs different degrees of probability, and that my in-

nate ſenſe of truth and falſehood leaned more or leſs to each. On this firſt obſervation, proceeding to compare impartially, and without prejudice, theſe different opinions with each other, I found that the firſt and moſt common was alſo the moſt ſimple and moſt rational; and that it wanted nothing more, to ſecure univerſal ſuffrage, than the circumſtance of having been laſt propoſed. Let us ſuppoſe that all our philoſophers, ancient and modern, had exhauſted all their whimſical ſyſtems of power, chance, fate, neceſſity, atoms, an animated world, ſenſitive matter, materialiſm, and of every other kind; and after them, let us imagine the celebrated Dr. Clarke, enlightening the world by diſplaying the Being of Beings, the ſupreme and ſovereign diſpoſer of all things. With what univerſal admiration, with what unanimous applauſe would not the world receive this new ſyſtem, ſo great, ſo conſolatory, ſo ſublime, ſo proper to elevate the ſoul; to lay the foundations of virtue, and, at the ſame time, ſo ſtriking, ſo enlightened, ſo ſimple, and, as it appears to me, pregnant with leſs incomprehenſibilities and abſurdity than any other ſyſtem whatever! I reflected that unanſwerable objections might be made to all, becauſe the human underſtanding is incapable of reſolving them, no proof therefore could be brought excluſively of any: but what difference is there in proofs! Ought not that ſyſtem then which xplains every thing to be preferred, when attended

attended with no greater difficulties than the reſt?

"The love of truth, therefore, being all my philoſophy, and my method of philoſophiſing the ſimple and eaſy rule of common ſenſe, which diſpenſed with the vain ſubtilty of argumentation, I re-examined, by this rule, all the intereſting knowledge I was poſſeſſed of; reſolved to admit, as evident, every thing to which I could not, in the ſincerity of my heart, refuſe my aſſent; to admit alſo, as true, all that appeared to have a neceſſary connexion with the former, and to leave every thing elſe as uncertain, without rejecting or admitting it; determined not to trouble myſelf about clearing up any point which did not tend to utility in practice.

"But, after all, who am I? What right have I to judge of theſe things? And what is it that determines my concluſions? If, ſubject to the impreſſions I receive, theſe are formed in direct conſequence of thoſe impreſſions, I trouble myſelf to no purpoſe in theſe inveſtigations. It is neceſſary, therefore, to examine myſelf, to know what inſtruments are made uſe of in ſuch reſearches, and how far I may confide in their uſe.

"In the firſt place, I know that I exiſt, and have ſenſes whereby I am affected. This is a truth ſo ſtriking that I am compelled to acquieſce in it. But have I properly a diſtinct ſenſe of my exiſtence, or do I only know it

from my various ſenſations? This is my firſt doubt; which, at preſent, it is impoſſible for me to reſolve: for, being continually affected by ſenſations, either directly from the objects of them or from the memory, how can I tell whether my ſelf-conſciouſneſs be, or be not, ſomething foreign to thoſe ſenſations and independent of them.

"My ſenſations are all internal, as they make me ſenſible of my own exiſtence; but the cauſe of them is external and independent, as they affect me without my conſent, and do not depend on my will, for their production or annihilation. I conceive very clearly, therefore, that the ſenſation which is internal, and its cauſe or object which is external, are not one and the ſame thing.

"Thus I know that I not only exiſt, but that other beings exiſt as well as myſelf; to wit, the objects of my ſenſations; and though theſe objects ſhould be nothing but ideas, it is very certain that theſe ideas are no part of myſelf.

"Now, every thing that I perceive out of myſelf, and which acts on my ſenſes, I call matter; and all thoſe portions of matter which I conceive united in individual beings I call bodies. Thus all the diſputes between the Idealiſts and Materialiſts ſignify nothing to me; their diſtinctions between the appearance and reality of bodies being chimerical.

"Hence I have already acquired as certain knowledge of the exiſtence of the univerſe as of

of my own. I next reflect on the objects of my ſenſations; and, finding in myſelf the faculty of comparing them with each other, I perceive myſelf endowed with an active power with which I was before unacquainted.

"To perceive is only to feel or be ſenſible of things; to compare them is to judge of their exiſtence: to judge of things and to be ſenſible of them are very different. Things preſent themſelves to our ſenſations as ſingle, and detached from each other, ſuch as they barely exiſt in nature: but in our intellectual compariſon of them they are removed, tranſported as it were, from place to place, diſpoſed on and beſide each other, to enable us to pronounce concerning their difference and ſimilitude. The characteriſtick faculty of an intelligent, active being, is, in my opinion, that of giving a ſenſe to the word *exiſt*. In beings merely ſenſitive, I have ſearched in vain to diſcover the like force of intellect; nor can I conceive it to be in their nature. Such paſſive beings perceive every object ſingle or by itſelf; or if two objects preſent themſelves, they are perceived as united into one. Such beings having no power to place one in competition with, beſide, or upon the other, they cannot compare them or judge of their ſeparate exiſtence.

"To ſee two objects at once, is not to ſee their relations to each other, nor to judge of their difference; as to ſee many objects, though diſtinct from one another is not to reckon their

number. I may poſſibly have in my mind the ideas of a great ſtick and a little one, without comparing thoſe ideas together, or judging that one is leſs than the other; as I may look at my hand without counting my fingers*. The comparative ideas of *greater* and *leſs*, as well as numerical ideas of *one*, *two*, &c. are certainly no ſenſations, although the underſtanding produces them only from our ſenſations.

"It has been pretended that ſenſitive beings diſtinguiſh ſenſations one from the other, by the actual difference there is between thoſe ſenſations: this, however, demands an explanation. When ſuch ſenſations are different, a ſenſitive being is ſuppoſed to diſtinguiſh them by their difference; but when they are alike, they can then only diſtinguiſh them becauſe they perceive one without the other: for otherwiſe, how can two objects exactly alike be diſtinguiſhed in a ſimultaneous ſenſation? Such objects muſt neceſſarily be blended together and taken for one and the ſame; particularly according to that ſyſtem of philoſophy, in which it is pretended that the ſenſations repreſentative of extenſion are not extended.

"When two comparative ſenſations are perceived, they make both a joint and ſeparate impreſſion; but their relation to each other is not

* M. de la Condamine tells us of a people, who knew how to reckon only as far as three. Yet theſe people, having hands, muſt neceſſarily have often ſeen their fingers without ever having counted five.

not neceſſarily perceived in conſequence of either. If the judgement we form of this relation were indeed a mere ſenſation, excited by the objects, we ſhould never be deceived in it, for it can never be denied that I truely perceive what I feel.

"How, therefore, can I be deceived in the relation between theſe two ſticks, particularly, if they are not parallel? Why do I ſay, for inſtance, that the little one is a third part as long as the great one, when it is in reality only a fourth? Why is not the image, which is the ſenſation, conformable to its model, which is the object? It is becauſe I am active when I judge, the operation which forms the compariſon is defective, and my underſtanding, which judges of relations, mixes its errors with the truth of thoſe ſenſations which are repreſentative of objects.

"Add to this a reflexion, which, I am certain you will think ſtriking, when you have duely weighed it: this is, that if we were merely paſſive in the uſe of our ſenſes, there would be no communication between them: ſo that it would be impoſſible for us to know, that the body we touched with our hands and the object we ſaw with our eyes were one and the ſame. Either we ſhould not be able to perceive external objects at all, or they would appear to exiſt as five perceptible ſubſtances, of which we ſhould have no method of aſcertaining the identity.

"What-

"Whatever name be given to that power of the mind, which aſſembles and compares my ſenſations; call it attention, meditation, reflexion, or what you pleaſe; certain it is, that it exiſts in me, and not in the objects of thoſe ſenſations: it is I alone who produce it, although it be diſplayed only in conſequence of the impreſſions made on me by thoſe objects. Without being ſo far maſter over myſelf as to perceive or not perceive at pleaſure, I am ſtill more or leſs capable of making an examination into the objects perceived.

"I am not, therefore, a mere ſenſitive and paſſive, but an active and intelligent being; and, whatever philoſophers may pretend, lay claim to the honour of thinking. I know only that truth depends on the exiſtence of things, and not on my underſtanding, which judges of them; and that the leſs ſuch judgement depends on me, the nearer I am certain of approaching the truth. Hence my rule, of confiding more on ſentiment than reaſon, is confirmed by reaſon itſelf.

"Being thus far aſſured of my own nature and capacity, I begin to conſider the objects about me; regarding myſelf, with a kind of ſhuddering, as a creature thrown on the wide world of the univerſe, and as it were loſt in an infinite variety of other beings, without knowing any thing of what they are, either among themſelves or with regard to me.

"Every

"Every thing that is perceptible to my ſenſes is matter, and I deduce all the eſſential properties of matter from thoſe ſenſible qualities, which occaſion its being perceptible, and are inſeparable from it. I ſee it ſometimes in motion and at other times at reſt*; hence I infer that neither motion nor reſt are eſſential to it; but motion, being an action, is clearly the effect of a cauſe, of which reſt is only the abſence. When nothing acts on matter, therefore, it does not move; and for that very reaſon, that it is equally indifferent to motion and reſt; its natural ſtate is to be at reſt.

"Again, I perceive in bodies two kinds of motion; that is, a mechanical or communicated motion, and a ſpontaneous or voluntary one. In the firſt, the moving cauſe is out of the body moved; and in the laſt exiſts within it. I ſhall not hence conclude, however, that the motion of a watch, for example, is ſpontaneous; for, if nothing ſhould act upon it but the ſpring, that ſpring would not wind itſelf up again when once down. For the ſame reaſon, alſo, I ſhould as little accede to the ſpontaneous motion

* This reſt may be ſaid to be only relative; but as we perceive degrees in motion, we can very clearly conceive one of the two extremes which is reſt; and this we conceive ſo diſtinctly, that we are even induced to take that for abſolute reſt which is only relative. Now motion cannot be eſſential to matter, if matter can be conceived to exiſt at reſt.

motion of fluids, nor even to fire itſelf, the cauſe of their fluidity*.

"You will aſk me, if the motions of animals are ſpontaneous? I will freely anſwer, I cannot poſitively tell, but analogy ſpeaks in the affirmative. You may aſk me further, how I know there is any ſuch thing as ſpontaneous motion? I anſwer, very well, becauſe I feel it. I *will* to move my arm, and accordingly it moves, without the intervention of any other immediate cauſe. It is in vain to endeavour to reaſon me out of this ſentiment; it is more powerful than any rational evidence: you might as well attempt to convince me that I do not exiſt.

"If the actions of men are not ſpontaneous, and there be no ſuch ſpontaneous action in what paſſes on earth, we are only the more embarraſſed to conceive what is the firſt cauſe of all motion. For my part, I am ſo fully perſuaded, that the natural ſtate of matter is a ſtate of reſt, and that it has in itſelf no principle of activity, that whenever I ſee a body in motion, I inſtantly conclude either that it is an animated body, or that its motion is communicated to it. My underſtanding will by no means acquieſce in the notion that unorganized matter can move of itſelf, or be productive of any kind of action.

"The

* The chemiſts conceive the element of fire to be diffuſed, and ſtagnant, in thoſe mixed bodies of which it makes a part, till ſome external cauſe ſets it in motion, and changes it into palpable fire.

"The viſible univerſe, however, is compoſed of inanimate matter*, which appears to have nothing in its compoſition of organization, or that ſenſation which is common to the parts of an animated body: as it is certain that we ourſelves, being parts thereof, do not perceive our exiſtence in the whole. The univerſe alſo is in motion; and its movements being all regular, uniform, and ſubjected to conſtant laws, nothing appears therein ſimilar to that liberty which is remarkable in the ſpontaneous motion of men and animals. The world, therefore, is not an huge ſelf-moving animal, but receives its motions from ſome foreign cauſe, which we do not perceive: but I am ſo ſtrongly perſuaded within myſelf of the exiſtence of this cauſe, that it is impoſſible for me to obſerve the apparent diurnal revolution of the ſun, without conceiving that ſome force muſt urge it forward; or, if it is the earth itſelf that turns, I cannot but conceive that ſome hand muſt turn it.

"If it be neceſſary to admit general laws, that have no apparent relation to matter, from what fixed point muſt that enquiry ſet out? Thoſe laws, being nothing real, or ſubſtantial, have ſome prior foundation equally unknown and occult.

* I have made the ſtrongeſt efforts I am able, to conceive the exiſtence of a living molecule, or primary element, but in vain. The idea of matter, perceiving without organs of perception, appears to me contradictory and unintelligible. To reject or adopt this notion, it is neceſſary we ſhould firſt comprehend it; and I muſt confeſs I am not ſo happy.

occult. Experience and obſervation have taught us the laws of motion; theſe laws, however, determine effects only without diſplaying their cauſes; and, therefore, are not ſufficient to explain the ſyſtem of the univerſe. Deſcartes could form a model of the heavens and the earth with dice; but he could not give their motions to thoſe dice, nor bring into play his centrifugal force without the aſſiſtance of a rotatory motion. Newton diſcovered the law of attraction; but attraction alone would ſoon have reduced the univerſe into one ſolid maſs: to this law, therefore, he found it neceſſary to add a projectile force, in order to account for the revolution of the heavenly bodies. Could Deſcartes tell us by what phyſical law his vortices were put and kept in motion? Could Newton produce the hand that firſt impelled the planets in the tangent of their reſpective orbits?

"The firſt cauſes of motion do not exiſt in matter; bodies receive from and communicate motion to each other, but they cannot originally produce it. The more I obſerve the action and re-action of the powers of nature acting on each other, the more I am convinced that they are merely effects, and that we muſt ever recur to ſome volition as the firſt cauſe; for to ſuppoſe there is a progreſſion of cauſes to infinity, is to ſuppoſe there is no firſt cauſe at all. In a word, every motion, that is not produced by ſome other, muſt be the effect of a ſpontaneous, voluntary act: inanimate bodies have

no

no action but motion; and there can be no real action without volition. Such is my first principle. I believe, therefore, that a *Will* gives motion to the universe, and animates all nature. This is my first article of faith.

"In what manner volition is productive of physical and corporeal action, I know not, but I experience within myself that it is productive of it. I *will* to act, and the action immediately succeeds; I *will* to move my body, and my body instantly moves; but, that an inanimate body, lying at rest, should move itself or produce motion is incomprehensible and unprecedented. The *Will* also is known by its effects and not by its essence. I know it as the cause of motion; but, to conceive matter producing motion, would be evidently to conceive an effect without a cause, or rather not to conceive any thing at all.

"It is no more possible for me to conceive how the will moves the body, than how the sensations affect the soul. I even know not why one of these mysteries ever appeared more explicable than the other. For my own part, whether at the time I am active or passive, the means of union between the two substances appear to me absolutely incomprehensible. Is it not strange that the philosophers have thrown off this incomprehensibility, merely to confound the two substances together, as if operations so different could be better explained as the effects of one subject than of two.

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"The principle which I have here laid down, is undoubtedly ſomething obſcure; it is however intelligible, and contains nothing repugnant to reaſon or obſervation: can we ſay as much of the doctrines of materialiſm? It is very certain, that, if motion be eſſential to matter, it would be inſeparable from it; it would be always the ſame in every portion of it, incommunicable, and incapable of increaſe or diminution; it would be impoſſible for us even to conceive matter at reſt. Again, when I am told that motion is not indeed eſſential to matter, but neceſſary to its exiſtence, I ſee through the attempt to impoſe on me, by a form of words, which it would be more eaſy to refute, if more intelligible. For, whether the motion of matter ariſes from itſelf, and is therefore eſſential to it, or whether it is derived from ſome external cauſe, it is no further neceſſary to it than as the moving cauſe acting thereon: ſo that we ſtill remain under the firſt difficulty.

"General and abſtract ideas form the ſource of our greateſt errours. The jargon of metaphyſicks never diſcovered one truth; but it has filled philoſophy with abſurdities, of which we are aſhamed as ſoon as they are ſtripped of their pompous expreſſions. Tell me truely, my friend, if, when you are told of a blind, unintelligent power being diffuſed throughout all nature, any preciſe idea is conveyed to your underſtanding? It is imagined that ſomething is meant by thoſe vague terms, Univerſal force and Neceſſary motion;

motion; and yet they convey no meaning. The idea of motion is nothing more than the idea of paſſing from one place to another, nor can there be any motion without ſome particular direction; for no individual being can move ſeveral ways at once. In what manner, then, is it, that matter neceſſarily moves? Has all the matter of which bodies are compoſed, a general and uniform motion, or has each atom a particular motion of its own? If we give into the firſt notion, the whole univerſe will appear to be one ſolid and indiviſible maſs; and according to the ſecond, it ſhould conſtitute a diffuſed and incoherent fluid, without a poſſibility that two atoms ever could be united. What can be the direction of this motion common to all matter? Is it in a right line upwards or downwards, to the right or to the left? Again, if every particle of matter has its particular direction, what can be the cauſe of all thoſe directions and their variations? If every atom or particle of matter revolved only on its axis, none of them would change their place, and there would be no motion communicated; and even in this caſe it is neceſſary that ſuch a revolving motion ſhould be carried on one way. To aſcribe to matter motion in the abſtract, is to make uſe of terms without a meaning; and in giving it any determinate motion, we muſt of neceſſity ſuppoſe the cauſe that determines it. The more I multiply particular forces, the more new cauſes have I to explain, without

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ever finding one common agent that directs them. So far from being able to conceive any regularity or order in the fortuitous concourſe of elements, I cannot even conceive the nature of their concurrence; and an univerſal chaos is more inconceivable than univerſal harmony. I eaſily comprehend that the mechaniſm of the world cannot be perfectly known to the human underſtanding; but, whenever men undertake to explain it, they ought at leaſt to ſpeak in ſuch a manner that others may underſtand them.

"If from matter being put in motion I diſcover the exiſtence of a *Will*, as the firſt active cauſe, this matter being ſubjected to certain regular laws of motion, diſplay alſo intelligence: This is my ſecond article of faith. To act, to compare, to prefer, are the operations of an active, thinking being; ſuch a being, therefore, exiſts. Do you proceed to aſk me, where I diſcover its exiſtence? I anſwer, not only in the revolutions of the celeſtial bodies; not only in myſelf, but in the flocks that feed on the plain, in the birds that fly in the air, in the ſtone that falls to the ground, and in the leaf that trembles in the wind.

"I am enabled to judge of the phyſical order of things, although ignorant of their final cauſe; becauſe, to be able to form ſuch a judgement, it is ſufficient for me to compare the ſeveral parts of the viſible univerſe with each other, to ſtudy their mutual concurrence, their reciprocal relations, and to obſerve the general reſult of the whole.

whole. I am ignorant why the univerſe exiſts, but I am enabled nevertheleſs to ſee how it is modified; I cannot fail to perceive that intimate connexion, by which the ſeveral beings it is compoſed of afford each other mutual aſſiſtance. I reſemble, in this reſpect, a man who ſees the inſide of a watch for the firſt time, and is captivated with the beauty of the work, although ignorant of its uſe. I know not, he may ſay, what this machine is good for, but I ſee that each part is made to fit ſome other; I admire the artiſt for every part of his performance, and am certain that all theſe wheels act thus in concert to ſome common end which it is impoſſible for me to ſee.

"But let us compare the partial and particular ends, the means whereby they are effected, and their conſtant relations of every kind; then let us appeal to our innate ſenſe of conviction; what man in his ſenſes can refuſe to acquieſce in ſuch teſtimony? To what unprejudiced view does not the viſible arrangement of the univerſe diſplay the ſupreme intelligence of its authour? How much ſophiſtry does it not require, to diſavow the harmony of created beings, and that admirable order in which all the parts of the ſyſtem concur to the preſervation of each other? You may talk to me as much as you pleaſe, of combinations and chances; what end will it anſwer to reduce me to ſilence, if you cannot perſuade me into the truth of what you advance? and how will you diveſt me of that

involuntary ſentiment, which continually contradicts you? If organiſed bodies are fortuitouſly combined in a thouſand ways, before they aſſume ſettled and conſtant forms; if at firſt they are formed ſtomachs without mouths, feet without heads, hands without arms, and imperfect organs of every kind, which have periſhed for want of the neceſſary faculties of ſelf-preſervation; how comes it that none of theſe imperfect eſſays have engaged our attention? Why hath nature, at length, confined herſelf to laws to which ſhe was not at firſt ſubjected? I confeſs that I ought not to be ſurpriſed that any poſſible thing ſhould happen, when the rarity of the event is compenſated by the great odds that it did not happen. And yet if any one was to tell me that a number of Printers types, jumbled promiſcuouſly together, had diſpoſed themſelves in the order of the letters compoſing the Æneid, I certainly ſhould not deign to take one ſtep to verify or diſprove ſuch a ſtory. It may be ſaid, I forget the number of chances; but, pray how many muſt I ſuppoſe to render ſuch a combination in any degree probable? I, who ſee only the one, muſt conclude that there is an infinite number againſt it, and that it is not the effect of chance. Add to this that the product of theſe combinations muſt be always of the ſame nature with the combined elements; hence life and organization never can reſult from a blind concourſe of atoms, nor will the chemiſt, with all his art in compounds,

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even find ſenſation and thought at the bottom of his crucible*.

" I have been frequently ſurpriſed, and ſometimes ſcandalized, in the reading of Nieuwentheit. What a preſumption was it to ſit down to make a book of thoſe wonders of nature that diſplay the wiſdom of their authour? Had his book been as big as the whole world, he would not have exhauſted his ſubject; and no ſooner do we enter into the minutiæ of things than the greateſt wonder of all eſcapes us; that is, the harmony and connexion of the whole. The generation of living and organiſed bodies alone baffles all the efforts of the human underſtanding. That inſurmountable barrier which nature hath placed between the various ſpecies of animals, that they might not be confounded with each other, makes her intentions ſufficiently evident. Not contented only to eſtabliſh order, ſhe had taken effectual methods to prevent its being diſturbed.

* It would be incredible, if we had not proof of it, that human extravagance could be carried to ſuch a pitch. *Amatus Luſitanus* aſſures us, that he has ſeen in a Phial an Homuncule, about an inch long, which *Julius Camillus*, like another *Prometheus* had generated by his ſkill in Alchemy. *Paracelſus*, in his treatiſe *de natura rerum*, gives the proceſs of making theſe Mannikins, and maintains that Pygmies, Fauns, Satyrs, and Nymphs were engendered by Chemiſtry. There wants nothing more, in my opinion, to eſtabliſh the poſſibility of theſe facts, than to prove that the organical materials can reſiſt fire, and that the component moleculæ may preſerve themſelves alive in the intenſe heat of a reverberatory furnace.

"There is not a being in the univerſe which may not, in ſome reſpect, be regarded as the common centre of all others, which are ranged around it in ſuch a manner that they ſerve reciprocally as cauſe and effect to one another. The imagination is loſt and the underſtanding confounded in ſuch an infinite diverſity of relations of which, however, not one of them is either loſt or confounded in the crowd. How abſurd the ſuppoſition, to deduce this wonderful harmony from the blind mechaniſm of a fortuitous jumble of atoms! Thoſe who deny the unity of deſign, ſo manifeſt in the relation of all the parts of this grand ſyſtem, may endeavour, as much as they will, to conceal their abſurdities with abſtract ideas, co-ordinations, general principles, and emblematical terms; whatever they may advance, it is impoſſible for me to conceive that a ſyſtem of beings can be ſo duly regulated, without the exiſtence of ſome intelligent cauſe which effects ſuch regulation. It is not in my power to believe that paſſive inanimate matter could ever have produced living and ſenſible creatures; that a blind fatality ſhould be productive of intelligent beings; or, that a cauſe, incapable itſelf of thinking, ſhould produce the faculty of thinking in its effect.

"I believe therefore, that the world is governed by a wiſe and powerful Will. I ſee it, or rather I feel it; and this is of importance for me to know: but is the world eternal or is it created? Are things derived from one ſelf-exiſtent prin-

ciple? or are there two, or more; and what is their eſſence? Of all this I know nothing, nor do I ſee that it is of any conſequence I ſhould. In proportion as ſuch knowledge may become intereſting, I will endeavour to acquire it: but, further than this, I give up all ſuch idle diſquiſitions, which ſerve only to make me diſcontented with myſelf, are uſeleſs in practice, and above my underſtanding.

"You will remember, however, that I am not dictating my ſentiments to you; but only diſplaying what they are. Whether matter be eternal or only created, whether it have a paſſive principle or not, certain it is that the whole univerſe is one deſign, and ſufficiently diſplays one intelligent agent: for I ſee no part of this ſyſtem that is not under regulation, or that does not concur to one and the ſame end; viz. that of preſerving the preſent and eſtabliſhed order of things. That Being, whoſe will is his deed, whoſe principle of action is in himſelf, that Being, in a word, whatever it be, that gives motion to all the parts of the univerſe and governs all things, I call GOD.

"To this term I annex the ideas of intelligence, power, and will, which I have collected from the order of things; and to theſe I add that of goodneſs, which is a neceſſary conſequence of their union: but I am not at all the wiſer concerning the eſſence of the Being to which I give theſe attributes: he remains at an equal diſtance from my ſenſes and my underſtanding:

ſtanding: the more I think of him, the more I am confounded; I know of a certainty that he exiſts, and that his exiſtence is independent of any of his creatures: I know alſo that my exiſtence is dependent on his, and that every thing I know is in the ſame ſituation with myſelf. I perceive the deity in all his works, I feel him within me, and behold him in every object around me: but, I no ſooner endeavour to contemplate what he is in himſelf; I no ſooner enquire where he is, and what is his ſubſtance, than he eludes the ſtrongeſt efforts of my imagination; and my bewildered underſtanding is convinced of its own weakneſs.

"For this reaſon I ſhall never take upon me to argue, about the nature of God, further than I am obliged to it by the relation he appears to ſtand in to myſelf. There is ſo great a temerity in ſuch diſquiſitions, that a wiſe man will never enter on them without trembling and being fully aſſured of his incapacity to proceed far on ſo ſublime a ſubject: for it is leſs injurious to the deity to entertain no ideas of him at all, than to harbour thoſe which are depreciating and unjuſt.

"After having diſcovered thoſe of his attributes, by which I am convinced of his exiſtence, I return to myſelf and conſider the place I occupy in that order of things, which is directed by him and ſubjected to my examination. Here I find my ſpecies ſtand inconteſtibly in the firſt rank; as man, by virtue of his will and the inſtruments

ſtruments he is poſſeſſed of to put it in execution, has a greater power over the bodies by which he is ſurrounded, than they, by mere phyſical impulſe, have over him: by virtue of his intelligence alſo I find he is the only created being here below that can take a general ſurvey of the whole ſyſtem. Is there one among them except man, who knows how to obſerve all others? to weigh, to calculate, to foreſee their motions, their effects, and to join, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, the ſentiment of a general exiſtence to that of the individual? What is there ſo very ridiculous in ſuppoſing every thing made for man, when he is the only created being who knows how to conſider the relation in which all things ſtand to himſelf.

"It is then true that man is lord of the creation, that he is, at leaſt, ſovereign over the habitable earth; for it is certain that he not only ſubdues all other animals, and even diſpoſes of the elements at his pleaſure by his induſtry; but he alone of all other terreſtrial beings knows how to ſubject the earth to his convenience, and even to appropriate to his uſe, by contemplation, the very ſtars and planets he cannot approach. Let any one produce me an animal of another ſpecies, who knows how to make uſe of fire, or hath faculties to admire the ſun. What! am I able to obſerve, to know other beings and their relations; am I capable of diſcovering what is order, beauty, virtue, of contemplating the univerſe, of elevating my

ideas to the hand which governs the whole; am I capable of loving what is good, and doing it, and ſhall I compare myſelf to the brutes? Abject ſoul! it is your gloomy philoſophy alone that renders you at all like them. Or, rather, it is in vain you would debaſe yourſelf; your own genius riſes up againſt your principles; your benevolent heart gives the lie to your abſurd doctrines, and even the abuſe of your faculties demonſtrates their excellence in ſpite of yourſelf.

"For my own part, who have no ſyſtem to maintain, who am only a ſimple, honeſt man, attached to no party, unambitious of being the founder of any ſect, and contented with the ſituation in which God hath placed me; I ſee nothing in the world, except the deity, better than my own ſpecies; and were I left to chooſe my place in the order of created beings, I ſee none that I could prefer to that of man.

"This reflexion, however, is leſs vain than affecting; for my ſtate is not the effect of choice, and could not be due to the merit of a being that did not before exiſt. Can I behold myſelf, nevertheleſs thus diſtinguiſhed, without thinking myſelf happy in occupying ſo honourable a poſt; or without bleſſing the hand that placed me here? From the firſt view I thus took of myſelf, my heart began to glow with a ſenſe of gratitude towards the authour of our being; and hence aroſe my firſt idea of the worſhip due to a beneficent deity. I adore the ſupreme power,

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and melt into tenderneſs at his goodneſs. I have no need to be taught artificial forms of worſhip; the dictates of nature are ſufficient. Is it not a natural conſequence of ſelf-love, to honour thoſe who protect us, and to love ſuch as do us good?

"But when I come afterwards to take a view of the particular rank and relation in which I ſtand, as an individual, among the fellow-creatures of my ſpecies; to conſider the different ranks of ſociety and the perſons by whom they are filled; what a ſcene is preſented me! Where is that order and regularity before obſerved? The ſcenes of nature preſent to my view the moſt perfect harmony and proportion: thoſe of mankind nothing but confuſion and diſorder. The phyſical elements of things act in concert with each other, the moral world alone is a chaos of diſcord. Mere animals are happy, but man, their lord and ſovereign, is miſerable! Where, Supreme Wiſdom! are thy laws? Is it thus, O Providence! thou governeſt the world? What is become of thy power, thou Supreme Beneficence! when I ſee evil prevailing on the earth?

"Would you believe, my good friend, that, from ſuch gloomy reflexions and apparent contradictions, I ſhould form to myſelf more ſublime ideas of the ſoul, than ever reſulted from my former reſearches? In meditating on the nature of man, I conceived that I diſcovered two diſtinct principles; the one raiſing him to the ſtudy of eternal truths, the love of juſtice

and moral beauty, bearing him aloft to the regions of the intellectual world, the contemplation of which yields the trueſt delight to the philoſopher; the other debaſing him even below himſelf, ſubjecting him to the ſlavery of ſenſe, the tyranny of the paſſions, and exciting theſe to counteract every noble and generous ſentiment inſpired by the former. When I perceived myſelf hurried away by two ſuch contrary powers, I naturally concluded that man is not one ſimple and individual ſubſtance. I will, and I will not; I perceive myſelf at once free and a ſlave; I ſee what is good, I admire it, and yet I do the evil: I am active when I liſten to my reaſon, and paſſive when hurried away by my paſſions; while my greateſt uneaſineſs is, to find, when fallen under temptations, that I had the power of reſiſting them.

"Attend, young man, with confidence, to what I ſay, you will find I ſhall never deceive you. If conſcience be the offspring of our prejudices, I am doubtleſs in the wrong, and moral virtue is not to be demonſtrated; but, if ſelf-love, which makes us prefer ourſelves to every thing elſe, be natural to man, and if nevertheleſs, an innate ſenſe of juſtice be found in his heart; let thoſe, who imagine him to be a ſimple uncompounded being reconcile theſe contradictions, and I will give up my opinion, and acknowledge him to be one ſubſtance.

"You will pleaſe to obſerve that, by the word ſubſtance, I here mean, in general, a being,

ing, poſſeſſed of ſome primitive quality, abſtracted from all particular or ſecondary modifications. Now, if all known primitive qualities may be united in one and the ſame being, we have no need to admit of more than one ſubſtance; but if ſome of theſe qualities are incompatible with, and neceſſarily excluſive of each other, we muſt admit of the exiſtence of as many different ſubſtances as there are ſuch incompatible qualities. You will do well to reflect on this ſubject; for my part, notwithſtanding what Mr. Locke hath ſaid on this head, I need only to know that matter is extended and diviſible, to be aſſured that it cannot think; and when a philoſopher comes and tells me that trees and rocks have thought and perception*, he may

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* It ſeems to me that, ſo far from attributing thought to ſtocks and ſtones, our modern philoſophers have diſcovered that even men are incapable of thinking. They acknowledge none but merely ſenſitive beings in nature; and all the difference they admit between a man and a ſtone is, that the former is a ſenſitive being poſſeſſed of ſenſations, and the latter a ſenſitive being that has none. But if it be true that all matter be ſenſible, wherein conſiſts the conſciouſneſs of the individual? Is it in every particle of matter, or only in compound bodies, in heterogeneous mixtures or ſingle elements? Does the individual exiſt alike in fluids and in ſolids? Is it ſaid that nothing but individuals exiſt in nature, I aſk what theſe individuals are? Is that ſtone, for inſtance, an individual or an aggregate of individuals? Is it a ſingle ſenſitive being, or does it contain as many ſeparate ones as it contains grains of ſand? If every elementary atom be a ſenſitive being, how am I to conceive that intimate

embarraſs me, indeed, with the ſubtilty of his arguments; but I cannot help regarding him as a diſingenuous ſophiſt, who had rather attribute ſentiment to ſtocks and ſtones than acknowledge man to have a ſoul.

"Let us ſuppoſe that a man, born deaf, ſhould deny the reality of ſounds, becauſe his ears were never ſenſible of them. To convince him of his errour, I place a violin before his eyes; and, by playing on another, concealed from him, give a vibration to the ſtrings of the former. This motion I tell him is effected by ſound. "Not at all (ſays he) the cauſe of the vibration of the ſtring, is in the ſtring itſelf; it is a common quality in all bodies ſo to vibrate:"

communication, by which one ſo perceives itſelf in another, that their two ſeparate identities are confounded in one? Attraction is one of the laws of nature, the myſtery of which may poſſibly be impenetrable; but we are at leaſt capable of conceiving that gravity, acting in the ratio of the quantity of matter, is neither incompatible with extenſion nor diviſibility. Can you conceive the ſame of thought and ſentiment? The ſenſible parts are extended, but the ſenſitive being is ſingle and indiviſible; it is either entirely itſelf or nothing: the ſenſitive being, therefore, is not a body. I know not how the materialiſts conceive this thing; but it ſeems to me that the ſame difficulties which make them give up their pretenſions to thought, ſhould induce them alſo to give up thoſe of ſentiment: nor do I ſee what ſhould hinder them, after having taken the firſt ſtep, from proceeding to take the latter: what can it coſt them more? As they are ſo well convinced they are incapable of thinking, how dare they ſo confidently affirm they are able to perceive?

brate:"—"Do (I reply) ſhow me then the ſame vibration in other bodies, or at leaſt the cauſe of it in this ſtring?" The deaf man will again reply, in his turn, "I cannot; but wherefore muſt I, becauſe I do not conceive how this ſtring vibrates, attribute the cauſe to your pretended ſounds, of which I cannot entertain the leaſt idea. This would be to attempt an explanation of one obſcurity by another ſtill greater. Either make your ſounds perceptible to me, or I ſhall continue to deny their exiſtence."

"The more I reflect on our capacity of thinking, and the nature of the human underſtanding, the greater is the reſemblance I find between the arguments of our materialiſts and that of ſuch a deaf man. They are, in effect, equally deaf to that internal voice, which nevertheleſs, calls to them ſo loud and emphatically. A mere machine is evidently incapable of thinking, it has neither motion nor figure productive of reflexion: whereas in man there exiſts ſomething perpetually prone to expand, and to burſt the fetters by which it is confined. Space itſelf affords not bounds to the human mind: the whole univerſe is not extenſive enough for him; his ſentiments, his deſires, his anxieties, and even his pride, take riſe from a principle, different from that body within which he perceives himſelf confined.

"No material being can be ſelf-active, and I perceive that I am ſo. It is in vain to diſpute

with me ſo clear a point; my own ſentiment carries with it a ſtronger conviction than any reaſon which can ever be brought againſt it. I have a body, on which other bodies act; and which acts reciprocally on them. This reciprocal action is indubitable; but my will is independent of my ſenſes. I can either conſent to, or reſiſt their impreſſions; I am either vanquiſhed or victor, and perceive clearly within myſelf when I act according to my will, and when I ſubmit to be governed by my paſſions. I have always the power to will, though not the force to execute it. When I give myſelf up to any temptation, I act from the impulſe of external objects. When I reproach myſelf for my weakneſs in ſo doing, I liſten only to the dictates of my will: I am a ſlave in my vices, and free in my repentance; the ſentiment of my liberty is effaced only by my depravation, and when I prevent the voice of the ſoul from being heard in oppoſition to the laws of the body.

"All the knowledge I have of volition, is deduced from a ſenſe of my own; and the underſtanding is known no better. When I am aſked what is the cauſe that determines my will, I aſk, in my turn, what is the cauſe that determines my judgement? for it is clear that theſe two cauſes make but one; and, if we conceive that man is active in forming his judgement of things, that his underſtanding is only a power of comparing and judging, we ſhall ſee that his

liberty is only a ſimilar power or one derived from this: he chooſes the good as he judges of the true, and for the ſame reaſon as he deduces a falſe judgement, he makes a bad choice. What then is the cauſe that determines his will? It is his judgement. And what is the cauſe that determines his judgement? It is his intelligent faculty, his power of judging; the determining cauſe lies in himſelf. If we go beyond this point, I know nothing of the matter.

"Not that I can ſuppoſe myſelf at liberty, not to will my own good, or to will my own evil: but my liberty conſiſts in this very circumſtance, that I am incapable to will any thing but what is uſeful to me, or at leaſt what appears ſo, without any foreign object interfering in my determination. Does it follow from hence that I am not my own maſter, becauſe I am incapable of aſſuming another being, or of diveſting myſelf of what is eſſential to my exiſtence?

"The principle of all action lies in the will of a free being; we can go no farther in ſearch of its ſource. It is not the word liberty that has no ſignification; it is that of neceſſity. To ſuppoſe any act or effect, which is not derived from an active principle, is indeed to ſuppoſe effects without a cauſe. Either there is no firſt impulſe, or every firſt impulſe can have no prior cauſe; nor can there be any ſuch thing as will without liberty. Man is, therefore, a free agent, and as ſuch animated by an immaterial ſubſtance;

ſubſtance; this is my third article of faith. From theſe three firſt you may eaſily deduce all the reſt, without my continuing to number them.

"If man be an active and free being, he acts of himſelf; none of his ſpontaneous actions, therefore, enter into the general ſyſtem of Providence, nor can be imputed to it. Providence doth not contrive the evil, which is the conſequence of man's abuſing the liberty his Creator gave him; it only doth not prevent it, either becauſe the evil, which ſo impotent a being is capable of doing, is beneath its notice, or becauſe it cannot prevent it without laying a reſtraint upon his liberty, and cauſing a greater evil by debaſing his nature. Providence hath left man at liberty, not that he ſhould do evil, but good, by choice. It hath capacitated him to make ſuch choice, in making a proper uſe of the faculties it hath beſtowed on him: his powers, however, are at the ſame time ſo limited and confined, that the abuſe he makes of his liberty is not of importance enough to diſturb the general order of the univerſe. The evil done by man falls upon his own head, without making any change in the ſyſtem of the world, without hindering the human ſpecies from being preſerved in ſpite of themſelves. To complain, therefore, that God doth not prevent man from doing evil is, in fact, to complain that he hath given a ſuperiour excellence to human nature, that he hath ennobled our actions by annexing

o them the merit of virtue. The higheſt enoyment is that of being contented with ourſelves, it is in order to deſerve this contentment hat we are placed here on earth and endowed vith liberty; that we are tempted by our paſions, and reſtrained by conſcience. What ould Omnipotence itſelf do more in our favour? Could it have eſtabliſhed a contradiction in our nature, or have allotted a reward for well-doing, o a being incapable of doing ill? Is it neceſary, in order to prevent man from being wicked, o reduce all his faculties to a ſimple inſtinct, nd make him a mere brute? No, never can I reproach the Deity for having given me a ſoul, made in his own image, that I might be free, good, and happy like himſelf.

"It is the abuſe of our faculties which makes us wicked and miſerable. Our cares, our anxieties, our griefs, are all owing to ourſelves. Moral evil is inconteſtably our own work, and phyſical evil would in fact be nothing, did not our vices render us ſenſible of it. Is it not for our preſervation that nature makes us ſenſible of our wants? Is not pain of body an indication that the machine is out of order, and a caution for us to provide a remedy? And as to death—do not the wicked render both our lives and their own miſerable? Who is there deſirous of living here for ever? Death is a remedy for all the evils we inflict on ourſelves; nature will not let us ſuffer perpetually. To how few evils are men ſubject, who live in primeval ſimplicity! they

they hardly know any diſeaſe, and are irritated by ſcarcely any paſſions: they neither foreſee death, nor ſuffer by the apprehenſions of it; when it approaches, their miſeries render it deſireable, and it is to them no evil. If we could be contented with being what we are, we ſhould have no inducement to lament our fate; but we inflict on ourſelves a thouſand real evils in ſeeking after an imaginary happineſs. Thoſe who are impatient under trifling inconveniencies, muſt expect to ſuffer much greater. In our endeavours to re-eſtabliſh by medicines a conſtitution impaired by irregularities, we always add to the evil we feel, the greater one which we fear; our apprehenſions of death anticipate its horrours, and haſten its approach. The faſter we endeavour to fly, the ſwifter it purſues us; thus we are terrified as long as we live, and die murmuring againſt nature, on account of thoſe evils which we bring on ourſelves by doing outrage to her laws.

"Enquire no longer, man, who is the authour of evil: behold him in yourſelf. There exiſts no other evil in nature that what you either do or ſuffer, and you are equally the authour of both. A general evil could exiſt only in diſorder, but, in the ſyſtem of nature, I ſee an eſtabliſhed order which is never diſturbed. Particular evil exiſts only in the ſentiment of the ſuffering being: and this ſentiment is not given to man by nature; but is of his own acquiſition. Pain and ſorrow have but little hold on thoſe, who,

who, unaccuſtomed to reflexion, have neither memory nor foreſight. Take away our fatal improvements, take away our errours and our vices, take away, in ſhort, every thing that is the work of man, and all the reſt is good.

"Where every thing is good, nothing can be unjuſt, juſtice being inſeparable from goodneſs. Now goodneſs is the neceſſary effect of infinite power, and ſelf-love eſſential to every being conſcious of its exiſtence. An omnipotent Being extends its exiſtence, alſo, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, with that of its creatures. Production and preſervation follow from the conſtant exertion of its power: it does not act on non-exiſtence: God is not the God of the dead, but of the living; he cannot be miſchievous or wicked without hurting himſelf. A being capable of doing every thing cannot *will* to do any thing but what is good. He, who is infinitely good, therefore, becauſe he is infinitely powerful, muſt alſo be ſupremely juſt, otherwiſe he would be inconſiſtent with himſelf: for that love of order which produces it we call goodneſs, and that love of order which preſerves it is called juſtice.

"God, it is ſaid, owes nothing to his creatures; for my part, I believe he owes them every thing he promiſed them when he gave them being. Now what is leſs than to promiſe them a bleſſing, if he gives them an idea of it and has ſo conſtituted them as to feel the want of it? The more I look into myſelf, the more plainly

plainly I read theſe words written in my ſoul; *be juſt and thou wilt be happy.* I ſee not the truth of this, however, in the preſent ſtate of things, wherein the wicked triumph and the juſt are trampled on and oppreſſed. What indignation, hence, ariſes within us, to find our hopes are fruſtrated! Conſcience itſelf riſes up and complains of its Maker, it cries out to him; lamenting, *thou haſt deceived me!*

" I have deceived thee! raſh man! who hath told thee ſo? Is thy ſoul annihilated? Doſt thou ceaſe to exiſt?—Oh, Brutus! ſtain not a life of glory in the end: leave not thy honour and thy hopes with thy body in the fields of Philippi. Wherefore doſt thou ſay, virtue is a ſhadow, when thou art going to enjoy the reward of thine own? Doſt thou imagine thou art going to die? No; thou art going to live, and then I will make good every promiſe I have made thee."

" One would be apt to think, from the murmurs of impatient mortals, that God owed them a recompence before they had deſerved it; and that he was obliged to reward their virtue beforehand. No; let us be firſt virtuous, and reſt aſſured we ſhall ſooner or later be happy. Let us not require the prize before we have got the victory, nor demand the price of our labour before the work be finiſhed. It is not in the liſts, ſays Plutarch, that the victors at our games are crowned, but after the conteſt is over.

If

" If the ſoul be immaterial, it may ſurvive the body, and if ſo, Providence is juſtified. Had I no other proof of the immateriality of the ſoul, than the oppreſſion of the juſt and the triumph of the wicked in this world, this alone would prevent my having the leaſt doubt of it. So ſhocking a diſcord amidſt the general harmony of things, would make me naturally look out for the cauſe. I ſhould ſay to myſelf, we do not ceaſe to exiſt with this life, every thing reaſſumes its order after death. I ſhould, indeed, be embarraſſed to tell where man was to be found, when all his perceptible properties were deſtroyed. At preſent, however, there appears to me no difficulty in this point, as I acknowledge the exiſtence of two different ſubſtances. It is very plain that during my corporeal life, as I perceive nothing but by means of my ſenſes, whatever is not ſubmitted to their cognizance muſt eſcape me. When the union of the body and the ſoul is broken, I conceive that the one may be diſſolved, and the other preſerved entire. Why ſhould the diſſolution of the one, neceſſarily bring on that of the other? On the contrary, being ſo different in their natures, their ſtate of union is a ſtate of violence, and when it is broken they both return to their natural ſituation: the active and living ſubſtance regains all the force it had employed in giving motion to the paſſive and dead ſubſtance to which it had been united. Alas! my failings make me but too ſenſible that man is but half alive in this

this life, and that the life of the ſoul commences at the death of the body.

"But what is that life? Is the ſoul immortal in its own nature? My limited comprehenſion is incapable of conceiving any thing that is unlimited. Whatever we call infinite is beyond my conception. What can I deny, or affirm? what arguments can I employ on a ſubject I cannot conceive? I believe that the ſoul ſurvives the body ſo long as is neceſſary to juſtify Providence in the good order of things; but who knows that this will be for ever? I can readily conceive how material bodies wear away and are deſtroyed by the ſeparation of their parts, but I cannot conceive a like diſſolution of a thinking being; and hence, as I cannot imagine how it can die, I preſume it cannot die at all. This preſumption, alſo, being conſolatory, and not unreaſonable, why ſhould I be fearful to indulge it?

"I feel that I have a ſoul, I know it both from thought and ſentiment; I know that it exiſts, without knowing its eſſence; I cannot reaſon, therefore, on ideas which I have not. One thing, indeed, I know very well, which is, that the identity of my being can be preſerved only by the memory, and that to be in fact the ſame perſon I muſt remember to have before exiſted. Now I cannot recollect, after my death, what I was during life, without recollecting alſo my perceptions, and conſequently my actions: and I doubt not but this remembrance will one day conſtitute

conſtitute the happineſs of the juſt and the torment of the wicked. Here below, the violence of our paſſions abſorbs the innate ſentiment of right and wrong, and ſtifles remorſe. The mortification and diſgrace alſo, under which virtue labours in the world, prevents our being ſenſible of its charms. But, when, delivered from the deluſions of ſenſe, we ſhall enjoy the contemplation of the Supreme Being, and thoſe eternal truths of which he is the ſource; when the beauty of the natural order of things ſhall ſtrike all the faculties of the ſoul, and when we ſhall be employed ſolely in comparing what we have really done with what we ought to have done, then will the voice of conſcience reaſſume its tone and ſtrength; then will that pure delight, which ariſes from a conſciouſneſs of virtue, and the bitter regret of having debaſed ourſelves by vice, determine the lot which is ſeverally prepared for us. Aſk me not, my good friend, if there may not be ſome other cauſes of future happineſs and miſery. I confeſs I am ignorant; theſe, however, which I conceive, are ſufficient to conſole me under the inconveniencies of this life, and give me hopes of another. I do not pretend to ſay that the virtuous will receive any peculiar rewards; for what other advantage can a Being, excellent in its own nature, expect than to exiſt in a manner agreeable to the excellence of its conſtitution? I dare affirm nevertheleſs that they will be happy: becauſe their Creator, the authour of all juſtice,

tice, having given them ſenſibility, cannot have made them to be miſerable; and, as they have not abuſed their liberty on earth, they have not perverted the deſign of their creation by their own fault: yet, as they have ſuffered evils in this life, they will certainly be indemnified in another. This opinion is not ſo much founded on the merits of a man, as on the notion of that goodneſs which appears to me inſeparable from the divine nature. I only ſuppoſe the order of things ſtrictly maintained, and that the Deity is ever conſiſtent with himſelf.

"It would be to as little purpoſe to aſk me whether the torments of the wicked will be eternal: Of this I am alſo equally ignorant, and have not the vain curioſity to perplex myſelf with ſuch uſeleſs diſquiſitions. What is it to me what becomes of the wicked? I intereſt myſelf very little in their deſtiny. I can never believe, however, that they will be condemned to everlaſting torments.

"If ſupreme juſtice avenges itſelf on the wicked, it avenges itſelf on them here below. It is you and your errours, ye nations! that are its miniſters of vengeance. It employs the evils you bring on each other, to puniſh the crimes for which you deſerve them. It is in the inſatiable hearts of mankind, corroding with envy, avarice, and ambition, that their avenging paſſions puniſh them for their vices, amidſt all the falſe appearances of proſperity. Where is the neceſſity of ſeeking a hell in another life, when it is

to

o be found even in this, in the hearts of the wicked?

"Where our momentary neceſſities or ſenſeleſs deſires have an end, there ought our paſſions and our vices to end alſo. Of what perverſity can pure ſpirits be ſuſceptible? As they ſtand in need of nothing, to what end ſhould they be vicious? If deſtitute of our groſſer ſenſes, all their happineſs conſiſts in the contemplation of things, they cannot be deſirous of any thing but good; and whoever ceaſes to be wicked, is it poſſible he ſhould be eternally miſerable? This is what I am inclined to believe on this head, without giving myſelf the trouble to determine poſitively concerning the matter.—O righteous and merciful Being! whatever be thy decrees, I acknowledge their rectitude; if thou puniſheſt the wicked, my weak reaſon is dumb before thy juſtice. But, if the remorſe of theſe unfortunate wretches is to have an end, if the ſame fate is one day to attend us all, my ſoul exults in thy praiſe. Is not the wicked man, after all, my brother? How often have I been tempted to reſemble him in partaking of his vices. O, may he be delivered from his miſery; may he caſt off, alſo, that malignity which accompanies it; may he be ever happy as myſelf; ſo far from exciting my jealouſy, his happineſs will only add to mine.

"It is thus that contemplating God in his works, and ſtudying him in thoſe attributes which it imports me to know, I learn by degrees

grees to extend that imperfect and confined idea I at firſt formed of the ſupreme Being. But, if this idea becomes thus more grand and noble, it is proportionably leſs adapted to the weakneſs of the human underſtanding. In proportion, as my mind approaches eternal light, its lightneſs dazzles and confounds me; ſo that I am forced to give up all thoſe mean and earthly images which aſſiſt my imagination. God is no longer a corporeal and perceptible Being: the ſupreme Intelligence which governs the world, is no longer the world itſelf: but in vain I endeavour to raiſe my thoughts to a conception of his eſſence. When I reflect that it is he who gives life and activity to that living and active ſubſtance, which moves and governs animated bodies; when I am told that my ſoul is a ſpiritual Being, and that God alſo is a ſpirit, I am incenſed at this debaſement of the divine eſſence, as if God and my ſoul were of the ſame nature, as if God was not the only abſolute, the only truly active Being, perceiving, thinking, and willing of himſelf, from whom his creatures derive thought, activity, will, liberty, and exiſtence. We are free only becauſe it is his will that we ſhould be ſo; his inexplicable ſubſtance being, with reſpect to our ſouls, ſuch as our ſouls are in regard to our bodies. I know nothing of his having created matter, bodies, ſpirits, or the world. The idea of creation confounds me and ſurpaſſes my conception, though I believe as much of it as I am able to conceive: but I know

that he hath formed the univerſe, and all that exiſts in the moſt conſummate order. God is doubtleſs eternal, but I am incapacitated to conceive an idea of eternity. Why then ſhould I amuſe myſelf with words? All that I conceive is, that he exiſted before all things, that he exiſts with them, and will exiſt after them, if they ſhould ever have an end. That a Being, whoſe eſſence is inconceivable, ſhould give exiſtence to other beings, is at beſt obſcure and incomprehenſible to our ideas; but that ſomething and nothing ſhould be reciprocally converted into each other is a palpable contradiction, a moſt manifeſt abſurdity.

"God is intelligent; but in what manner? Man is intelligent by the act of reaſoning, but the ſupreme intelligence lies under no neceſſity to reaſon. He requires neither premiſſes nor conſequences; nor even the ſimple form of a propoſition: his knowledge is purely intuitive; he beholds equally what is and will be; all truths are to him as one idea, as all places are but one point, and all times one moment. Human power acts by the uſe of means, the divine power in and of itſelf. God is powerful becauſe he is willing, his will conſtituting his power. God is good, nothing is more manifeſt than this truth; goodneſs in man, however, conſiſts in a love to his fellow-creatures, and the goodneſs of God in a love of order: for it is on ſuch order that the connexion and preſervation of all things depend. Again, God is juſt; this I am fully

convinced of, as it is the natural conſequence of his goodneſs. The injuſtice of men is their own work, not his; and that moral diſorder, which, in the judgement of ſome philoſophers, makes againſt the ſyſtem of providence, is in mine the ſtrongeſt argument for it. Juſtice in man, indeed, is to render every one his due; but the juſtice of God requires at the hands of every one, an account of the talents with which he has entruſted them.

"In the diſcovery, however, by the force of reaſon, of thoſe divine attributes, of which I have no abſolute idea, I only affirm what I do not clearly comprehend, which is in effect to affirm nothing. I may ſay, it is true that God is this or that; I may be ſenſible of it, and fully convinced within myſelf that he is ſo, I am yet never the better able to conceive how, or in what manner, he ſo is.

"In ſhort, the greater efforts I make to contemplate his infinite eſſence, the leſs I am able to conceive it: But I am certain that he is, and that is ſufficient; the more he ſurpaſſes my conceptions, the more I adore him. I humble myſelf before him, and ſay, 'Being of beings, I am, 'becauſe thou art; to meditate continually on 'thee is to elevate my thoughts to the fountain 'of exiſtence. The moſt meritorious uſe of my 'reaſon is to be annihilated before thee: it is 'the delight of my ſoul, to feel my weak faculties overcome by the ſplendour of thy greatneſs.'

"After

"After having thus deduced, from the impreſſions of perceptible objects, and that innate principle which leads me to judge of natural cauſes from experience, the moſt important truth; it remains for me to enquire what maxims I ought to draw from them, for my conduct in life, what rules I ought to preſcribe to myſelf, in order to fulfil my deſtination on earth, agreeably to the deſign of him who placed me here. To purſue my own method, I deduce not theſe rules from the ſublime principles of philoſophy; but find them written in indelible characters on my heart. I have only to conſult myſelf concerning what I ought to do; all that I feel to be right, is right; whatever I feel to be wrong, is wrong: conſcience is the ableſt of all caſuiſts, and it is only when we are trafficking with her, that we have recourſe to the ſubtilties of logical ratiocination. The chief of our concerns is that of ourſelves; yet how often have we not been told by the monitor within, that to purſue our own intereſt at the expence of others would be to do wrong! we imagine thus, that we are ſometimes obeying the impulſe of nature, and we are all the while reſiſting it: in liſtening to the voice of our ſenſes we turn a deaf ear to the dictates of our hearts, the active Being obeys, the paſſive Being commands. Conſcience is the voice of the ſoul, the paſſions are the voice of the body. Is it ſurpriſing that theſe two voices ſhould ſometimes contradict each other; or can it be doubted,

when they do, which ought to be obeyed? Reaſon deceives us but too often, and has given us a right to diſtruſt her concluſions; but conſcience never deceives us. She is a man's trueſt and ſafeſt guide; conſcience is in the ſoul what inſtinct is in the body*. Whoever puts himſelf

* Modern philoſophy, which affects to admit of nothing but what it can explain, hath nevertheleſs very unadviſedly admitted of that obſcure faculty, called inſtinct, which appears to direct animals to the purpoſes of their being, without any acquiſition of knowledge. Inſtinct, according to one of our greateſt philoſophers, is a habit deſtitute of reflexion, but acquired by reflecting: thus from the manner in which he explains its progreſs, we are led to conclude that children reflect more than grown perſons; a paradox ſingular enough to require ſome examination. Without entering, however, into the diſcuſſion of it at preſent, I would only aſk what name I am to give to that eagerneſs which my dog ſhows to purſue a mole, for inſtance, which he does not eat when he has caught it; to that patience with which he ſtands watching for them whole hours, and to that expertneſs with which he makes them a prey the moment they reach the ſurface of the earth; and that in order only to kill them, without ever having been trained to mole hunting, or having been taught that moles were beneath the ſpot? I would aſk further, as more important, why the firſt time I threaten the ſame dog, he throws himſelf down with his back to the ground and his feet raiſed in a ſuppliant attitude, the moſt proper of all others to excite my compaſſion, an attitude in which he would not long remain, if I were ſo obdurate as to beat him lying in ſuch a poſture? Is it poſſible that a young puppy can have already acquired moral ideas? Can he have any notion of clemency and generoſity? What experience can encourage him to hope he ſhall appeaſe me, by giving himſelf up to my mercy? Almoſt all dogs do

ſelf under the conduct of this guide, purſues the direct path of nature, and need not fear to be miſled. This point is very important (purſued my benefactor, perceiving I was going to interrupt him) permit me to detain you a little longer, in order to clear it up.

"All the morality of our actions lies in the judgement we ourſelves form of them. If virtue be any thing real, it ought to be the ſame in our hearts as in our actions; and one of the firſt rewards of juſtice is to be conſcious of our puting it in practice. If moral goodneſs be agreeable to our nature, a man cannot be found of mind, or perfectly conſtituted, unleſs he be good. On the contrary, if it be not ſo, and man is naturally wicked, he cannot become good without a corruption of his nature; goodneſs being evidently contrary to his conſtitution. Formed for the deſtruction of his fellow-creatures, as the wolf to devour its prey, an humane and compaſſionate man would be as depraved an animal as a meek and lamb-like wolf, while virtue only would leave behind it the ſtings of remorſe.

"Let us examine ourſelves, my young friend, all partiality apart, and ſee which way our in-

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nearly the ſame thing in the ſame circumſtances, nor do I advance any thing here of which every one may not convince himſelf. Let the philoſophers, who reject ſo diſdainfully the term inſtinct, explain this fact merely by the operation of our ſenſes, and the knowledge thereby acquired; let them explain it, I ſay, in a manner ſatisfactory to any perſon of common ſenſe, and I have no more to ſay in favour of inſtinct.

clinations tend. Which is moſt agreeable to us, to contemplate the happineſs or the miſeries of others? Which is moſt pleaſing for us to do, and leaves the moſt agreeable reflexion behind it, an act of benevolence or of miſchief? For whom are we the moſt deeply intereſted at our theatres? Do you take a pleaſure in acts of villainy? or do you ſhed tears at ſeeing the authours of them brought to condign puniſhment? It has been ſaid that every thing is indifferent to us in which we are not intereſted: the contrary, however, is certain, as the ſoothing endearments of friendſhip and humanity conſole us under affliction; and even in our pleaſures we ſhould be too ſolitary, too miſerable, if we had nobody to partake them with us. If there be nothing moral in the heart of man, whence ariſe thoſe tranſports of admiration and eſteem we entertain for heroick actions, and great minds? What has this virtuous enthuſiaſm to do with our private intereſt? Wherefore do I rather wiſh to be an expiring Cato, than a triumphant Cæſar? Deprive our hearts of a natural affection for the ſublime and beautiful, and you deprive us of all the pleaſures of life. The man, whoſe meaner paſſions have ſtifled, in his narrow ſoul, ſuch delightful ſentiments; he, who, by dint of concentrating all his affections within himſelf, hath arrived at the pitch of having no regard for any one elſe, is no longer capable of ſuch tranſports; his frozen heart never flutters with joy; no ſympathetick tenderneſs brings the tears into his

eyes; he is incapable of enjoyment; the unhappy wretch is void of ſenſibility: he is already dead.

"But how great ſoever may be the number of the wicked; there are but few of theſe cadaverous ſouls, but few perſons ſo inſenſible, if their own intereſt be ſet aſide, to what is juſt and good. Iniquity never pleaſes unleſs we profit by it; in every other caſe it is natural for us to deſire the protection of the innocent. Do we ſee, for inſtance, an act of injuſtice or violence committed in the ſtreet, or on the highway; an emotion of reſentment and indignation immediately riſes in the heart, and incites us to ſtand up in defence of the injured or oppreſſed: but a more powerful conſideration reſtrains us, and the laws deprive individuals of the right of taking upon themſelves to avenge inſulted innocence. On the contrary, if we happen to be witneſſes to any act of compaſſion or generoſity with what admiration, with what eſteem are we inſtantly inſpired! Who is there that doth not, on ſuch an occaſion, ſay to himſelf, would I had done as much! It is certainly of very little conſequence to us whether a man was good or bad who lived two thouſand years ago; and yet we are as much affected in this reſpect, by the relations we meet with in ancient hiſtory, as if the tranſactions recorded had happened in our own times. Of what hurt is the wickedneſs of a Catiline to me? Am I afraid of falling a victim to his villainy? Wherefore then, do I look

upon him with the ſame horrour as if he was my cotemporary? We do not hate the wicked only becauſe their vices are hurtful, but alſo becauſe they are wicked. We are not only deſirous of happineſs for ourſelves, but alſo of the happineſs of others; and when that happineſs does not diminiſh our's, it neceſſarily increaſes it. In a word, we cannot help ſympathizing with the unfortunate, and always ſuffer when we are witneſſes to their miſery. The moſt perverſe natures cannot be altogether diveſted of this ſympathy; though we ſee it frequently makes them act in contradiction to themſelves. The robber, who ſtrips the paſſenger on the highway, will frequently diſtribute his ſpoils to cover the nakedneſs of the poor, and the moſt barbarous aſſaſſin may be induced humanely to ſupport a man falling into a fit.

"We hear daily of the cries of remorſe, and the goadings of conſcience for ſecret crimes; and ſee remarkable inſtances of their frequently bringing them to light. Alas! who is a total ſtranger to this importunate voice? We ſpeak of it from experience, and would be glad to ſilence ſo diſagreeable a monitor. But let us be obedient to Nature; we know that her government is very mild and gracious; and that nothing is more agreeable than that teſtimony of a good conſcience, which ever follows our obſervance of her laws. The wicked man is afraid of, and ſhuns himſelf; he turns his eyes on every ſide in ſearch of objects to amuſe him; without

without an opportunity for ſatire and raillery, he would be always ſad: his only pleaſure lies in mockery and inſult. On the contrary, the ſerenity of the juſt is internal, his ſmiles are not thoſe of malignity but of joy: The ſource of them is found in himſelf, and he is as chearful when alone, as in the midſt of an aſſembly: he derives not contentment from thoſe who approach him, but communicates it to them.

"Caſt your eye over the ſeveral nations of the world, take a retroſpective view of their hiſtories. Amidſt all the many inhuman and abſurd forms of worſhip, amidſt all that prodigious diverſity of manners and characters, you will every-where find the ſame ideas of juſtice and honeſty, the ſame notions of good and evil. Ancient paganiſm adopted the moſt abominable deities, which it would have puniſhed on earth as infamous criminals; deities that preſented no other picture of ſupreme happineſs than the commiſſion of crimes and the gratification of their paſſions. But vice, armed even with ſacred authority, deſcended in vain on earth: moral inſtinct influenced the human heart to revolt againſt it. Even in celebrating the debaucheries of Jupiter, the world admired and reſpected the continence of Zenocrates; the chaſte Lucretia adored the impudent Venus; the intrepid Roman ſacrificed to Fear; they invoked the God who diſabled his father, and yet died without murmuring by the hand of their's; the moſt contemptible divinities were adored by the nobleſt of men. The

voice

voice of nature, more powerful than that of the Gods, made itſelf reſpected on earth, and ſeemed to have baniſhed vice to Heaven.

"There evidently exiſts, therefore, in the ſoul of man an innate principle of juſtice and goodneſs; by which, in ſpite of our own maxims, we approve or condemn the actions of ourſelves and others: to this principle it is that I give the appellation of conſcience.

"At this word, however, I hear the clamour of our pretended philoſophers; who all exclaim about the miſtakes of infancy, and the prejudices of education. There is nothing, they ſay, in the human mind but what is inſtilled by experience; nor can we judge of any thing but from the ideas we have acquired. Nay, they go farther, and venture to reject the univerſal ſenſe of all nations; ſeeking ſome obſcure example known only to themſelves, to controvert this ſtriking uniformity in the judgement of mankind: as if all the natural inclinations of man were annihilated by the depravation of one people, and as if when monſters appeared the ſpecies itſelf were extinct. But what end did it ſerve to the ſceptical Montagne, to take ſo much trouble to diſcover, in an obſcure corner of the world, a cuſtom oppoſed to the common notions of juſtice? What end did it anſwer for him to place a confidence in the moſt ſuſpicious travellers, which he refuſed to the moſt celebrated writers? Should a few whimſical and uncertain cuſtoms, founded on local

local motives unknown to us, invalidate a general induction, drawn from the united concurrence of all nations, contradicting each other in every other point, and agreeing only in this? You did [illegible]ue yourself, Montagne, on being ingenuous and ſincere; give us a proof, if it be in the power of a philoſopher, of your frankneſs and veracity: tell me if there be any country upon earth, in which it is deemed a crime to be ſincere, compaſſionate, beneficent, and generous; in which an honeſt man is deſpicable, and knavery held in eſteem?

End of the Second Volume.